HOWLING DIPLOMATS: SELECT EXAMPLES OF CHINA’S “WOLF WARRIOR DIPLOMACY”
EUROPEAN VALUES CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY

European Values Center for Security Policy is a non-governmental, non-partisan institute defending freedom and sovereignty. We protect liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the transatlantic alliance of the Czech Republic. We help defend Europe especially from the malign influences of Russia, China, and Islamic extremists.

We envision a free, safe, and prosperous Czechia within a vibrant Central Europe that is an integral part of the transatlantic community and is based on a firm alliance with the USA.

Author:
Kateřina Urbancová, Analyst of the Red Watch Program, European Values Center for Security Policy

Author of the foreword:
Edward Lucas, Non-resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis

With support of:

KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG
FOREWORD

When you have finished reading this report, watch the Wolf Warrior films, particularly the second one. Spoiler alert: Leng Feng, a Chinese Rambo, heroically routs a bunch of ruthless, incompetent Western mercenaries who are menacing valiant Chinese medical aid workers during a pandemic in Africa.

Wolf Warrior 2 is not just the biggest success in Chinese movie history, it also reflects the worldview of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and now shapes its diplomacy. The Wolf Warrior has the qualities of a mythical hero, exposing deceit, righting wrongs and battling dangers. He is rescued from defeat against overwhelming odds by the deus ex machina intervention of a Chinese carrier battle group.

Africa is the backdrop, but the message is universal: China is morally and psychologically superior to the West. Resistance brings a nasty surprise followed by ignominious defeat. There are other underlying themes: resentment against corruption and humiliation (like the fictional Western Rambo, Leng Feng is an outcast who embodies and eventually vindicates his country’s real values).

It is easy to see why the besuited officials of the Chinese foreign ministry find all of this rather exciting. Traditional diplomacy involves a large dose of excruciatingly boring politeness. You are paid to be nice to foreigners. Wolf Warrior diplomacy is different. You are paid to shout loudly. The ruder you are, the more your bosses in Beijing are pleased with you.

The case studies in this report highlight the different triggers for this behavior. But they also point to the great weakness of China’s institutionalized prickliness. It is easy to be thunderously cross with one country over one issue. It is impossible to be equally cross with lots of countries over lots of issues.

Chinese leadership has chosen to elevate minor symbolic issues, such as political ties with Taiwan, to questions of totemic, existential importance. If the authorities in Beijing maintained a bored silence on all aspects of Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan would not be an issue. Indeed, support for full normalization would probably rise in the island state and Western countries would regard the issue as closed. Instead, support for Taiwan has become a touchstone of Western resolve.

The Czech delegation - that visited the offshore Chinese democracy in the summer - highlighted the weakness of the mainland’s taboo. Dire consequences were threatened, but little happened. Other countries can follow suit (keep an eye on the new Lithuanian government, which has pledged to defend freedom “from Belarus to Taiwan”) and they can do so collectively. The European Union could boost the status of its mission in Taipei. NATO could open an information office there. Or the new D-10 – President Joe Biden’s proposed grouping of the world’s biggest democracies – could do something. China can focus the full wrath of the party-state on one country and on that issue. But imagine if lots of countries do the same thing. Or lots of things. The CCP cannot fire in all directions at once and do so all the time.

The fictional “Wolf Warrior” succeeds because he is alert, brave and decisive. His enemies are complacent and disorganized. But the countries of the free world are not a bunch of decadent mercenaries. Our whole-of-government, whole-of-society and whole-of-the-world responses are, potentially, far more creative, adaptable and resilient than anything that the CCP can manage. Solidarity and spontaneity are mystifying for those schooled in its cynical Leninist approach to politics and human nature. If we choose to, we can bewilder, distract and demoralize our foes while reenergizing our own side with a sense of purpose and shared mission.

So watch the “Wolf Warrior movies” – but make sure we write and direct the real blockbuster.

Edward Lucas
SUMMARY

“Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” is a non-authoritative term used to describe the most aggressive form of high-profile diplomacy carried out by Chinese state actors (MoFA spokespersons and ambassadors) during the last 1-2 years. This form of diplomacy is held in a confrontational manner and does not avoid aggressive rhetoric and direct or indirect threats. As such, the Wolf Warrior Diplomacy is a specific case of coercive diplomacy employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

This report summarizes the most common triggers of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy as well as forms of responses CCP diplomats use and recommends appropriate policy measures that should be implemented by democratic countries in order to neutralize the possible effects “Wolf Warrior” Diplomacy or any other form of coercion could bring about.

The most common triggers are:

- Challenging the One-China policy
- Exclusion of Huawei from 5G networks
- Support of the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong
- Criticism of human rights abuses in China
- The role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the COVID-19 pandemic
- Protection against China’s influence in local markets; and counterintelligence findings and warnings on China.

As in other cases of coercive diplomacy, the main form of policy responses to Wolf Warrior Diplomacy should consist of:

- Raising awareness about the phenomenon
- Encouraging joint and coordinated responses from affected countries
- Economic decoupling from the PRC
- Developing guidelines for companies
- Raising the political cost of “Wolf Warrior” behavior
Wolf Warrior Diplomacy (WWD) is an aggressive behavior fully developed and made famous by Chinese diplomats during the COVID-19 pandemic. Mainly via western social media platforms like Twitter, those diplomats are pushing the CCP's political narratives repudiating Western criticism related to the most sensitive topics. WWD is a rhetorically aggressive form of state-issued threats, which are the standard tool of CCP coercive diplomacy. Common expressions of coercive diplomacy are: “pay a heavy price”; “irreversible impact”; “countermeasures”, etc. Various forms of coercive diplomacy have been implemented over the last decade (with sporadic touches of “Wolf Warrior” style even before that), with significant escalation since 2018 and even more during the COVID-19 pandemic, which boosted diplomatic competition between the two superpowers - the USA and the PRC.

Although Chinese foreign policy was changing its course long before Xi Jinping, a significant shift took place after he came to power in 2012 and gradually embraced Mao Zedong's approach to state and party governance. As Mao once told the PRC's first diplomats: “Diplomatic work is a political struggle; you don't engage in a war of weapons, you engage in a war of words.” War of words is the field for “Wolf Warrior Diplomats”, who undoubtedly enjoy the full support of at least part of the Chinese partisan and state officials despite attempts to frame the “Wolf Warrior” behavior of Chinese MoFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian - who advanced the conspiracy that Coronavirus originated in the US - as the personal opinion of one rogue individual.

The moniker is a light-hearted, non-authoritative label taken from the PRC's patriotic blockbuster film Wolf Warrior II (2017). In October 2019, Global Times - an English-language Chinese nationalistic outlet (belonging to the CCP's People's Daily) - reported that the BBC had used the term to describe PRC diplomats’ recent increase in “proactive” Twitter use, implying that the BBC was applying “western double standards”. We have been unable to locate the offending BBC article, but the term has come to describe China's coercive tactics and tendency to throw tantrums on the world stage.

The aggressive approach to foreign policy mirrors the overall assertive stance of the CCP, which - in sharp contrast with Deng Xiaoping's concealing strengths and biding time - emphasizes the PRC's upcoming dominant position in global affairs. Including the foreign affairs minister in the most important decision-making body in 2017 reflected a sea-change in the role of diplomacy in Chinese policymaking: “China's foreign ministers were excluded from the central decision-making body of the Politburo until 2017, when Yang Jiechi, now the state councillor [sic] for foreign affairs (more senior than the foreign minister), was elevated to the 19th Politburo of the CCP. This not only integrated Foreign Ministry views into the setting of foreign policy decisions, it also highlighted the growing importance of diplomacy in the overall strategy of the Chinese leadership.”

Although the rise of WWD was sudden, it was a logical development for a state that found itself in competition with the world's leading superpower on multiple fronts.

of foreign policy, but also elevated its personnel in terms of China’s internal political structure. It is in this context that China’s diplomats and foreign ministry spokespeople are now undertaking their duties.”

Early signs of coercive diplomacy were first displayed in 2010 when the PRC froze diplomatic ties and trade relations with Norway to protest the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. The Chinese foreign minister interpreted this turn in international relations as a breach of mutual trust on the part of Norway, which established a dialogue with China to improve mutual relations. Relations were restored after six years. In the same year, the Chinese foreign minister protested that 12 of the 27 members of the ASEAN Regional Forum praised the United States’ presence in the South China Sea. The Singapore delegate was dismissively told that “China is big and other countries are small and that’s just the way it is”.

The goal of this report is to collect WWD examples, summarize their most common triggers as well as the nature of diplomatic responses from the CCP and recommend the appropriate policy measures that shall be implemented by democratic countries in order to neutralize their possible effects - or any other form of coercion. We identified seven triggers of WWD: challenging the One-China policy; exclusion of Huawei from 5G networks; support of the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong; criticism of human rights abuses in China; the PRC’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic; protection against China’s influence in local markets; and counterintelligence findings and warnings on China.

1. Challenging the One-China Policy

Territorial integrity has been a crucial issue for politicians, academics and intellectuals from the very beginning of China’s modernization. Keeping in mind a century of humiliation (1839-1949) - when China lost full control over its territory to western powers, Russia and Japan - the country’s unification has remained an important task for the PRC ever since its establishment in 1949. Taiwan is a constant reminder of the unfinished civil war between CCP and Guomindang. Besides that, Taiwan’s democracy represents an ideological threat to Xi Jinping’s notion that China’s unique historical and social conditions are incompatible with a democratic political system. The PRC sees international cooperation with Tibetan government representatives in exile or Taiwan as an attack on the One-China policy, which considers both Taiwan and Tibet as integral parts of China and punishes countries that defy this understanding.

Specific examples:

- Prague’s mayor Zdeněk Hřib (Pirate Party) visited Taiwan in 2019. Subsequently, he decided to cancel the “sister treaty” between Prague and Beijing. One of the reasons for this was the section concerning the One-China policy. Taiwan has shown its appreciation for this by sending humanitarian assistance during the coronavirus crisis: nine ventilators, hundreds of masks, inhalators and filters. The Chinese authorities postponed the PKF’s (Prague Philharmonia) tour and canceled the planned performances of the Pražák Quartet, the Czech Radio Symphony Orchestra and the Guarneri Trio Prague.

- On January 13, 2020, the Embassy of the PRC sent a letter through the Office of the President of the Czech Republic to the president of the Czech Senate, Jaroslav Kubera, threatening retaliation against Czech companies functioning in the PRC if he made a trip to Taiwan. On September 6, 2020, a new
President of the Senate, Miloš Výstrčil, announced his willingness to visit Taiwan despite the vocal disapproval of the Czech President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and Prime Minister. On August 28, Miloš Výstrčil left for Taiwan accompanied by a delegation of businessmen and representatives of scientific and cultural organizations. During his visit to Germany on August 31, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi threatened that Miloš Vystčil would pay a “heavy price” for visiting Taiwan. Wang branded Vystrčil’s trip to Taiwan as “public provocation”. To challenge the One-China principle on Taiwan is to make an enemy of 1.4 billion Chinese people, and is an international breach of trust. We must make him pay a heavy price for his short-sighted actions and political opportunism, Wang said. At a press conference held on September 3, spokesperson of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying denounced Výstrčil visit as an “open provocation” and stressed that the actions of the President of the Senate do not represent the official stance of the Chinese Government. A Chinese business partner canceled the delivery of twelve pianos and grand pianos worth 5.3 million CZK and new deals have not been made. Prior to the deterioration of Czech-Chinese relations, the PRC represented a key market for Petrof with a 35% share. Chinese car manufacturers indicate that they might cancel contracts with PRC-based Czech factories producing spare parts such as Czech company Brano. The PRC has terminated its cooperation with the private company Fair for pilot training.

- On January 10, 2020, the PRC started putting economic and diplomatic pressure on Eswatini, the only country on the African continent to recognize Taiwan as an independent state. The Chinese ambassador to South Africa issued a statement threatening to sever diplomatic and trade relations between Eswatini and the PRC. He limited the issuance of travel visas to Eswatini residents of the PRC’s Embassy in Pretoria. Furthermore, the embassy appealed to other states in Africa to reduce diplomatic ties with Eswatini. Eswatini has not succumbed to pressure from the PRC and has retained its diplomatic and economic ties with Taiwan.

- In May, 2019, the President of the Tibetan Government in Exile (Central Tibetan Administration), Lobsang Sangay, visited Lithuania and spoke at a press conference. The PRC’s Embassy condemned the event as a “serious political incident”. The Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis (VIPA) and its leaders received letters of condemnation from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China and some Lithuanian media outlets distributed an announcement from the embassy damning the institute.

2. Exclusion of Huawei from 5G networks

Huawei is a Chinese technology company with evident ties to the Chinese military and intelligence services.


18 ZHENG, Sarah, China’s foreign minister says Czech senate president will ‘pay heavy price’ for visiting Taiwan | South China Morning Post. HK, China, Asia news & opinion from SCMP’s global edition | South China Morning Post [online]. Retrieved from: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3099597/chinas-foreign-minister-says-czech-senate-president-will-pay

19 Chinese Embassy in CZ. Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/ChineseEmbinCZ/status/1301968921029902340/photo/2


The controversy over the company concerns the risks of possible misuse of technology and components by the PRC. Even though Huawei claims it is 100% owned by its employees, under Chinese law, any Chinese company can be ordered to act under the direction of the Chinese Government, constituting a great security risk for any country using Huawei technologies. The US government - including the FBI, CIA, NSA, the Federal Communications Commission and the House Intelligence Committee - warned its allies against using Huawei technologies because its equipment could be used to spy on other countries and companies. Since May, 2020, the US has required foreign manufacturers using US’s chip-making equipment to get a license before being able to sell semiconductors to Huawei. The Huawei quagmire has already ensnared several state actors. The PRC denies all allegations about security risks associated with cooperating with Chinese companies. In doing so, it very skillfully uses the principles of the free market and accuses Western society of discrimination. All “Wolf Warrior” reactions to allegations against the PRC have one thing in common: they aggressively defend China’s reputation and reject all accusations of abusive or coercive practices.

Specific examples:

• On November 11, 2019, the Chinese ambassador to Denmark was recorded saying to the Faroe Islands’ Prime Minister (an autonomous part of Denmark) that acceptance of Huawei as the 5G technology supplier to the island would make or break a free trade agreement with the archipelago. In reaction to the introduction of a law for foreign investments in critical infrastructure, Huawei’s CEO Jiang Lichao sent a letter to Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen suggesting that Denmark was not creating a fair business environment for enterprises to invest in the country. The Faroese Telecommunication operator is yet to choose the provider of its 5G technologies.

• In December, 2019, the Chinese ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, threatened the German government: if Huawei was excluded from the tender for 5G technology suppliers, the decision would not go unnoticed and could endanger the export of German vehicles to the PRC. Christian Democrat lawmakers subsequently backed a position paper on 5G technology suppliers that recommended tougher rules on foreign vendors while preventing a ban on Huawei.

• The editorial from May 24, 2020, of the state-controlled newspaper China Daily headlined that the “UK will pay the price if it carries out [its] decision to exclude Huawei”. It followed the Prime Minister’s planned reversal of his decision to allow Huawei to participate in Britain’s 5G rollout. The author of the editorial accused the British government of “significant escalation of discriminative government interference, which almost certainly will meet retaliatory responses from Beijing”. Shortly after the editorial was issued, China’s ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, threatened the British government: cutting out the telecoms giant could undermine plans for Chinese companies to build
nuclear power plants and the HS2 high-speed rail network. The British Prime Minister had already instructed officials to prepare plans to reduce the PRC’s involvement in the UK’s infrastructure by 2023. While that directive was toned down in January 2020, the National Security Council of the UK decided, in July 2020, to ban Huawei completely from its 5G networks. This earned plaudits from the Trump administration. While US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised the UK’s decision, the Chinese Global Times called for unspecified retaliation against the UK. The official state-run press agency Xinhua called the UK’s decision to ban Huawei “ill-founded” and warned that the move could negatively affect the investment environment in the UK.

• At the beginning of January, 2020, the PRC’s ambassador to Canada, Lu Shaye, criticized Canadian media for spreading a negative image of the PRC abroad since the beginning of his Canadian mandate. He received significant attention after an interview with The Hill Times, where he accused the Canadian government of “double standards” as well as “Western egoism and white supremacy” in assessing the detention of Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in the PRC. The two were arrested in retaliation for the arrest of Huawei’s CEO Meng Wanzhou. She was arrested in Canada at the instigation of the United States for alleged bank fraud. A Canadian court in mid-May, 2020, ruled that the case meets the threshold of double criminality - the charges would be crimes in both the US and Canada. Beijing warned that the case would cause “continuous harm to China-Canada relations”. Wanzhou’s arrest also led to a trade row between Canada and China. The PRC escalated its retaliatory action against Canada in early 2019 by instituting trade bans on key Canadian exports to China, namely canola seed products, soybeans and peas.

• On December 17, 2018, the Czech Cyber Security Center (NÚKIB) issued a warning against the use of Huawei’s and ZTE’s software and hardware. According to NÚKIB, the latter presents a threat to Czech national security. On December 23, 2018, the PRC’s ambassador to the Czech Republic urgently requested a meeting with the Czech Prime Minister to discuss “allegations” against Huawei/ZTE. The Chinese Embassy issued a statement condemning NÚKIB’s warning and expressed hope that the Czech Government would not repeat similar mistakes and would protect Chinese companies’ legal rights. The Chinese Ambassador to the Czech Republic (Zhang Jianmin) forced a meeting with the Czech Prime Minister on Sunday, December 23, just one day before Christmas Eve. The battle for interpreting the results of the meeting went on for several days with the Czech Prime Minister denying the Chinese Embassy’s claims of the Czech government’s penitence and calling


the Ambassador’s communication “unusual”. However, on May 6, 2020, the Czech Prime Minister signed a Joint Declaration on 5G Network Security with the American Minister of Foreign Affairs Mike Pompeo. The declaration aims to work together to build 5th generation networks resistant to unauthorized access and possible attacks and protective of citizens’ privacy and fundamental rights.

3. Support of the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is a special administrative region of the PRC. It was leased to the United Kingdom for 99 years until June 30, 1997, when the whole territory was handed back to PRC. In 1984, a Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed to guarantee the leased area a liberal economic and political system until 2047. Riots termed the “Umbrella Movement” emerged when China effectively reneged on the accord by implementing electoral reform in 2014. Another wave of unrest occurred in 2019, this time in response to an extradition law that would have allowed the extradition of prosecuted people to the PRC. At the end of June 2020, a national security law amended the territory’s legal system. The vague wording of some articles granted PRC security operatives the right to investigate “anyone who conspires with foreigners to provoke ‘hatred’ of the Chinese government, or the authorities in Hong Kong.” This stimulated further unrest and a widespread pro-freedom movement.

Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong play an important role in the PRC’s quest to unify the country under centralized control from Beijing. Any form of support for these countries is considered a threat to Chinese sovereignty and resonates with old grievances when once-mighty China was divided between other countries during the century of humiliation as mentioned above. Thus we can explain why any challenge to the One-China policy or support for the pro-democratic movement in Hong Kong triggers such a strong reaction from the PRC. The following incidents show that China does not take international criticism of the erosion of Hong Kong’s longstanding independence lightly.

Specific examples:

- As the PRC government tries to regain control of the situation in Hong Kong, it wants to limit other countries from engaging with Hong Kong activists. At a press conference, German Ambassador Heiko Maas was condemned by China’s ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, for meeting with Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong on September 10, 2019. A Hong Kong court has banned Wong from traveling to London after his visit to Germany. Wu said the event portended a negative impact on bilateral relations and the Chinese side would be forced to respond. As the PRC government tries to regain control of the situation in Hong Kong, it wants to limit other countries from engaging with Hong Kong activists.

- White House national security adviser Robert O’Brien reported on May 24, 2020, that the U.S. government will likely impose economic sanctions on the PRC if Beijing enacted the national security law to limit Hong Kong’s autonomy. The PRC foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian
consequently denounced US interference in Hong Kong’s freedom during a Regular Press Conference on May 25, 2020.52

• On July 9, 2020, Australia put a hold on its extradition treaty with Hong Kong in reaction to the new security law. It offered to prolong the temporary visas of resident Hong Kong citizens and widened the routes for permanent residency. The Hong Kong community was also made eligible for the humanitarian and refugee visa program. On the very same day, Zhao Lijian condemned the moves and stated that “China reserves the right to take action, and Australia will have to bear all consequences”.53 Australia’s allies Canada, New Zealand, and the UK took similar measures and faced similar reactions

4. Reporting the PRC’s abuse of human rights

The PRC exerts great effort to create a positive image of itself abroad. In some cases where there is no way to represent its human rights abuses in a positive light, the PRC attempts to change the discourse of human rights by eroding both the very definition of human rights and the institutions responsible for their application and protection.54 Xi Jinping uses a similar argument against human rights as he uses against democracy or political plurality. The PRC even today refuses to accept human rights as a universally valid concept arguing that “Each country’s cultural and historical particularities, economic circumstances, and chosen development path must be acknowledged and respected. Imposition of a single model of human rights promotion and protection must therefore be avoided.”55 The PRC challenges the definition of human rights and attempts to erode its basic premises even though the Chinese academic Peng Chun Chang (better known as P.C. Chang) played an important role in writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The PRC today refuses to accept human rights as a universally valid concept and perceives allegations of human rights violations as interference in the internal affairs of the country, as illustrated by the following:

Specific examples:

• On April 11, 2019, Swedish PEN awarded the Tucholsky Prize to the Sino-Swedish writer, publisher, and dissident Gui Minhai in absentia, as he is currently being held in the PRC. In January 2020, China’s ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, likened Sweden to a lightweight boxer provoking a match with a much heavier fighter. He also said that the presentation of the Tucholsky Prize would lead to Chinese countermeasures. Shortly after the award ceremony, the ambassador began attacking the Swedish media, reiterating comments that China offers its friends good wine and enemies gunshots.56

• In August 2019, members of the German Parliament’s Human Rights Commission were barred from entering Beijing, Tibet, and the western part of Xinjiang.57 Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the foreign ministry, commented that “as a sovereign country and host, China has the right to reject uninvited people. China surely doesn’t welcome anyone that has been lobbying on behalf of anti-China forces and harming China’s interests.”58

China is manipulating global institutions to suppress negative coverage of human rights. On March 7, 2019, Human Rights Watch ambassadors in Geneva received a warning letter from the PRC stating, inter alia, that in the name of maintaining bilateral relations and continuing multilateral cooperation, delegations should not attend or in any way support a March conference on human rights violations in Xinjiang organized by the US, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Some delegates from the so-called Global South told Human Rights Watch that the PRC had warned them not to take part in the event.59

Moreover, a recent letter from 37 ambassadors, mostly from Africa and the Middle East, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Russia positively evaluated the human rights developments in Xinjiang. The letter, addressed to the president of the Geneva-based council and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, boasted China’s success in counterterrorism and de-radicalization in Xinjiang.60

On July 9, 2020, the Trump administration blocked Chen Quanguo, the Communist Party secretary for the Xinjiang region, Zhu Hailun, the Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Political and Legal Committee and the current Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and Wang Mingshan and their families from entering the country in response to human rights abuses targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other minority groups in Xinjiang.61 Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying demanded that the US “stop interfering in China’s international affairs” in a press conference on July 13. It levied sanctions, the extent of which is unclear, on U.S. Senators Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and U.S. Representative Chris Smith, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.62

---

5. The PRC’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic

In line with the PRC’s attempts to control the discourse about itself and construct a positive perception of the PRC abroad, these attempts intensified vis-a-vis COVID-19. Chinese political representation exerted great effort to redirect the focus away from the fact that the PRC was the epicenter of the pandemic and restore the notion of the PRC as a valuable member of the international community. The COVID-19 outbreak blighted the country’s reputation abroad. PRC diplomats have been encouraged to broadcast the narrative of the PRC’s superior governance model in disease control and highlight the PRC as a reliable partner in medical aid, suppressing the idea that the PRC is responsible for the crisis. Its emissaries later stated that Western countries were unable to cope with the pandemic. That message spread disinformation on the origin of COVID-19, claiming it was an attempt to undermine trust in democratic systems among US and EU voters. Unsurprisingly, China has stymied moves to launch an international investigation on the origin of COVID-19 and actively seeks to redirect attention:

Specific examples:

• On March 12, 2020, deputy director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhao Lijian promoted a conspiracy theory through his Twitter account that the US military may have brought the new coronavirus to the PRC. Zhao was smarting from Trump's labeling of the disease as the “Chinese virus”.

• The PRC Embassy in France posted anonymous texts online and an article alleging that “residents of retirement homes were made to sign ‘waivers of emergency care’, that nursing staff of the Ehpad (Établissement d’hébergement pour personnes âgées dépendantes) abandoned their posts overnight, and deserted collectively, leaving their residents to die of hunger and disease.” On April 14, 2020, the French foreign office summoned the Chinese ambassador, Lu Shaye, to express its deep disapproval about the fabricated information that more accurately described a situation in Spain. Lu appeared in an April 29 tweet accusing French media of lacking independence.

• One of the greatest successes of WWD at the EU level came when the EU watered down a report addressing the PRC’s key role in spreading COVID-19 disinformation via social media. PRC representatives at the EU delegation in Beijing threatened to withdraw from the EU-China Summit if EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s office issued the report in its original form. When the report was tempered, Czech analyst Monika Richter admonished her colleagues for self-censorship.

• In an interview for the Australian Financial Review on April 26, 2020, the PRC ambassador to Australia Cheng Jingye denounced Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s calls for an independent review of the COVID-19 outbreak as “politically motivated.” The PRC ambassador threatened a boycott of Australian products—especially wine and beef—and a bar of tourism and academic study on the subcontinent. The PRC is Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods and services, representing more than a quarter of all its international trade. A boycott of Australian products would leave the PRC relatively unharmed.

6. Protection of local markets

In 2013, President Xi presented the Belt and Road Initiative as his strategic vision of economic cooperation between Asian and African states. As part of this concept, the PRC is heavily investing in building critical
infrastructure in developing countries. This seemingly generous help is in reality extortionary because developing countries, with limited financial resources, are easy targets for manipulative financing schemes.

**Specific examples:**

- In October 2018, the Chinese ambassador to Kenya, Li Xuhang, repeatedly threatened trade sanctions after Nairobi banned Chinese fish imports, which flooded Kenyan markets at the expense of local production. Li interpreted the ban as a declaration of a trade war. 66 The ban was lifted only three months after the restriction took effect in January 2020. 67

7. **Counterintelligence findings and warnings**

Given its growing hegemonic ambitions, the PRC is not content as a player in the current order of international relations and wants an alternative system to the liberal-economic order led by the United States and the West. Beijing finds it intolerable when intelligence authorities document these ambitions.

**Specific examples:**

- On February 14, 2020, the PRC Embassy in Estonia requested the withdrawal of that country’s intelligence service’s annual report, which highlighted the mounting political and economic Chinese influence in the country. The report warned against over-dependence on China, which could facilitate potential Chinese pressure, and voiced concerns that the PRC’s true intention is to create an international environment suitable only for China with a sole Chinese worldview and standards. 68

---


---


---

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

#1 **Raising awareness about coercive and WWD**

Raising awareness about WWD (and other forms of coercive diplomacy) in the public sphere, especially among policymakers and journalists, as well as in business and academic circles would promote appropriate understanding of the extent and impact of this phenomenon. Governments should encourage their foreign ministries and research institutions to extensively record cases of PRC coercive diplomacy. The online tracker of coercive diplomacy incidents shall be created to carefully register which of the CCP threats were empty, and where and for what reason retaliatory action was effected.

#2 **Consistent coordination of the policy responses with allies**

The unwanted coercive behavior of the PRC diplomats is both carefully coordinated and globally implemented, and the response should mirror this strategy. Adequately responding to this type of coercion is harder for individual countries and some of the measures can work only when part of coordinated pushback through multilateral forums. 70 The small countries in particular should stand firmly in the international structures like
the EU or NATO. The measures democratic countries impose should abide by democratic values such as rule of law and inalienable human rights.

**# 3 Work on economically decoupling from the PRC**

Economic coercion is the most common and effective tool used by the “Wolf Warrior” diplomats and represents the systemic threat to economic security. The long-term government strategy should lie in building the economic resilience of the state by establishing equal economic relations with reliable partners.

**# 4 Develop guidelines for companies**

Governments should create a manual and prepare briefings for companies that are already doing business with China or are willing to do so in the future. The manual should provide guidelines for businesses on how to deal with the potential risks of engaging with authoritarian or totalitarian countries. As seen in the above examples of punishments of businesses, in the case of the People’s Republic of China, multiple risks have to be taken into consideration, including the interference into the company’s operation, blackmailing, and espionage.

**# 5 Raise the political cost of “Wolf Warrior” behavior**

The Chinese party-state should feel the political costs of implementing and supporting the aggressive “Wolf Warrior” tactics. Affected countries should issue clear statements on the unacceptability of the coercive behavior of the PRC diplomats. Joint statements of multilateral platforms are another useful tool.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Chinese foreign policy defined</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Form of threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-China Policy</td>
<td>President of the Czech senate visiting Taiwan</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic recognition of Taiwan</td>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>Economic and diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The President of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Lobsang Sangay visit</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion of Huawei from 5G networks</td>
<td>Free trade agreement in exchange for selection of Huawei as supplier of 5G technologies</td>
<td>Faroe Islands (Denmark)</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The discussion about exclusion of Huawei from the tender for 5G technology suppliers</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prime Minister’s plan to reverse his decision to allow Huawei to participate in the UK’s 5G rollout</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huawei CEO Meng Wanzhou arrest</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Economic and diplomatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Security Center (NÚKIB) issued a warning against the use of both software and hardware of Huawei and ZTE</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong</td>
<td>Meeting of the German Ambassador and Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Government imposed economic sanctions against the CCP officials</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspension of extradition treaty with Hong Kong</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of PRC abuse of human rights</td>
<td>Tucholsky Prize awarded to the Sino-Swedish writer, publisher, and dissident Gui Minhai</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Generic threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the German Parliament’s Human Rights Commission denied entry to Beijing, Tibet, and Xinjiang</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC effort to prevent states from entering or supporting a conference on human rights in Xinjiang</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criticism of the PRC role in the COVID-19 pandemic</strong></td>
<td>CCP representatives of Xinjiang area blocked from entering the USA for human rights violations.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA Diplomatic</strong></td>
<td>Chinese deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes conspiracy theory that COVID-19 was brought to China by the US Military.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRC Embassy in France</strong></td>
<td>PRC Embassy in France posted online texts containing fabricated information about the nursing staff of Ehpad.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Diplomatic</strong></td>
<td>EU report addressing PRC key role in spreading COVID-19.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australian call for an independent review of the COVID-19 outbreak.</strong></td>
<td>Australian call for an independent review of the COVID-19 outbreak.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection of local markets</strong></td>
<td>Chinese ambassador threatened trade sanctions after a ban on PRC fish imports</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterintelligence findings</strong></td>
<td>The PRC Embassy requested the withdrawal of the intelligence services report highlighting the influence of the PRC</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Censorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The revelation of interference with academic freedom and freedom of speech</strong></td>
<td>Dublin City Council offered to censor topics politically sensitive to Beijing after pressure from the Chinese embassy</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Censorship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>