What is going on?
There is law, but law is not justice. And few real-life examples illustrate it more clearly than the recent uptick in Chinese lawfare activities against Taiwan.
Lawfare, or legal warfare, is emerging as an increasingly prevalent tool of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political warfare targeted at Taiwan, a de facto sovereign state that the CCP continues to claim as a part of its territory despite never having controlled it.
On June 21st, Beijing announced alarming new guiding opinions under the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. Effective immediately, these new legal guidelines include the death penalty for vaguely defined activities supporting “Taiwanese independence.” Only a few days earlier, on June 15, China Coast Guard (CCG) Regulation No. 3 came into effect, authorizing CCG commanders to detain foreign vessels and their crew that are seized in waters under China’s jurisdiction or claimed by China for up to 60 days. This move raised significant concerns over the legal validity of new regulations and, consequently, emerged as a threat to regional stability and the international maritime legal regime.
What is the broader picture?
Along with public opinion and psychological warfare, lawfare constitutes a core tenet of the Three Warfares (三種戰法), the key political warfare strategy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) set forth in the amended Political Work Regulations of the PLA in 2003. The specific and interconnected aims of the Three Warfares illustrate Beijing’s quest to manipulate perception and psychology to condition the operational environment in its favor. Lawfare serves as an essential component in China’s efforts to “diminish an opponent’s political support and to advance, inform, and structure territorial and resource claims.”
The recent developments effectively demonstrate the practical implications of Beijing’s incessant pursuit of political warfare, and lawfare in particular, as a tool of realizing its hegemonic ambitions.
The Chinese Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued “Opinions on Legal Punishing of Diehards Elements of ‘Taiwan Independence’ for Inciting the Split of the Country and Secession.” The new guidelines target advocates of Taiwan’s independence and enable trials in absentia. The main perpetrators face life imprisonment or sentences exceeding ten years. Those who are deemed to cause serious harm to the PRC and its people may face the death penalty. Active participants in “secessionist activities” (although these lack a clear legal definition) may also face deprivation of political rights. These new regulations, also known as the “22 Opinions,” are perceived as the refinement of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. As a result, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) raised the alert level for Taiwanese travelers to China, Macau, and Hong Kong to orange, the second-highest alert level in Taiwan’s four-level travel alert system, advising nationals to cancel non-essential travel. The new regulation also met with concern from Taiwan ruling and opposition parties and the US Department of State.
Another bold move of Chinese authorities was the introduction of the China Coast Guard Regulation No. 3, which grants it a wide range of operational powers, including boarding and detaining foreign vessels in disputed waters if they are suspected of violating China’s entry and exit regulations. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the new regulation exacerbates the persistent geopolitical tensions in the region, particularly regarding the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. Thus, MOFA accused the PRC of violating international laws and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Consequently, Taiwanese authorities view the seizing of Penghu-registered Da Jin Man (大進滿) fishing vessel No. 88 on July 4 as a direct result of the new CCG regulation.
Why does it matter?
Introducing 22 Opinions relatively shortly after the May 20 inauguration of Lai Ching-te (賴清德) as the new president of Taiwan might be a strategic move of the PRC aimed at further intimidating the self-ruled island nation. The concern is whether these regulations will affect ordinary Taiwanese citizens and foreigners advocating for Taiwan’s independence or will primarily target politicians. Additionally, whether China will leverage the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to pursue such individuals remains a key question. China has been expanding its extradition treaties (currently approximately 60 bilateral extradition treaties, of which 45 have been ratified), which has raised human rights concerns as the Chinese government has been accused of manipulating these treaties to exert global influence and prosecute individuals for political reasons. This expansion is seen as part of a broader strategy of transnational repression.
Furthermore, the operations related to China Coast Guard Regulation No. 3 could escalate regional tensions related to coastal state sovereign rights, including fisheries rights of coastal areas. China’s increasing harassment of foreign vessels is evident in the interference in the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), such as the June 17 clash at the Second Thomas Shoal. Thus, recent regulations by China should be a matter of international concern as they could affect regional peace and security.