Photo: Tibetan Monks in Sera monastery, Tibet. Author: Zuzana Košková
What is happening?
On July 1, China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法) entered into force. Adopted in March, the law has since drawn criticism from China analysts, Western governments, and human rights organizations.
The legislation expands the scope of Chinese jurisdiction beyond its territory, making it a potentially powerful instrument of transnational repression. It targets not only ethnic groups Beijing perceives as threats under its broad national security framework, but also foreign citizens. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has already warned its citizens against traveling to China, citing risks linked to the law’s vague provisions.
What is the broader picture?
The stated aim of the law is to “forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识), a concept repeated throughout the document. Across its seven chapters, the law emphasizes patriotic education, the promotion of the Chinese language, and the construction of a unified national identity among all ethnic groups.
The law adopts a whole-of-society approach. Article 18 mandates the integration of “community consciousness” into national, cadre, and social education. It promotes both traditional culture and “red” content highlighting the achievements of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.“ Article 20 obliges parents and guardians to educate minors to “love the Chinese Communist Party, the motherland, and the Chinese people.”
The law also functions as a tool of broader sinicization in regions Beijing considers politically sensitive. Article 21 extends these requirements to Hong Kong and Macao, while also addressing Taiwan by promoting cross-strait exchanges and strengthening a shared sense of identity, belonging, and cultural inheritance. The same article emphasizes strengthening ties with overseas Chinese communities, encouraging them to promote Chinese culture and support China’s national objectives. This reflects a broader United Front approach, in which diaspora communities are not only cultural bridges but also political actors encouraged to align with Beijing’s narratives and interests.
More broadly, the legislation seeks to resolve what the Chinese government frames as “ethnic problems,”portraying the Chinese nation as a unified, pluralistic family. At the same time, it explicitly rejects external criticism framed around ethnicity, religion, or human rights.
“The cause of national unity and progress shall not be interfered with by external forces,” reads the text. “We resolutely oppose all acts of slander, smearing, containment, suppression, infiltration, and sabotage against the People’s Republic of China under the pretext of ethnicity, religion, or human rights.“
Digital control is addressed in Article 31, which imposes obligations on platforms to monitor, remove, and report content that “undermines ethnic unity.”
Particular attention has focused on Article 63, which states: “Organizations and individuals outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China who engage in acts that undermine national unity and progress or create national division against the People’s Republic of China shall be held legally accountable in accordance with the law.” 中华人民共和国境外的组织和个人，针对中华人民共和国实施破坏民族团结进步、制造民族分裂行为的，依法追究法律责任。
The law does not define these acts, leaving broad discretion to authorities. Analysts warn that this ambiguity could extend to foreign individuals, businesses, researchers, academic institutions, or human rights defenders critical of China. The ambiguity of the legislation has been partially clarified by Hu Weilie (胡卫列), Vice Minister of Justice, who stated at a press conference of the State Council Information Office that holding overseas individuals legally liable for undermining ethnic unity is “legitimate, lawful, and consistent with international norms.”
The extraterritorial reach of the law has raised concerns in the European Union and the United States, particularly regarding its potential application to foreign citizens.
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen (蔡明彥) warned citizens against traveling to China, noting that the law vaguely defines offenses such as “undermining ethnic unity” and that under its provisions, Chinese authorities may investigate individuals, including foreign nationals, seize property, and inspect electronic devices.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council stated that the law “aims to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty and extend ideological control over its population.”
Concerns extend beyond Taiwan. Tibetan communities have protested the law since its adoption. On July 2, Lobga Rangzen, a Tibetan in exile, self-immolated in front of the United Nations headquarters in New York. While self-immolation has long been used as a form of protest among Tibetans, such incidents abroad — particularly in the United States — are rare and signal heightened urgency.
Why does it matter?
This legislation represents a significant expansion of China’s transnational repression toolkit. By combining vague legal definitions with extraterritorial jurisdiction, it creates legal uncertainty not only for Chinese diaspora communities, but also for foreign nationals engaging with China-related issues.