What is happening?
One of the biggest events in the last week of June, at least for those interested in security and geopolitics, was the NATO Summit in The Hague (June 24-25). Although like-minded democracies are facing their most challenging period since the end of the Cold War, and the summit was described as “historic,” much was missing compared to previous years.
The Allies’ main objective was to agree on 5% of GDP for defense spending, with everything else seemingly pushed aside. The Hague Summit Declaration consists of just five paragraphs and focuses strictly on the Euro-Atlantic region. In contrast, the previous Washington Summit Declaration had 38 paragraphs and addressed, among other issues, China, the Indo-Pacific, and Asia-Pacific partners — notably the IP4 (South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia), whose leaders were all absent this year, including Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who had more than one reason not to attend.
What is the broader picture?
Originally, it had been announced that Ishiba would attend the to “reaffirm with NATO allies and others the recognition that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable.” However, just three days later, on June 23, Ishiba’s trip was canceled, marking the first time a Japanese leader has been absent since 2022, when the IP4 countries were collectively invited to participate more actively in NATO summits. The Japanese Foreign Ministry explained that “various circumstances” had led to the cancellation, and that Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya would travel to the Netherlands instead.
One of those “circumstances” is likely the shift in U.S. foreign policy. While the administration of former President Joe Biden promoted the idea of an interconnection between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security, the Trump administration favors a more regional approach. The absence of IP4 leaders may therefore signal a symbolic weakening of the previously emphasized strategic linkage between security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, several sources have indicated that Ishiba canceled the trip because he was unable to secure a one-on-one meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. During his first presidency, Trump had a notably warm personal rapport with then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, setting a high bar for Ishiba, whose efforts to build a relationship with Trump have been under scrutiny. For example, the fact that Ishiba’s first post-election phone call with Trump lasted only five minutes was enough to raise concerns about personal dynamics or potential language barriers. However, their in-person meeting in February was considered a success, and Ishiba likely did not want to jeopardize that media win with failure to secure one-on-one meeting with Trump in The Hague.
Another contributing factor to Ishiba’s absence is thought to be the recent strain in US-Japan relations over defense spending. In 2022, Japan committed to doubling its defense budget from 1% to 2% of GDP by 2027. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth were supposed to meet with their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, in Washington on July 1 for the annual 2+2 security talks. One agenda item was to be the U.S. request for Japan to raise its defense spending to 3% of GDP. However, Tokyo canceled the meeting after Elbridge Colby, the third-most senior official at the Pentagon, reportedly requested an increase to 3.5%, and the Japanese newspaper Nikkei published an article stating that the U.S. might ask its Asian allies, including Japan, to spend as much as 5% of GDP. These claims reportedly sparked anger in Tokyo.
Why does it matter?
Yet another reason behind Ishiba’s decision to skip the summit may connect all of the above “circumstances” – namely elections. Just before the “historic” NATO summit, Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a “historic defeat” in the 2025 Tokyo prefectural election on June 22. The LDP’s share in the Tokyo assembly fell to a record low of 21 seats (down from 30) out of 127. Although the LDP maintained a combined majority with the Komeito and Tomin First parties, the results are expected to influence strategies for the upcoming Upper House elections on July 20. Under such conditions, an unsuccessful appearance at the NATO summit, or an unpredictable outcome of the 2+2 security talks, especially amid ongoing tariff negotiations with the U.S., could have destabilized Ishiba’s already fragile minority coalition. Given the summit’s predominantly Euro-Atlantic focus, Ishiba likely did not have huge concerns about missing out. Domestic worries are apparently far more pressing.
