{"id":22828,"date":"2021-12-14T15:20:39","date_gmt":"2021-12-14T13:20:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/?p=22828"},"modified":"2021-12-16T12:23:44","modified_gmt":"2021-12-16T10:23:44","slug":"nathalie-vogel-senior-fellow-of-kremlin-watch-program-spoke-at-international-institute-for-strategic-studies-conference-on-statecraft-and-influence-networks-russia-china-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/nathalie-vogel-senior-fellow-of-kremlin-watch-program-spoke-at-international-institute-for-strategic-studies-conference-on-statecraft-and-influence-networks-russia-china-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"Nathalie Vogel, Senior Fellow of Kremlin Watch Program spoke at International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference on Statecraft and influence networks: Russia, China, Turkey\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

Germany needs a specialized Fusion Center and political backing if it wants to tackle hybrid threats<\/h2>

Nathalie VOGEL
European Values Center for Security Policy, Prague<\/p>

Discussion paper presented at the IISS conference on \u2018Statecraft and influence networks: Russia, China, Turkey\u2019.<\/h3>

December 7-8, Berlin<\/p>

A simple look into the latest issue of Germany\u2019s federal domestic intelligence agency\u2019s report for 2020 (Verfassungsschutzbericht) provides an overview on the hostile activities of the Russian Federation on German soil. Pages 309 to 317 list concrete cases of disinformation, cyber-attacks, aggressive influence operations, interference, liquidation and espionage.[1]<\/a><\/p>

During the last five STRATCOM summits in Prague, international security experts have discussed the shortcomings of German authorities when it comes to the timely detection and subsequent countering of hostile Russian activities on German soil.[2]<\/a> This self-inflicted vulnerability, they concluded, appears to be caused less by a lack of professionalism than by the restrictive institutional framework within which security authorities are forced to evolve.[3]<\/a><\/p>

The total preparedness approach as practiced in Sweden and Finland, which involves as many stakeholders as possible while emphasizing media and cyber literacy, is regarded as the \u2018Swiss army knife\u2019 for countering a wide range of hybrid operations, including disinformation. Germany\u2019s government has found it difficult to adopt a similar strategy, let alone gather such expertise. Both Sweden\u2019s and Finland\u2019s multi-stakeholder approaches demand a swift mobilization of all actors in civil society, the media, law enforcement, security agencies, political decision-making circles as well as the private sector.[4]<\/a><\/p>

The Czech \u2018bottom-up approach\u2019, in which Czech authorities delegate the early warning system to grass roots elements of society thus empowering communities to become an essential pillar of societal resilience, has also been put forward as an example of best practice.[5]<\/a><\/p>

Germany seems reluctant to use these examples and adapt them to the German context. The main obstacles to this are legal contingencies that are rooted in an almost endemic distrust towards a concentration of security powers, a legacy from both the Third Reich and the \u201cGDR\u201d. These restrictions are enshrined within the constitutional framework of the Grundgesetz.<\/p>

Federalism and \u201cTrennungsgebot\u201d (separation of police and intelligence authorities), for instance, make the pooling and sharing of information between states (Bundesl\u00e4nder) and the Federal Government difficult. Furthermore, it restricts information and intelligence sharing within the Federal Government and its agencies. Actors such as the Ministry of Defense whose expertise is essential in the fight against disinformation, as demonstrated in the Baltic states, are limited in their operational capacities within Germany. Articles 87a and 87b of the Grundgesetz inhibit them from applying their expertise in the domestic context. Paradoxically, operative information units can be deployed in support of German armed forces during their missions abroad, for instance, but their use or even the exploitation of their expertise is strictly prohibited on German soil. This leaves Bundeswehr experts in information warfare unable to intervene in the domestic context, even at an active consultation level.<\/p>

The second obstacle is political in nature. It appears pointless to discuss a multi-stakeholder approach to combatting hybrid threats emanating from the Russian Federation in states governed by “Die Linke\u201d such as Thuringia for example, or Mecklenburg Western Pomerania which is governed by the SPD. Both Minister-Presidents have openly displayed a Kremlin friendly attitude. Even worse, their respective parties are downplaying the Russian threat and are highly critical of security agencies. For \u2018Die Linke\u2019, the domestic intelligence agency IS the threat. The party even demands the dismantlement of the Verfassungsschutz.[6]<\/a> For the SPD, the Russian Federation poses no threat to Germany.<\/p>

Therefore, the prospect of an outreach concept involving ministries, the military, intelligence agencies, academia, political actors, the private sector, civil society and the media seems unlikely.<\/p>

The solution to tackling hostile operations by foreign actors on German soil appears more likely to be the introduction of fusion centers following the example of the Center for Cybersecurity linking the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior.<\/p>