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What is happening?
At the turn of August and September, Tianjin, China (PRC) hosted the long-anticipated two-day annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The event sparked a major political, diplomatic, and propaganda offensive by the PRC. As the host of this high-profile gathering, the country became the centerstage for a live spectacle of notorious dictators, authoritarian displays, populist rhetoric, and weapons of mass destruction. Shortly afterward, Beijing unveiled a meticulously choreographed military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Through these events, the PRC delivered a message—subtle in form but unmistakable in content—to all of its neighbors: the post-American world will feature Beijing at its center.
What is the broader picture?
The SCO was founded in 2001 by the so-called Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) and Uzbekistan to resolve territorial disputes and border tensions in Central Asia. Over time, the grouping expanded its mandate beyond cooperation against “three evils”: counterterrorism, counter-separatism, and counter-extremism to include joint military exercises. SCO also beefed up its membership to include major players such as India, Iran, and Pakistan. On the international stage, it has gradually positioned itself as a broader Eurasian economic and security forum, increasingly self-identified by its opposition to Western groupings like NATO and the G7, or more directly, to the United States, its Western allies, and the post-World War II institutions.
At the same time, the SCO is deeply divided, reflecting many cleavage lines between its members. It is neither a military alliance nor a coherent defensive bloc. Its list of members includes long-standing rivals such as India and Pakistan, as well as China and India. Yet, as Moscow’s power declines, the SCO is shifting into an increasingly Sinocentric organization—representing roughly a quarter of global GDP, nearly half the world’s population, and covering almost the entire Eurasian landmass. Through such institutions and partnerships, Beijing is striving to showcase itself as a superpower offering an alternative to U.S. primacy.
The 25th SCO summit this year drew more than twenty states—marking the largest turnout in its history. A defining moment was the clear demonstration of Moscow’s diminished status relative to Beijing, highlighted by the approval of the long-planned SCO Development Bank. The new institution’s purpose is to finance Chinese infrastructure projects, promote cross-border trade, and position the renminbi as a robust alternative to the U.S. dollar. Analysts argue that Beijing is laying the groundwork for a new global financial architecture—one that bypasses not only Western states but also Russia, which had previously vetoed such initiatives. For Moscow, the picture is stark. While Russia has made some progress in escaping international isolation, Vladimir Putin has now openly accepted a subordinate junior role to Beijing. This state of affairs is a direct consequence of Russia’s economic, military, and financial dependence on the PRC in the context of the war in Ukraine. Xi Jinping (習近平) also used the summit to reiterate his Global Governance Initiative (全球治理倡議), aimed at building new international structures configured and controlled by the PRC and designed to counterbalance or even replace Western architecture of international institutions.
Arguably, the most disturbing scenes came when Putin once again repeated his unfounded justifications for the invasion of Ukraine. Equally striking was the unprecedented image of the leaders of Russia, China, and North Korea walking side by side, presenting themselves as partners in shaping the future world.
Nevertheless, a major subplot was the seeming rapprochement between India and China. While the roots of this shift run deeper, the pace has accelerated in recent days, primarily driven by Donald Trump’s aggressive trade policies toward India. During the summit, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi announced significant progress on long-standing contentious issues, particularly territorial disputes that have persisted for decades and most recently flared into armed conflict in 2020. That clash resulted in casualties on both sides and strained bilateral relations for years. This time, however, both governments announced steps forward on trade, visas, the resumption of direct flights, and a declaration that they now regard each other as “partners, not rivals.”
Trump’s decision to impose a 50 percent tariff on Indian goods bound for the United States has forced New Delhi not only to seek trade alternatives in other markets, but also significantly damaged the political and security partnership between Washington and New Delhi that they have been consciously building up for decades. According to some analysts, Trump’s trade policy toward India represents the most significant mistake of his presidency to date. India is a pivotal partner of the U.S. in balancing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and jeopardizing that relationship is strategically reckless. Even more troubling is that it remains unclear whether the tariffs stem from India’s purchases of Russian oil or from Trump’s bruised ego after New Delhi declined to credit him with negotiating a ceasefire in the recent India-Pakistan conflict.
Yet, despite public declarations of progress, deep strategic mistrust between New Delhi and Beijing persists. Territorial disputes remain unresolved. China’s arming of Pakistan, India’s archrival, remains a source of acute concern, with Chinese weaponry proving highly effective against Indian forces in this year’s clashes. Looking ahead, further flashpoints loom: the question of the Dalai Lama’s succession and the legitimacy of the Tibetan government-in-exile based in India; China’s construction of the world’s largest hydroelectric dam, with potential consequences for millions of Indians; the enduring trade imbalance and China’s state-subsidized industrial overcapacity, which distorts global markets; and Beijing’s claim to leadership of the Global South, a mantle India has long sought for itself. Whether this budding rapprochement survives—or whether Trump can repair the damage done—remains an open question.
Why does it matter?
In the wake of Donald Trump’s failing foreign policies, China is working to project an image of unassailable status and global influence while courting some key Western security partners. Xi is leveraging the collective weight of SCO members in his bid for global preeminence and in reshaping the international order into a multipolar system with Beijing at its epicenter. The vision is clear: the PRC seeks a world where powerful states carve surrounding regions into spheres of influence reflecting their inherent norms and institutions, and a world where fewer but stronger states dominate at the expense of smaller and weaker ones. For medium-sized states in the heart of a divided Europe, this is a deeply bleak outlook.