Photo: 智飛科技股份有限公司. Used with permission.
What is happening?
At the International Defense Industry Exhibition (MSPO) in Kielce, Poland, a Taiwanese industry delegation signed MOUs with Polish and Ukrainian partners to cooperate on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, an arrangement that pairs Taiwan’s components and know-how with Polish expertise and Ukraine’s wartime R&D. Taiwan’s representative to Poland, Jeff Liu (劉永健; Liu Yung-chien), attended the signing ceremony, which underscored Taiwan’s growing engagement with Central and Eastern Europe in the defense sector, a trend shaped by regional security concerns and shared democratic values.
What is the broader picture?
Now in its thirty-third year, the MSPO held from September 2 to 5 in Kielce, Poland, has drawn nearly 800 defense companies representing 34 countries. It is ranked as the third-largest defense industry fair in Europe after its counterparts in France and United Kingdom. Under the MOUs signed during the fair, Taiwan will provide technology and components, Ukraine will contribute research and development, and Poland will share its expertise in the field. Representative Liu emphasized that Taiwan has consistently supported like-minded democracies and hopes the three parties will deepen their cooperation to jointly promote peace, security, and democratic values.
On the MSPO floor, Polish buyers aren’t browsing abstractions; they are price-checking attritable airframes and China-free subsystems made urgent by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. That immediacy explains why Europe—especially Poland—has become Taiwan’s front door for drones: in H1 2025, exports reached 11.89 million USD, a stunning 749 percent increase year-over-year, with Poland accounting for approximately 6.48 million USD (54 percent), vaulting to the top spot ahead of the U.S. and Germany. Those numbers turn fairs like MSPO into deal rooms, not just showrooms.
The pipeline runs both ways. In Chiayi, Taiwan’s Asia UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center has evolved into a living lab where delegations—from Baltic lawmakers to EU officials—see flight testing, certification, and training up close. This “street level” of pilots, maintainers, and SMEs is how MOUs mature into orders and support contracts.
Underneath the headlines sits an industrial thesis: build a “non-Red” (China-free) UAV supply chain and scale it through transatlantic demand. Analyses urge Europe to bring Taiwan into Readiness 2030 tooling—joint procurement, standards work, and SAFE-backed financing—as a politically feasible path that de-risks Europe’s own drone supply while anchoring Taiwan in European programs.
In recent years, Taiwan has begun to cautiously expand its defense industry cooperation with Europe, with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) emerging as a particularly promising arena. A landmark example was the memorandum of understanding signed between the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association (TW-DIDA) and the Czech-Taiwanese Business Chamber in 2021, signaling an early effort to institutionalize channels for bilateral defense-industrial dialogue.
Alongside these bilateral and trilateral initiatives, Taiwan has also sought to engage with Europe on broader strategic platforms. After a seven-year absence, Taiwan made a high-profile return to the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 2023, highlighting its defense challenges, including delays in arms deliveries and the need to expand asymmetric capabilities. Its participation was widely seen as timely and as a signal of Taiwan’s determination to contribute to global security debates. However, Taiwan’s absence from MSC 2024 was notable, given growing European interest in Taiwan’s security and cross-strait stability. Observers considered this a missed opportunity.
In 2025, Taiwan’s return, led by Audrey Tang (唐鳳), a former Minister of Digital Affairs and the country’s first transgender cabinet member, widely recognized for her expertise in digital governance, open data, and civic technology, underscored the potential to broaden cooperation into digital and cyber resilience.
Still, substantial barriers remain, as many member states are reluctant to jeopardize their economic ties with China, and many CEE defense companies hesitate to engage openly with Taiwan due to their countries’ respective one-China policies. Analysts also point to a broader lack of “Taiwan literacy” across Europe; nevertheless, CEE offers opportunities for collaboration. Taiwan’s steady presence at international security forums suggests that, despite constraints, there is gradual momentum for closer, if still carefully calibrated, cooperation.
Why does it matter?
The opportunity for Taiwan and CEE to cooperate on drones is practical and near-term: use CEE demand and battlefield-proven R&D to scale a China-free UAV ecosystem, linking Taiwan’s component depth to European procurement and standards. The risk is inertia—without EU instruments (Readiness 2030/SAFE), Taiwan’s surge could stall at small-batch exports. The fix is your usual closing move: pilot joint procurement and certification tracks with Poland (and willing partners), plug Chiayi’s testbed into European trials, and conclude MOUs that include supply-chain transparency clauses—so “non-red” is verifiable, not just aspirational.