Photo: via Japan Ministry of Defense Website
What is happening?
What is the broader picture?
Since 2022, the MOD’s foremost priority has been building counterstrike capabilities featuring stand-off missiles and integrated air and missile defense. This year, however, unmanned systems have become the main character of the strategy. Lessons from the Ukrainian front have demonstrated the value of relatively cheap drones capable of destroying much costlier conventional military assets. Japan has therefore allocated ¥277 billion (approximately US$1.75 billion) to unmanned capabilities this fiscal year, which is roughly 2.5 times the previous year’s budget.
This rise in financing is connected to SHIELD (Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense), a coastal defense program approved by Japan’s cabinet in December 2025. The system is a multi-domain architecture designed to network a large number of relatively low-cost aerial, surface, and underwater drones to detect and counter approaching hostile forces. The implementation of SHIELD reflects concerns over increasingly frequent Chinese military activity around Japan and Beijing’s rapidly expanding production of UVs, further widening the military asymmetry between the two countries.
The choice of drone suppliers is also noteworthy. While U.S. companies remain the SDF’s primary foreign suppliers, Japan is increasingly diversifying its procurement network. Australian company DefendTex recently secured a contract for attack drones, while European systems are competing for further orders. At the same time, Tokyo wants to reduce its reliance on imports by supporting domestic tech startups alongside established manufacturers such as Mitsubishi and Kawasaki. International cooperation is another part of this strategy: one example is a partnership between Japan’s Terra Drone and Ukrainian defense firms Amazing Drones and WinnyLab to develop interceptor drones. Their drone models have already been deployed to thwart Russian attacks in Ukraine. Such partnerships reflect Tokyo’s broader effort to build a progressively interconnected defense-industrial networkamong aligned countries.
This points to the second highlight of this year’s white paper: its increasingly global view of security. Deepening ties between authoritarian powers, visible in Sino-Russian military exercises and the deployment of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces, have linked the threats confronting Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo has therefore attempted to bridge the two theaters in order to better coordinate diplomatic, economic and military responses. This approach, initiated under the administration of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, over the past decade has evolved from a collection of individual bilateral partnerships into a broader multilateral network of like-minded countries increasingly sharing responsibility for maintaining the international order.
Why does it matter?
Japan has become a pivotal actor in Indo-Pacific security, making its defense strategy even more consequential for the resilience of the region. Through arms transfers, joint development and deeper interoperability, Tokyo is also strengthening the capabilities of its partners.
As tensions rise at both ends of Eurasia, such cooperation is vital for building convincing deterrence to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo and avoid escalation into a broader conflict. For European states, this makes engagement in the Indo-Pacific not only desirable, but increasingly relevant to their own story.