What is happening?
In light of an increasingly transactional approach in Washington’s pursuit of international relations, Taiwan is planning extensive acquisitions of weapons, military technology, and other defense capabilities from the United States (US). Taipei had already sent similar signals in November of last year in response to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. However, these transactions now appear to take specific contours, and major acquisitions are moving forward. While many questions regarding the entire situation remain unclear, it is essential to consider the broader context. The way Taipei purchases defense assets—especially from Washington—could have far-reaching consequences for the successful defense of the island country against a potential attack from the People’s Republic China (PRC).
What is the broader picture?
Estimates of the newly rumored acquisitions vary, but according to available sources, purchases range between $7 billion and $10 billion—larger than the Czech Republic’s defense budget in 2024. The government in Taipei is outwardly trying to demonstrate its determination to defend the country against threats from across the strait while also adapting to the transactional style of the U.S. president’s politics. Trump has repeatedly criticized Taiwan for insufficient efforts to defend itself and for its trade surplus with the US, a recurring thorn in Donald Trump’s flesh. For this reason, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) recently announced his commitment to allocate at least 3 percent of Taiwan’s GDP to its defense budget, aiming to kill two birds with one stone. However, this still falls short of the expectations of U.S. Republicans, who are pushing Taiwan to increase its defense budget to 5 percent of GDP, with Donald Trump even suggesting an unrealistic 10 percent.
The specific contents of the purchases remain unknown; however, according to anonymous sources familiar with the situation, the package is expected to include missiles for HIMARS systems and cruise missiles designed to protect coastal areas. National Security Council Secretary-General and former Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) stated that while Taiwan’s defense establishment is still evaluating which weapon systems are most useful for the country’s defense, the new acquisitions will include both lower-cost items in large quantities and some highly sophisticated and expensive weapon systems. Additionally, Taiwan has had to wait several years for weapons ordered during Trump’s first presidency due to delivery delays. Trump’s national security advisor, Mike Waltz, has, therefore, already pledged to speed up these deliveries as much as possible. These clues suggest that Taiwan is once again leaning toward purchasing traditional yet highly expensive defense assets, whose numbers will never be able to match the military arsenal of its rival across the Taiwan Strait.
Precisely for this reason, the Biden administration has hesitated to sell Taiwan large quantities of traditional weapon systems, such as tanks, aircraft, or warships. Instead, Washington has encouraged Taipei to purchase more significant numbers of lower-cost defensive and combat equipment, which would be more effective in an asymmetric conflict—the strategy Taiwan would likely have to adopt in a conventional war with the PRC. However, in total value, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under Biden have not matched the levels seen during Trump’s first administration, which largely consisted of traditional, expensive, and sophisticated military systems in smaller quantities. It should be noted, however, that in 2022, Congress approved legislation allowing President Joe Biden to once again provide direct military aid to Taiwan, which has reached nearly $1 billion over two years.
It remains uncertain whether the government’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will succeed in pushing through its newly planned defense budget, as opposition parties Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) seek to limit the executive branch’s power even at the cost of making the country more vulnerable to Chinese aggression. In a statement last Friday, President Lai announced that the government intends to use special budgetary funds to increase defense spending, circumventing the opposition’s reduced defense budget proposal. The DPP plans to use record tax revenues, arguing that these extraordinary measures are necessary to ensure national security. However, these special budget expenditures still require approval from the Legislative Yuan, meaning that KMT and TPP would have the opportunity to block them once again. Another internal political battle might break out soon.
Why does it matter?
If the PRC were to gain control over Taiwan, it would not only significantly erode U.S. power in the region but also weaken all existing China-skeptic, anti-authoritarian alliances in the Indo-Pacific. This could have far-reaching political, security, and economic consequences—from a substantial boost to China’s geopolitical influence to increased nuclear proliferation worldwide. Military experts have lately agreed that Taiwan should adopt the so-called “porcupine strategy,” which would provide the island democracy with a stronger deterrent against its much larger aggressor on the mainland. This strategy requires investments in smaller, more flexible, and lower-cost defense assets in larger quantities, which could help Taiwan withstand an initial Chinese assault and inflict heavy losses on invading forces. Therefore, Taipei must carefully prioritize between dancing to Washington’s tune and its effective defense strategy.
