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What is happening?
During her visit to Vietnam in May, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi introduced an updated version of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. The concept was originally introduced by Takaichi’s mentor, the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. At that time, the main goals were defined as the promotion and establishment of fundamental values (the rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.), the pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity, etc.), and a commitment to peace and stability(capacity building in maritime law enforcement, etc.). Even then, the FOIP was announced amid rising concerns about China’s growing influence and assertiveness in the region. It was based on a desire to preserve maritime security and uphold the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. While this objective remains unchanged, the technological, social, and geopolitical developments of the past decade have called for an update of the strategy.
What is the broader picture?
While upholding the core principles set out in 2016, the updated FOIP will focus on three priority areas. First, building economic infrastructure for the age of artificial intelligence (AI) and data. This strand of the new FOIP covers the supply chain resilience for energy and critical materials, the development of both the hard and soft infrastructure required, and enhancing the region’s resilience and freedom for regional actors to decide for themselves.
Among other things, this reflects Japan’s long-term effort to diversify its critical minerals supply away from China, which has repeatedly weaponized Japanese dependence on these key materials since 2010. The most recent obvious example of this came after Takaichi’s remarks last November, hinting at Japan’s potential involvement in the Taiwan Strait should Beijing attempt to change the status quo there.
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has also highlighted the region’s vulnerability in the energy sector, leading Takaichi to pledge US$10 billion under the Partnership on Wide Energy and Resource Resilience Asia (POWERR Asia), to help Asian partners secure energy resources and strengthen supply chains.
The first priority area also includes the FOIP Digital Corridor Concept, focusing on areas such as AI, data flows, undersea cables, and satellite communications.
Second, expanding public-private cooperation to generate economic growth. The objective in this area is to leverage Japan’s expertise and technology to address challenges in the Global South and co-create new business opportunities in line with international norms. This pillar includes the maintenance and renewal of aging infrastructure, as well as the promotion of free trade and investment through dialogue with theEuropean Union (EU) and ASEAN. Some of the activities within this area could provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has been criticized for issues such as debt-trap diplomacy, lack of transparency and sustainability, etc. Like Japan, the EU is seeking to provide an alternative to the BRI in the region through its Global Gateway Initiative.
Third, enhancing security cooperation to ensure regional peace and stability by further developing existing policy tools such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), Official Security Assistance (OSA), and defense equipment transfers. The Takaichi cabinet has significantly increased the budgets in these sectors to strengthen the security and law enforcement capabilities of countries across the region. Along with Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan are just a few examples of regional actors that share concerns regarding China’s territorial claims and military activities in the East and South China Seas.
Why does it matter?
The updated FOIP pays significant attention to ASEAN, but its individual activities effectively span from the Americas through Africa to Europe, reflecting the twin realities that security has no borders and that preserving the rules-based international order cannot be limited only to one’s back yard. Japan’s new strategy is not merely about noble ideas but about delivering tangible results. Tokyo is signaling that at a time of deepening cooperation between and increasing assertiveness by systemic rivals of the current international order, such as Russia, China, and North Korea (although no actor is specifically mentioned in the FOIP), and at a time when the United States’ commitment to regional alliances has become less predictable, Japan remains committed to being a trustworthy and reliable partner. The message is that Tokyo proactively does its share to increase not just national but also regional security, instead of leaving the burden to others.
It is a strategic move that should resonate not only in the countries the updated FOIP primarily targets, but also in Washington, D.C., where the current administration appears to be pursuing a more pragmatic and transactional philosophy in U.S. foreign policy. Japan’s approach could serve as an inspiration for Europe, which finds itself in a similar position in many ways. For instance, Washington remains the primary security guarantor for both Tokyo and many European states.