{"id":38112,"date":"2024-10-29T12:03:42","date_gmt":"2024-10-29T10:03:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/?p=38112"},"modified":"2024-11-08T00:08:42","modified_gmt":"2024-11-07T22:08:42","slug":"distortion-of-un-resolution-2758-and-chinas-legal-warfare","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/distortion-of-un-resolution-2758-and-chinas-legal-warfare\/","title":{"rendered":"Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and China\u2019s Legal Warfare"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
As China is increasing its belligerence and aggression vis-\u00e0-vis Taiwan<\/strong>, the international community continues to focus its attention on the material dimension of confrontation. Pundits scrutinize the number of Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels<\/strong> operating around Taiwan, and much ink is spilled on Beijing\u2019s efforts to modernize People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities<\/strong> in physical domains<\/strong> of warfare. Yet, it is crucial to highlight that China seeks to \u201cadvance towards the center of the world stage<\/strong><\/a>\u201d (\u8d70\u9032\u4e16\u754c\u821e\u81fa\u4e2d\u592e) through non-kinetic means<\/strong>. Beijing\u2019s lawfare<\/strong> campaign, which includes deliberate efforts to distort the United Nations (UN) Resolution 2758<\/strong>, is an illustrative component of the regime\u2019s political warfare<\/strong>, which U.S. diplomat George Kennan described<\/a> as \u201cthe employment of all the means at a nation\u2019s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.\u201d<\/p> Within the Chinese party-state, the PLA is not a genuine national military<\/strong> under the control of the state but rather the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party<\/strong> (CCP), which defines protecting the party\u2019s rule <\/strong>and defending the party\u2019s interests<\/strong> as its core objectives. Consequently, analyzing the PLA’s nonmaterial power projection capabilities<\/strong>, manifested in its political warfare, remains critical for understanding the Chinese strategy<\/strong>.<\/p> The PLA\u2019s most developed doctrinal and operational framework of political warfare is the \u201cThree Warfares<\/strong>\u201d\u2014 psychological<\/strong>, public opinion<\/strong>, and legal<\/strong>\u2014which were known to be first formulated<\/a> in the 2003 \u201cPolitical Work Guidelines of the People\u2019s Liberation Army<\/strong>.\u201d Concerning Taiwan, realizing the strategy of the \u201cThree Warfares\u201d could allow Beijing to annex the democratic island nation without firing a single bullet. Notably, through legal warfare \u2013 or lawfare \u2013 Beijing is actively preparing the legal environment for a potential escalation in the Taiwan Strait and invasion of Taiwan<\/strong>.<\/p> The PLA\u2019s legal warfare <\/strong>consists<\/a> of Beijing’s efforts to construct legal and pseudo-legal arguments to redefine legality<\/strong> and legitimacy<\/strong>. In other words, the PLA uses (and misuses) the law, including its domestic legislation<\/strong> and the international legal system<\/strong>, to delegitimize adversaries <\/strong>and legitimize its own behaviors<\/strong>. In the context of cross-strait tensions, some of the tools of lawfare deployed by Beijing include<\/a> its 2005 Anti-Secession Law, <\/strong>the 22-point set of guidelines<\/strong><\/a> to punish \u201cdie-hard\u201d Taiwanese independence separatists<\/strong>, published in June 2024, the deliberate conflation<\/strong> of its one-China principle with one China policies of other nations \u2013 including Central Eastern European countries such as Czechia<\/a>, and, last but not least, the manipulation of UN Resolution 2758<\/strong> meaning to legitimize its claims over Taiwan in the international arena.<\/p> The UN Resolution 2758<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> adopted on October 25, 1971, transferred the Chinese seat at the United Nations<\/strong> from the Taipei-based Republic of China (ROC) government to the Beijing-based authorities of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC). While the resolution granted the PRC the status of the sole representative of China in the UN, it does not discuss Taiwan\u2019s status<\/strong> \u2013 notably, the word \u201cTaiwan\u201d does not even appear in the document<\/strong>. At the same, Beijing is actively distorting the meaning of the resolution<\/strong>, asserting that it provides a basis for its sovereignty claims over Taiwan <\/strong>and justifies Taiwan\u2019s exclusion from<\/strong> international organizations<\/strong>. In reality, the document only addresses the issue of China\u2019s<\/em> representation within the UN system. It does not resolve the international legal question of Taiwan\u2019s status.<\/p> These efforts to distort the meaning of the UN Resolution 2758 <\/strong>constitute a tool of China\u2019s lawfare<\/strong> as Beijing actively seeks to misuse the document to secure international acceptance of its version of the \u201cOne China\u201d principle<\/strong> under customary international law<\/strong>. Referring to the resolution, the PRC\u2019s August 2022 white paper on Taiwan, \u201cThe Taiwan Question and China\u2019s Reunification in the New Era<\/a>,\u201d claims, \u201cResolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide.\u201d Beijing\u2019s \u201cone China\u201d principle<\/strong> stipulates<\/a> that \u201cthere is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the Government of the People\u2019s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.\u201d Yet, China\u2019s claims that the UN Resolution 2758 constitutes the basis of its \u201cone China\u201d principle are entirely unfounded<\/strong>. The document does not purport to regulate Taiwan\u2019s international status, its ability to participate in the works of international organizations in any capacity or whether Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Any such language is simply not present in the resolution. <\/strong><\/p> Despite China\u2019s claims, its \u201cone<\/strong> China\u201d<\/strong> principle<\/strong> formulation is not universally accepted under customary international law.<\/strong> Instead, many states worldwide, including Czechia, have formulated their own \u201cone China\u201d policies<\/strong>, which can adapt and change to adjust to the evolving context of cross-strait relations. Chong Ja Ian of Carnegie China enumerates<\/strong><\/a> ten categories<\/strong> of positions that states around the world have taken on the issue of \u201cone China<\/strong>,\u201d demonstrating the complexity of the issue and demonstrating that Beijing\u2019s diktats on this subject are not universally accepted. Consequently, in the efforts to counteract China\u2019s lawfare, it is imperative to challenge the myth of consensus <\/strong>over the question of \u201cone China\u201d and clearly distinguish between China\u2019s \u201cOne China\u201d principle and other countries\u2019 definitions of their \u201cone China\u201d policies.<\/p> In recognition of the PLA\u2019s lawfare efforts, which include distortion of the UN Resolution 2758, democratic countries began to devise defensive strategies<\/strong> to uphold the rule of law <\/strong>and preserve international peace and security<\/strong>. The \u201c<\/strong>Counter-Lawfare<\/strong><\/a>\u201d initiative<\/strong> of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) is a laudable example. By building legitimacy through consensus and denying potential adversaries from gaining legal superiority, the initiative support integrated deterrence<\/strong> against instrumentalization and distortion of legal instruments<\/strong> as tools of non-kinetic warfare<\/strong>. Maintaining peace and stability around Taiwan is a core strategic interest of democratic countries \u2013 as recently reaffirmed<\/a> by the EU. As the PLA, the armed wing of the CCP, resorts to political warfare to realize Beijing\u2019s hegemonic ambitions, it is imperative that democratic partners work together to expose and deter the PRC\u2019s disruptive non-kinetic campaigns <\/strong>such as the efforts to corrupt the meaning of the UN Resolution 2758. <\/strong><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As China is increasing its belligerence and aggression vis-\u00e0-vis Taiwan, the international community continues to focus its attention on the material dimension of confrontation. Pundits scrutinize the number of Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels operating around Taiwan, and much ink is spilled on Beijing\u2019s efforts to modernize People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities in physical […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":38113,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[500],"tags":[495],"class_list":["post-38112","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-marcin-jerzewski"],"yoast_head":"\n