Tibet, Potala Palace, Lhasa. Photo by Zuzana Košková
What is happening?
In a surprise development, Xi Jinping, led a delegation of officials to visit Tibet on Thursday to “celebrate” the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (西藏自治區, TAR). This is the first time the Chinese leader has officially visited Tibet, since 2021.
The delegation was composed of several high-ranking officials, and the program included a work briefing by the TAR Party Committee and Government in Lhasa, officials‘ speeches, and parades by Tibetans, who, according to Chinese state media, live happy lives ever since the PLA “peacefully liberated” the region in 1950.
In the context of the ongoing discussion about the Dalai Lama’ s successor, this visit is all the more symbolic, signaling China’s firm control and power over the strategically important region.
What is the broader picture?
Chinese official media paid special attention to the visit, showing Xi being warmly welcome by Tibetans at Lhasa airport, the delegation listening to a work report by the TAR Party Committee and government in Lhasa, and colorful celebration in front of the Potala Palace former seat of the Tibetan government and the Dalai Lama, who now lives in exile in India.
During the celebration at the Potala Square, Wang Huning gave a speech, highlighting successes in creating infrastructure and raising Tibetans out of poverty “under the loving care of the CCP” since the TAR was established 60 years ago.
Tibet, home to the Tibetan people, is, however, much larger than the administrative unit of the “Tibetan Autonomous Region. ” Historically and ethnically Tibet was divided into three parts: Amdo, Kham and Ü-Tsang, stretching over the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, western Sichuan, northern Yunnan and the west part of Gansu. For Tibetans, the TAR symbolically marks their defeat and subjugation after a violent uprising in 1959, when the 14th Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans fled to India.
So, why is China so interested in controlling this mountainous region, which is geographically and culturally so distant from Beijing?
Tibet is not a densely populated region, but it is strategically important. It is the source of many of Asia’s largest rivers, such as the Indus, Brahmaputra, Mekong, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers. The region is also rich in natural resources such as copper, gold, lithium, coal, natural gas, uranium, and rare earth metals. Tibet shares borders with India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar, making its location critical for national security, especially in the context of the Sino-Indian border and contested areas.
The Tibetan Plateau is one of the world’s most significant ecological regions. Known as the “Asian Water Tower,” Tibet is crucial to Asia’s water resources, and the stability of its glaciers and water cycle is threatened by climate change. Tibet’s glaciers are melting, and snow cover is decreasing, creating an environmental crisis. According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the region is warming two to three times faster than the global average.
In recent years, however, China’s control over Tibet has become more militarized. The concept of “civil-military integration” (军民融合) refers to infrastructure projects that serve both economic development and defense needs. China has invested heavily in building dual-use infrastructure projects, such as highways, airports, heliports, railways, communication networks and border villages. Framed as improving the lives of locals, fostering “long-term peace” and “stability,” and providing disaster relief, these projects are used by the People’s Liberation Army to enhance its operational capacity and control over the region. The mushrooming “border villages” are nothing more than military bases.
In July of this year, Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced the construction of the world’s largest hydropower station on the Yarlung Zangbo River, located on Tibet’s eastern border with Yunnan Province. Neighboring countries, especially India, have expressed concerns over these developments.
During Xi’s visit, Chinese media avoided any mention of the Tibetans’ spiritual leader, His Holiness, the 14th Dalai Lama who turned 90 in July this year and whom Beijing sees as a chief adversary due to the respect he commands among the six million Tibetans and internationally. The CCP views him as a “wolf in monk’s clothing,” a separatist, despite his advocacy for greater Tibetan autonomy within China, as opposed to full independence.
The Dalai Lama has stated that he would reincarnate in a “free world,” meaning outside PRC, that his successor could be a woman, and that his Gaden Phodrang Trust, a religious body he founded, holds the “sole authority to recognize his future reincarnation.”
The Chinese government of course opposes these statements, claiming that “the reincarnation and succession of the Dalai Lama is inherently an internal affair of China.” This echoes the controversy surrounding the 11th Panchen Lama. There is a concern that after the Dalai Lama’s death, there could be two competing claimants to the title of Dalai Lama. Despite these concerns, the Dalai Lama, in good health, has stated that he intends to “live another 30 or 40 years.”
Such controversies have made meetings with the Dalai Lama a taboo for many serving politicians, though some have pique Beijing’s ire by holding talks with the exiled leader — perhaps most notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2007. Following in the footsteps of his predecessor Václav Havel, who was a friend of His Holiness, Czech President Petr Pavel traveled to India to congratulate the spiritual leader in person on his 90th birthday, enraging Chinese officials who responded by announcing that the PRC was “ceasing all engagement“ with Pavel.
Why does it matter?
This visit by CCP officials to Lhasa is clearly symbolic. It demonstrates to the world, and Tibetans, that the CCP is the sole governing power in the region. With the aging of the Dalai Lama, the question of his successor has become more frequent. Leaving aside the issue of China’s “fake” Dalai Lama, any future Dalai Lama will face significant challenges, as it will take years for a successor to fully embrace and advocate for the Tibetan cause.
On the other hand, the militarization of Tibet could elevate the issue of Tibet from being “just” a human rights issue into a broader security concern, perhaps leading to more advocates for the Tibetan cause.