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What is happening?
Hungary just witnessed a historic parliamentary election ending prime minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule and a system condemned as “electoral autocracy.” His successor, Péter Magyar, is a former party insider who ousted Orbán with nearly 70% of seats, suggesting that his Tisza party is set to command a supermajority in parliament.
Magyar promises to restore the system of checks and balances and to make Hungary a democratic state governed by the rule of law once again. The top priority of Magyar’s administration will be unlocking the €18 billion in the European Union (EU) funds that were frozen due to Orbán’s democratic backsliding, although Brussels is waiting for tangible evidence of reforms before releasing such funds. Magyar’s other key reform priorities center on domestic issues, such as establishing a new constitution that limits prime ministerial terms, setting up an anti-corruption authority, and restoring press independence.
What is the broader picture?
In the past 16 years, Hungary has become the most pro-China EU member state, with collaboration spanning domains from trade, investment, and technology to security matters. In 2024, the two countries signed “All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era” which further strengthened their economic and political ties. In the Indo-Pacific region, the Orbán government explicitly framed Hungary’s foreign policy orientation around “economic neutrality,” presenting Budapest as a bridge between East and West, rather than a participant in the region’s security architecture. Despite Orbán’s personal link to US President Donald Trump and his support for MAGA republicans, it was clear that China-Hungary relations had continuously intensified throughout his tenure.
However, the end of the Orbán era is unlikely to mark a breakneck shift in China-Hungary ties, as Magyar has not mapped out a radical policy reversal on Hungary’s trade relationship with China. Following Magyar’s landslide victory, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson expressed Beijing’s willingness to build on its relationship with the new Hungarian government, prioritizing reciprocal and mutually beneficial engagement. Hungary’s economic dependence on China is not something that can be unwound overnight. A case in point is Hungary’s position as the world’s second-largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment in electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing between 2013 and 2024. This has contributed to a widening trade deficit with China, deepening Hungary’s economic dependence on Beijing. Tisza’s foreign minister-designate, Anita Orbán (no relation), signaled that economic ties with China are crucial, while at the same time emphasizing that Hungary should no longer act as an outlier within the EU,weakening European cohesion to the benefit of Moscow or Beijing. What remains clear is that, in contrast to the outgoing regime’s confrontational posture toward Brussels, Magyar’s foreign policy orientation will align more closely with EU rules. In this regard, Budapest will likely exercise greater caution in how it navigates its ties with Beijing within EU forums.
Why does it matter?
The result of this election is important as it reflects broader strategic choices about Hungary’s geopolitical orientation. Magyar’s victory matters for the unity of the EU, as it clearly demonstrates that there is still room for a center-right politics that is conservative without being illiberal, and pro-European without being politically impotent. As for Hungary’s foreign relations, on the one hand, it is foreseeable that Magyar will adopt a pragmatic approach to maintain economic relations with China. On the other hand, Budapest needs to adapt new diplomatic maneuvers with Washington, which has now lost its most steadfast European ally. Ultimately, Hungary’s geopolitical position in the Indo-Pacific will hinge on how delicately the Magyar administration navigates the ever-tightening U.S.-China tightrope.