Summit 2024

European Values Summit

European Values Center for Security Policy hosted 10th edition of its international conference

The European Values Center for Security Policy proudly hosted the 10th edition of the European Values Summit, an international conference focused on security policy. The summit took place on September 25, 2024, under the auspices of the President of the Czech Republic, H.E. Petr Pavel, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Lipavský and Chief of Czech General Staff Lieutenant-General Karel Řehka.

This year over 100 international participants joined the event to discuss main security challenges arising from hostile influences and strategies how to tackle them.

Divided into four panels, program focused on transatlantic cooperation on security in the Indo-Pacific region, rising assertive behavior of the People’s Republic of China, European economic security, or misuse of lawfare by authoritarian regimes.

The conference started with three keynote addresses. The director of the European Values Center for Security Policy, Jakub Janda, stressed that there are not two separate global theaters—Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific—but rather one global theater in which we all face the same global situation. Zdeněk Beránek, Foreign policy advisor to the President of the Czech Chamber of Deputies, H.E. Markéta Pekarová Adamová, on her behalf addressed the audience with the notion that a rules-based international order is a precondition for the existence of countries like Czechia, but that some actors, including Russia and China, view this system as an obstacle to the growth of their influence. Finally, Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Mr. Fei-fan Lin, spoke about the parallels between Taiwan and Czechia, as well as between East Asia and Europe, including shared values. He concluded by quoting former Czech President Václav Havel: “Hope is not the same thing as optimism, but certainty that something makes sense regardless of how it turns out.”

The thanks goes to our partners, who made this conference possible. Thank you for your trust and support, namely: Robert Tsao, Datenna, the leading global provider of techno-economic intelligence on China, Czech German Fund for the Future (ČNFB), the Representation of the European Commission in Prague, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Embassy of Sweden, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Prague (TECO) and Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD).

LIST OF SPEAKERS

Below, you can read the main takeaways from the four panels and/or browse the picture gallery.

Panel 1

Shared Prosperity and Security —Transatlantic Cooperation on Taiwan

The security and economic interests of Taiwan and its Trans-Atlantic allies are increasingly intertwined. While Taiwan remains committed to safeguarding stability in the Indo-Pacific region, it is pursuing a supply chain diversification strategy to enhance its economic security. Consequently, the island democracy remains a critical trading partner for European and American technological and digital sovereignty a a critical node in the first island chain. European countries increasingly recognize Taiwan as a like-minded partner in its own right. Yet, the balance between engaging Taiwan and maintaining “normalcy” in relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a contentious issue within transatlantic relations due to divergent approaches, experiences, and national interests of actors across Euro-Atlantic theater.

Transatlantic partners struggle to find common ground for bolstering mutual collaboration in countering Chinese threats across several domains, including economic, military, digital, and cyber. Moreover, the importance of empowering civil society organizations to push back against Chinese malign influence on a societal level remains very much neglected. Supporting the non-governmental sector and cultural diplomacy between Taiwan and Transatlantic allies will enhance mutual comprehension and strengthen interpersonal ties between both sides, potentially serve as another deterrent force against PRC’s revisionism and thus contribute to shared prosperity and security between Taiwan and NATO allies.

If the PRC attempted to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force, the geopolitical and economic consequences would be severe, especially for the EU Member States. According to various calculations, a blockade of Taiwan alone would mean a loss of 8% of GDP for the EU annually; the consequences of a full-scale war would be even worse. That is why European states, in particular, need to proactively prepare for such scenarios and enhance their resilience if a conflict breaks out. One of the most feasible aspects of this preparedness may be a greater emphasis on European strategic sovereignty and security emancipation, which would allow the European states to take on more responsibility in defense of Ukraine and thus enable the United States to allocate more resources towards the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, broad diplomatic efforts, particularly within international organizations, and a focus on safeguarding EU economic security through everyday deterrence measures should become an essential aspect of the broad European China strategy, which should effectively counter the PRC’s ongoing salami slice strategy in the region.

Panel 2

Exploring Geopolitical Interdependence between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific Regions: How to Effectively Manage the China Challenge?

The “no-limits” friendship between China and Russia, followed by Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has significantly stressed the interdependence between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters. On one hand, the mutual reinforcement of revisionist powers like Russia, China, and North Korea illustrates this dynamic well. Despite its efforts to position itself as a neutral, peacemaking actor, China has both indirectly and directly aided Russia. For example, Beijing provided Moscow with critical components used to manufacture drones used to attack Ukraine. Russia has also deepened its cooperation with North Korea, as demonstrated by the comprehensive strategic partnership signed in June, covering cooperation in various areas, including security and military affairs.

On the other side, like-minded defenders of the rules-based international order are providing all kinds of aid to Ukraine while strengthening cooperation among themselves. For example, Japan has become one of Kyiv’s most important financial backers. At the same time, South Korea signed a framework agreement with Poland to export arms worth billions of dollars, helping it increase its defense capabilities against a potential Russian threat. A question arises as to whether Western nations would be equally willing to assist East Asia in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, as the risk of China breaking the status quo in the region continues to grow.

There is an unprecedented consensus among liberal democracies that China poses a challenge. Still, there is disagreement over what should be done about it, as different national and security interests of individual countries come into play. The response of the democratic world to a Taiwan Strait contingency would largely depend on the decision of the next U.S. President, whose identity will remain unknown until November. It is clear, for example, that South Korea’s engagement would be limited due to the constant threat from North Korea, which is steadily growing. Asian partners are likewise uncertain about what to expect from Europe, especially following Macron’s statement last year that Europe should not get “caught up in crises that are not ours.”

To counter the growing pressure from revisionist countries, like-minded democracies should stop seeking a universal solution and instead work with the consensus that action is necessary. This includes strengthening deterrence against revisionist powers, building competence in both software (e.g., concepts, strategies, agreements) and hardware (e.g., increasing military interoperability, defense buildup) to address the respective challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters while calling out violations of international law by revisionist states. The battle of narratives will be vital in winning the hearts and minds of the rest of the world, particularly in the Global South.

Panel 3

Economic Zeitenwende? Bolstering Economic Security Amid Geopolitical Tensions

A critical question in the current international economic relations framework still needs to be answered. Is the world witnessing a gradual shift in the global economic order caused by rising geopolitical tensions, particularly concerning China’s (PRC) use of its substantial economic statecraft? Ongoing discussions among expert communities focus broadly on how democratic countries can rebalance their economic security policies amid strategic concerns while avoiding the pitfalls of nationalism, isolationism, and broad state interventions in their national economies.

One major topic in the ongoing debate is the fragmented approach to economic security policies across multiple democratic allies. The European continent still needs a unified approach to tackle inconsistencies in how individual countries address potential economic threats, namely those from the PRC and the Russian Federation. By comparison, despite its ongoing substantial trade with mainland China, Taiwan has already made various strategic moves to reduce its dependencies, especially in the case of sensitive sectors like semiconductor manufacturing. This shift reflects a growing awareness of Chinese misuse of its economic power for political leverage, especially in industries such as electric vehicles or green energy, where vast state subsidies drive overproduction and economic decisions are driven by political leadership demand rather than free market mechanisms.

To a certain extent, Japan has also been proactive in implementing various measures to safeguard its own economic security. Tokyo has already passed legislation to regulate sensitive investments in foreign countries and to protect its critical infrastructure while fostering intelligence-sharing partnerships with like-minded countries, namely with the US. This comprehensive approach aims to counter Chinese economic coercion by diversifying trade and supply chains to mitigate risks.

The European Union has also implemented its own FDI screening mechanism. Still, it faces challenges in maintaining competitive trade relations in Southeast Asia, where China, Japan, and South Korea have established numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The EU’s limited presence in this region could hamper its ability to strengthen economic ties and secure its strategic interests, which are sometimes tricky to operationalize and pursue consistently.

In the case of the Western Balkans, China’s influence, mainly through investments in Serbia, poses additional challenges to the EU’s economic security strategy. The region is geopolitically divided, and some countries have found themselves in problematic financial agreements with the PRC, such as Montenegro’s debt trap crisis linked to Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects.

Overall, coordinated global efforts are needed to address economic security concerns, particularly in the face of China’s growing economic and political influence. Supply chain diversification, more robust intelligence sharing, and strategic partnerships among democratic nations are crucial to navigating this new economic reality.

Panel 4

From Cognitive Warfare to Lawfare: Understanding the Impact of China's "Anti-Secession Law"

As China continues to challenge the current rules-based international order, it implements its three-fold political warfare: psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare (lawfare). The latter refers to the use—or, at times, misuse—of legal tools to realize Beijing’s raison d’État.

Chinese lawfare manifests itself in a variety of ways, which includes shrinking Taiwan’s international space. To this end, the 2005 Anti-Secession Law stipulates that “Taiwan is a part of China,” and its “reunification” with the mainland is considered China’s “internal affair,” which Beijing can pursue through both peaceful and non-peaceful means. This law simultaneously positions China as a lawmaker, judge, and enforcer, establishing a legal basis for a potential military invasion of Taiwan. In 2005, there was very little pushback from the international community, as the law was perceived as largely symbolic. However, this stance has shifted under Xi Jinping (習近平), who is unwilling to tolerate the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Next year will mark the 20th anniversary of this law, and there are growing concerns about what this could mean for stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Anti-Secession Law sets a precedent that could be applied to Taiwan and Hong Kong, Tibet, or East Turkestan.

In 2024, Chinese authorities issued 22 guidelines based on the Anti-Secession Law. These guidelines impose criminal punishments on so-called “diehard ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists,” allowing for trials in absentia and the death penalty. Crimes punishable under these guidelines include promoting Taiwan’s entry into international organizations where statehood is a condition, conducting “external official exchanges,” and “suppressing” parties, groups, and individuals that promote “reunification” or engage in other acts that seek to separate Taiwan from China. The vague wording of the guidelines allows for broad interpretation, thereby strengthening their chilling effect and increasing self-censorship among those they target, mainly Taiwanese senior officials.

Apart from adopting its laws with extraterritorial effects, China has been skillfully gaslighting the international community by distorting the meaning of documents such as the 1971 UN Resolution 2758. According to the resolution, the PRC is “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” China has been misusing the resolution to assert its “One China” policy a block Taiwan’s participation in global organizations, even though the resolution did not explicitly settle the status of Taiwan or declare Taiwan to be part of the PRC. China is employing similar lawfare tactics not only against Taiwan but also against other countries around the world, which is why it is in their interest to pay attention to the Taiwan case.