Photo: Kuomintang headquarters, photo by Lin Wei-Lun
What is happening?
Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), chair of Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), completed a visit to China last week, during which she met with Xi Jinping (習近平), marking the first high-level encounter between KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in a decade. The meeting reflects Beijing’s longstanding approach of engaging primarily with Taiwanese political actors who accept its position that Taiwan is part of China, while avoiding official contact with successive Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations.
What is the broader picture?
The visit followed a precedent set by former KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰), who in 2005 traveled to China and met with Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in his capacity as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Notably, Cheng joined the KMT after leaving the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at Lien’s invitation, underscoring a personal and political continuity with this earlier moment of cross-strait engagement. The trip took place amid ongoing domestic political tensions, as the KMT and its opposition coalition partner, the Taiwan People’s Party, have delayed consideration of a proposed US$40 billion defense budget put forward by President Lai Ching-te (賴清德), while advancing alternative proposals for significantly smaller amounts. The KMT-led opposition coalition currently holds a narrow majority in Taiwan’s legislature, which it has used to obstruct significant parts of Lai’s policy agenda. Opposition lawmakers have, for instance, delayed progress on the 2026 general budget and initiated impeachment proceedings against the president, reflecting a broader context of political polarization.
Cheng emerged as a dark-horse candidate, gaining prominence through relatively hardline positions. She has previously stated her hope to see “ Taiwanese proud to be Chinese ,” and has framed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defensive response to NATO expansion. These comments have drawn controversy and have been widely interpreted as aligning with narratives associated with Beijing-friendly media.
Despite her broader political positioning, Cheng emphasized that unification is not an immediate objective, stating that, “what we need to address now is how to create peaceful and stable cross-strait relations.” At the same time, she called for the so-called 1992 Consensus to serve as the foundational framework for cross-strait exchanges, aligning her position with a long-standing KMT policy line. Cheng also outlined several areas for potential cooperation between Taiwan and China, including artificial intelligence, sustainable development, disaster prevention, healthcare, and carbon reduction. To engage younger generations, particularly those born after 1992, she emphasized the importance of expanding youth exchanges. She further noted that Xi had suggested energy as a possible field of cooperation. Most ominously, her rhetoric during the visit incorporated phrasing commonly associated with Xi’s discourse on cross-strait relations.
Her engagement with Xi has drawn fire from the ruling DPP, echoing similar criticism of a 2015 meeting between then-KMT Chairman and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in Singapore. DPP Secretary-General Hsu Kuo-yung (徐國勇) argued that while KMT–CCP exchanges may be party-to-party interactions, they carry direct implications for Taiwan’s national security and governance. He stressed that any such engagement must safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and uphold its core values of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and called on Cheng to clearly justify the purpose of the meeting. Similarly, Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) underscored that contacts with the CCP should be subject to stringent oversight. Even within the ranks of the KMT, the visit was reportedly not approved by all members, exposing internal divisions over the party’s strategic direction in cross-strait relations.
These concerns have been amplified in discussions regarding the trip’s funding. The six-day trip, involving 35 participants and costing NT$4.8 million, was not financed by the KMT itself but through public funds allocated via an application to the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, currently chaired by legislative speaker Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), a former mayor of Kaohsiung and the KMT’s losing candidate in the 2020 presidential election. This funding arrangement has drawn political scrutiny in Taiwan, particularly regarding the use of public funds for party-to-party exchanges.
Why does it matter?
Culminating as it did in a high-level meeting with Xi, the visit to China by Cheng, has been framed as both a strategic breakthrough and a reflection of shifting dynamics within the KMT. With Cheng positioning herself as an “agent of change,” her ascension to the party reins has signaled a challenge to the party’s traditional leadership and a move away from its ambiguity on cross-strait policy in recent years. The trip, alongside Beijing’s rollout of new cross-strait measures, is portrayed as opening a window for renewed engagement, though its broader implications for Taiwan’s domestic politics, cross-strait relations, and regional security remain uncertain.
At the same time, Cheng’s rise and approach highlight a deeper shift within the KMT, where a figure previously seen as outside the party’s core establishment has been able to challenge long-standing strategic ambiguity and open a new, more assertive line on cross-strait relations. This repositioning unfolds against a backdrop of domestic political polarization, legislative gridlock, and shifting public sentiment, which together create both constraints and opportunities for redefining party strategy. Beijing’s high-level reception and the rollout of new cross-strait measures indicate a willingness to engage selectively with Taiwanese political actors who signal alignment with its preferred framework.