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What is happening?
On January 24, an announcement by China’s Ministry of Defense that two senior generals — Zhang Youxia (張又俠) and Liu Zhenli (劉振立) — were under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law” took many observers by surprise. Since then, rumors have circulated about why Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) would remove two high-ranking generals whom he himself appointed.
The fact that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is deeply corrupt and has been under intense scrutiny during Xi’s rule is well-documented. What, then, is different this time? And what do we actually know about the internal dynamics within the PLA and the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?
In a recent episode of the Sharp China podcast, analyst Bill Bishop responded “we don’t know” nearly 20 times in relation to questions about the circumstances of the purge. This alone illustrates how little insight experts have into developments within China’s top political bodies, such as the CCP Politburo or the Central Military Commission (CMC). Given these limitations, it is worth focusing on what can be established with reasonable confidence.
What is the broader picture?
To understand the significance of these events, it is essential to clarify the role of the CMC, as the CCP’s top military leadership body, rather than a state institution. By extension, the PLA is not a national military in the Western sense, but a party-controlled army whose primary mission is to protect the CCP and safeguard its rule. Ideological loyalty, not professional military autonomy, remains paramount.
After the recent shakeup which saw another two members expelled, the CMC is down from its original seven to only two members: Xi Jinping, as chairman, and Zhang Shengmin (張升民), as vice chairman.
The January 24 announcement stated that the two generals “are suspected of serious violations of discipline and law,” and that “it has been decided to place Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under investigation.”
Zhang Youxia, 75, a first-ranked vice chairman of the CMC, is one of the very few senior PLA officers with actual combat experience, having fought in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. His father was a PLA general who fought alongside Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun in the Chinese Civil War, placing the younger Zhang firmly among the so-called princelings. He was widely regarded as one of Xi’s most trusted military allies, making his ouster all the more surprising. Many analysts believe Zhang played a stabilizing role within the PLA, helping to temper unrealistic military expectations and providing Xi with a more realistic assessment of the PLA’s capabilities.
Following the announcement, speculation exploded across social media and even made headlines in traditional media outlets. According to various reports and rumors, including claims cited in The Wall Street Journal, Zhang was accused of leaking nuclear secrets to the United States. Other reports mentioned another recent military scandal — the apparent suicide of He Weidong (何衛東), a former CMC vice chairman who had previously been targeted in an anti-corruption campaign.
At present, there is no way to verify any of the rumors surrounding these incidents. We do not know whether any of them are grounded in fact and can only speculate whether it was the leader’s paranoia and fear of powerful subordinates, or a sincere effort to fight corruption and prevent factionalism within the military, thus ensuring absolute obedience from the PLA.
What makes the fall of Zhang and Liu Zhenli, 64, different from previous purges is the speed and severity of the process. Both men were reportedly last seen in public in late December, with their fall publicly announced in January — far more quickly than in prior cases. The language used in official announcements and PLA editorials has also been unusually harsh. According to the PLA Daily, their actions “seriously undermined the image and authority” (形象威信) of the military and “seriously trampled“ (严重践踏) institutional norms — phrasing that implies direct defiance or disregard for Xi’s authority. As a Jamestown Foundation analyst has argued, this suggests that the two men, “most likely fell from power due to disagreements with Xi Jinping over PLA development, particularly the timeline for joint operations training, and may have pursued policies or issued orders that ran counter to Xi’s directives.”
The timing is also telling. Reports indicate that Xi Jinping has repeatedly ordered the PLA to be combat-ready by 2027—a year that marks both the PLA’s centenary and the likely beginning of a fourth term for the Chinese president. The moves against these senior figures may signal that Xi has lost patience with a military he views as insufficiently prepared, insufficiently loyal, or both.
Why does it matter?
What is clear is that Xi Jinping is further consolidating power. On Wednesday February 4, he held phone calls with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump — an unmistakable signal of confidence and authority.
The official Chinese readout of the call with Trump stated that, “China is true to its word and resolute in its actions; we do what we say.” It also emphasized the Taiwan issue, asserting that, “Taiwan is Chinese territory; China must defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never allow Taiwan to be separated. The U.S. side must handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with caution.” This can be read as a direct warning to the United States: stay away from Taiwan and cease arms sales to Taipei.
Trump’s reported response on his Truth Social platform — that he “values China’s concerns regarding the Taiwan question” and is willing to maintain communication to keep U.S.–China relations “good and stable”— raises important questions about future U.S. signaling and deterrence.
This all unfolds in the context of a new U.S. Security Strategy that appears less confrontational toward China, alongside persistent concerns about Taiwan’s defense spending and readiness.
Taken together, the purges within the PLA may not signal weakness but rather a leadership preparing, impatiently and forcefully, for decisions it considers historically inevitable.
Disclaimer: This article was submitted on Friday, February 6, and does not reflect any subsequent developments.