{"id":34819,"date":"2023-10-17T14:18:34","date_gmt":"2023-10-17T12:18:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/?p=34819"},"modified":"2024-03-11T15:30:13","modified_gmt":"2024-03-11T13:30:13","slug":"belt-and-road-initiative-in-laos-a-success-story","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/belt-and-road-initiative-in-laos-a-success-story\/","title":{"rendered":"Belt and Road Initiative in Laos: A Success Story?"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
This year marks the decennial of the Belt and Road Initiative (\u4e00\u5e36\u4e00\u8def Yidai Yilu<\/em>, BRI), and\u00a0this week, the third Belt and Road forum will take place in Beijing<\/a>. Lets look at one of the most significant infrastructure projects to remember the decade we have lived with the BRI.\u00a0<\/p> It has been almost two years since the\u00a0China-backed high-speed railway launched its operations in Laos<\/strong>. As the first real railway in Laos (before the construction began, Laos had had only four kilometers of railways) and\u00a0one of the biggest and costliest infrastructure projects in Laos<\/strong>, which is among the world’s poorest countries, it was subject to huge expectations from the Lao government. Vientiane, Laos capital, hoped that the “Iron River” \u2014 a Lao monicker for the railroad \u2014 would transform the country\u00a0from “landlocked” to “land-linked<\/strong>,” attracting foreign investment and enhancing tourism, logistics, and people-to-people exchanges. For Laos, the railway is undoubtedly an essential step towards its people’s economic development and welfare. But at what cost?\u00a0<\/p> Laos had engaged with Chinese infrastructure projects long before the BRI. Since the early 2000s, China has bolstered its economic presence in Laos, increasing its demand for the country’s natural resources and agricultural products. Through its state-owned enterprises and large private companies, Beijing invested in the construction of roads, dams, telecommunication networks, development of mining, agriculture, etc.\u00a0<\/p> The new railway cuts through 417 kilometers of rugged terrain between the Lao capital of Vientiane and Boten, the country’s main border town with China. Having been known for gambling, prostitution, and crime, Boten became one of the special economic zones. The road travel time between the two cities is 15 hours, but\u00a0the high-speed train cuts to just four hours<\/strong>. On the other hand, the price tag of US$5.9 billion makes it the costliest and most controversial infrastructure project in Laos<\/strong>.\u00a0<\/p> Despite propaganda efforts showing\u00a0only the project’s benefits<\/a>, in reality, the construction of the railway abounded with serious\u00a0controversy<\/a>. China received criticism for its unfair compensation to the resettled Lao people, damage to water and irrigation systems, employing\u00a0mainly Chinese workers and companies<\/a>, and several cases of labor exploitation. After the railways launched its operation, controversy continued: there were strict goods controls on the Chinese borders, and\u00a0Chinese companies began to dominate the tourism<\/a>\u00a0sector in Laos. Currently, the “Iron River” flows only one way\u2014it facilitates the export of Chinese goods to Laos, while Lao exports to China remain minuscule. Further, there are serious concerns related to using underground\u00a0mineral resources as loan guarantees,\u00a0<\/strong>which allows China to extract natural resources if the revenues are too low. The MoU signed between the two countries in 2010 “guaranteed repayment of China’s loan with the income and assets of the railway and\u00a0two unspecified mining areas<\/a>.”\u00a0<\/p> As in other BRI projects, the Boten\u2013Vientiane railway is an example of\u00a0asymmetrical power relations<\/strong>\u00a0between China and its partners. Laos and China established the Laos\u2013China Railway Joined Venture Company to carry out the project. Chinese state-owned enterprises own 70 percent, and only 30 percent belong to the Lao State Railway. The joint venture contributed 40 percent of the total project cost, and the remaining 60 percent ($3.54 billion) came from a loan from the Chinese Exim Bank. According to\u00a0AidData<\/a>, the Lao government has been trapped in a \u201chidden debt\u201d as the project is \u201ctoo big to fail.\u201d As a result, the \u201cLaotian government\u2019s\u00a0true level of contingent liability due to lending from China\u00a0<\/strong>may be as high as\u00a035 percent of GDP.\u201d\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\u00a0<\/h2>
What is the broader picture?<\/h2>
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Why it matters?<\/h2>