What is happening?
The imprisonment of Yang Chih-yuan (楊智淵), a Taiwanese activist and co-founder of the Taiwanese National Party – a fringe political party advocating for Taiwanese independence – sent shockwaves across the island nation. After Beijing the 22-point set of guidelines to punish “die-hard” Taiwanese independence separatists in June, Yang became the first Taiwanese individual against whom China used secession charges. China announced its Anti-Secession Law – aimed at unifying Taiwan through peaceful negotiation or, under the law’s vaguely defined circumstances, through forced annexation – in 2005; yet, prior to Yang’s arrest, Beijing had used criminal charges of “separatism” against ethnic minorities within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rather than Taiwan nationals. Labeling Yang as a “ringleader of Taiwan independence,” the People’s Court of Wenzhou in eastern China handed him a nine-year prison sentence on August 26. Yang’s case demonstrates that China is increasingly using lawfare as a tool of its multifaceted pressure campaign to compel Taiwan into compliance as Beijing aspires to annex its territory.
What is the broader picture?
A Taiwanese political activist, Chinese authorities apprehended Yang Chih-yuan in Wenzhou, Zhejiang on August 3, 2022 – one day after the then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi began her visit to Taiwan. Noting that Yang’s arrest took place more than seven months after his arrival to China and several years after he terminated his political activities, the NGO Safeguard Defenders considers his arrest “arbitrary” and “politically motivated.”
The case of Yang Chih-yuan is emblematic for two main reasons. Firstly, he is the first known Taiwanese individual detained in the PRC on separatism charges. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long track record of persecuting Mongolians, Tibetans, and Uyghurs within China and accusing them of splitism, Yang’s charges are unusual for a non-PRC citizen. Secondly, Yang’s arrest demonstrates that China is willing to use its domestic legislation, including the 2005 Anti-Secession Law and the 22 guidelines released this year, to criminalize activities perpetrated outside of the PRC territory. This is an intimidation tactic which the CCP uses to send a stern warning to the people of Taiwan amid its efforts to extend its claim of jurisdiction over Taiwanese citizens.
Lawfare, or legal warfare, constitutes a core component of the PRC’s doctrine of political warfare. Formulated in 2003, the non-kinetic strategy of “Three Warfares” posits that the CCP should be able to achieve China’s national objectives and break the adversary’s (in this case, Taiwan’s) resistance through as public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. A tool of lawfare aimed at Taiwan, The new guidelines for “punishing Taiwan’s independendists” allow for criminal prosecution of alleged separatist activities carried out overseas, which also effectively constrains the freedom of speech of actors connected to China through economic, social, or academic ties.
In response to Yang’s sentencing, the Mainland Affairs Council – Taiwan’s ministerial level body responsible for cross-strait relations – underscored the arbitrary nature of his arrest and emphasized that “any Taiwanese individual can be labeled as a Taiwan independence separatist at the wanton discretion of the CCP.”
Why does it matter?
Taiwan frequently serves as a laboratory or a “testing ground” for new coercive instruments that China uses to realize its regional hegemonic ambitions. Importantly, Taiwan is hardly the only target of the CCP’s political warfare, including lawfare. While domestic legislation, including the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, is used as both an instrument of intimidation and a legal basis for the potential launch of kinetic warfare – including to achieve the annexation of Taiwan by force – Chinese lawfare also includes manipulation of international law. One example thereof is the sustained effort by Beijing to distort the meaning of the UN Resolution 2758 – Beijing’s revisionism intends to misguide the international community into the belief that the document is a legal foundation of its “one China” principle, while in reality, it does not regulate the status of Taiwan. Consequently, it is imperative that the democratic community closely monitors China’s efforts to employ lawfare as a tool of its malign authoritarian influence, seeking to distort the rule-based international order.
