Článek Taipei Times se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Taipei Times se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Seznam Zprávy se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Seznam Zprávy se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Ocean of Peace: Fiji’s Strategic Autonomy and China’s Pacific Miscalculation se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Photo: Suva, Fiji, by Olimpia Kot, EVC
Australia and Fiji have recently signed two agreements that could reshape Pacific security. The Vuvale Union deepens cooperation in the areas of economics, labor, education, skills, investment, and government-to-government relations. The Ocean of Peace Alliance, also known as the Veitacini Treaty, goes further: it establishes a qualified mutual defense commitment and opens the door for other Pacific states to join.
Hours after the signing of the Veitacini Treaty, China launched a nuclear-capable ballistic missile into the South Pacific. Beijing called it routine. Pacific leaders read it differently. The test drew regional criticism, revived discussion about Pacific-led security, and may have strengthened the case for the very architecture China would prefer to weaken.
The key development is Fiji’s strategic autonomy. Suva is aligning more closely with Australia while preserving the language of Pacific sovereignty, regional consensus, and non-exclusion. In a region where neutrality is becoming harder to sustain, Fiji is choosing deeper security cooperation without fully abandoning its long-standing balancing posture.
Fiji matters because it is a regional hub, a diplomatic center, a military actor, and a country long practiced in hedging between partners. It has deep historical, security, and people-to-people ties with Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. It also maintains economic and diplomatic links with China. For years, this balancing act reflected a broader Pacific preference: Remain open to all partners, avoid rigid alignment, and resist being turned into a chessboard for larger powers.
However, we are now witnessing an institutional shift in these dynamics. Australia is moving beyond episodic aid, summitry, and crisis diplomacy. It is building a web of Pacific agreements that combine security commitments, infrastructure, labor mobility, policing, economic integration, and administrative embedding. Fiji’s agreements sit alongside Australia’s recent arrangements with Tuvalu, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.
For Fiji, joining this network is a calculation. Suva appears to have concluded that the current strategic environment requires closer security ties with Canberra, while still leaving room for economic engagement with Beijing and regional leadership through Pacific institutions. Strategic autonomy does not always mean equidistance. Sometimes it means choosing a clearer security partner while retaining diplomatic maneuverability.
China’s missile test exposed the difficulty of Beijing’s own Pacific narrative. Beijing presents itself as respectful of sovereignty, opposed to bloc politics, and committed to development cooperation. Yet firing a nuclear-capable missile into the South Pacific, with limited notice amid the region’s nuclear history, was always likely to cause unease. China’s missile test may have been geared toward the United States and its allies, but it landed politically in the Pacific. For island governments, the launch reinforced concerns about coercion, nuclear risk, environmental harm, and great-power disregard for regional agency.
That is why the test may have been counterproductive. It did not stop Australia and Fiji from moving closer. It made the logic of tighter coordination easier to defend.
The key question is whether Ocean of Peace is changing from a diplomatic aspiration into a form of security architecture.
If Aotearoa joins early, the alliance would begin to look less like a bilateral Fiji-Australia arrangement and more like the nucleus of a wider Pacific framework. Papua New Guinea and Tonga would be obvious reference points because they have standing militaries, but other Pacific states may also seek non-military ways to contribute. Fiji has already welcomed New Zealand’s interest, while framing any decision as Wellington’s sovereign choice.
That would create a layered architecture: not all states doing the same thing, but more states accepting that peace requires coordination, resilience, and deterrence.
For Australia, the challenge is credibility. Canberra cannot ask Pacific states to trust its leadership while treating Pacific agency as decorative. Implementation must be transparent, respectful of the Pacific Islands Forum, and responsive to local priorities: climate resilience, disaster response, infrastructure, labor mobility, and economic security. Treaty-building will only work if it strengthens Pacific agency rather than placing Australian management under a Pacific label.
For China, the lesson is sharper. Military signaling can demonstrate capability, but it can also damage influence. In Oceania, power is judged not only by hardware, but by whether external actors respect the region’s political memory, nuclear anxieties, and desire for agency.
Fiji’s move toward Australia therefore should be read as hedging under pressure. Suva is not abandoning strategic autonomy – it is using it.
Článek Ocean of Peace: Fiji’s Strategic Autonomy and China’s Pacific Miscalculation se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Ukraine May Be Just the Beginning: Why NATO Needs the Indo-Pacific se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Photo: Unsplash.com
This year’s NATO Summit in Ankara was marked by a reaffirmation of the commitments made by member states at last year’s summit in The Hague. These include a significant increase in defense spending – up to 3.5% (5%) of GDP by 2035 – as well as a burden shifting of NATO’s defense expenditure toward the European flank. However, the Ankara summit did not bring any fundamental developments regarding the alliance’s broader strategic direction. Instead, the most significant progress continues to be made through sustained support for Ukraine and deeper cooperation across the defense-industrial base. Nevertheless, one important aspect remains underappreciated in Western debate. While NATO remains naturally an Atlantic-centered organization, its partnerships and various forms of cooperation extend well beyond the Euro-Atlantic theater. In its this year’s summit declaration, the alliance refers to “strategic competition,” implicitly once again highlighting the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its deepening strategic partnership with Russia — a development that represents a growing challenge not only for Western allies, but also for Indo-Pacific democracies and the broader rules-based international order. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners has therefore become an increasingly important area of engagement for the alliance. This is also why senior representatives from Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand (the NATO-IP4 format) participated in this year’s NATO Ankara Summit.
The shifting of the defense burden toward Europe is taking place primarily in the context of aforementioned strategic competition between the United States (US) and the PRC. In such environment, Washington increasingly lacks both the resources and the political will to sustain Europe’s post-Cold War peace dividend at the expense of its ability to counter growing Chinese pressure in the Indo-Pacific and across other domains of power competition. However, European part of NATO still underestimates the extent to which the confrontation with Russia is embedded within a broader strategic competition with Beijing unfolding across multiple fronts, with Europe increasingly becoming an integral part of this wider geopolitical rivalry. In 2024, NATO identified the PRC as a decisive enabler of Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, particularly due to Beijing’s extensive support for the Russian military-industrial complex and its provision of dual-use technologies. It has also recently emerged that Beijing has supported Moscow through classified programs involving joint military training between Russian and Chinese personnel. North Korea has meanwhile become one of the main suppliers of artillery and missile ammunition, military equipment, and personnel support for Russia’s war effort, receiving in return substantial financial resources, technological know-how, and valuable combat experience from a modern battlefield. This cooperation has further strengthened Pyongyang’s military capabilities and contributed to its growing threat to regional security in the Indo-Pacific, particularly for Seoul. The possibility of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, alongside simultaneous Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank, which is increasingly viewed as a realistic scenario, also cannot be overlooked. Such a conflict would have entirely unprecedented security and economic consequences for the rest of the world, including NATO.
Current developments clearly demonstrate that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters has become increasingly intertwined and mutually reinforcing dimension of the broader strategic environment. Democracies in both theaters have thus become increasingly aware of this trend, particularly in recent years. The deepening cooperation between Indo-Pacific democracies and NATO, which — although still largely implicit — increasingly reflects concerns about the possibility of a broader conflict spanning multiple theaters, is therefore a logical response to the deteriorating security environment and the growing convergence of strategic interests among authoritarian regimes across both theaters. A significant challenge, however, remains the fact that Europe continues to underestimate the scope and nature of the security challenge posed by the PRC. While NATO summit declarations in recent years have gradually adopted a more critical stance toward Beijing, this year’s declaration relied on broader and less explicit language, including vague references to strategic competition. This approach presents a challenge for NATO, particularly because its European members struggle to build the needed political consensus for a comprehensive assessment of the security challenge posed by Beijing, namely due to their deep economic dependence on the PRC. Washington is fully aware of this threat, but amid its ongoing commitments in the Middle East and the temporary political détente reached with Beijing during the latest meeting between Donald Trump and China’s leadership, it has been reluctant to adopt a tougher position.
It is also worth noting that the participation of IP4 countries at this year’s summit – with the exception of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who is generally perceived as more politically moderate in his approach toward Beijing – was limited to the ministerial level, with representation from defense and foreign affairs portfolios. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had planned to attend the summit but ultimately remained in Japan due to recent domestic political turmoil faced by her Liberal Democratic Party. While the summit was attended by the top leaders of all four countries in both 2022 and 2023, this was reduced to three leaders in 2024, with participation in 2025 and 2026 limited to only a single head of government. This year’s summit, therefore, didn’t bring any significant developments regarding the NATO-IP4 format itself. Despite the lower level of political representation, however, the summit did deliver certain progress in several areas. The US, Japan, and South Korea signed an agreement on the development of small modular nuclear reactors, while NATO and the IP4 states reaffirmed their intention to deepen ongoing cooperation on key security issues. These efforts continue to focus primarily on defense-industrial cooperation, military interoperability, cybersecurity and advanced technologies, support for Ukraine, arms control, maritime security, and countering hybrid threats.
The deepening cooperation between NATO and Indo-Pacific democracies represents one of the significant trends of contemporary security architecture. Although this does not yet involve a formal expansion of alliance commitments outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the growing interlink of security challenges shows that the stability of both theaters can no longer be viewed as separable. The ability of democracies to coordinate their policies toward shared challenges posed by authoritarian regimes – from Russian aggression against Ukraine and growing Chinese coercion in the Indo-Pacific to hybrid threats and technological competition – will therefore be a crucial factor for preserving the rules-based international order. For Czechia and Europe, this primarily implies the necessity of overcoming a narrowly defined regional perception of their own security and beginning to understand it in a broader and interconnected strategic context. This will be essential, especially at a time when authoritarian powers are linking their strategic objectives across multiple theaters. The same need for strategic thinking also applies to NATO’s democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Článek Ukraine May Be Just the Beginning: Why NATO Needs the Indo-Pacific se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek EUalive se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek EUalive se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Domino Theory se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Hungarian Prime Minister Says Orban’s Foreign Minister ‘Entering the Service of the CCP’
Článek Domino Theory se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek China’s Ethnic Unity Law as a Tool of Transnational Repression se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Photo: Tibetan Monks in Sera monastery, Tibet. Author: Zuzana Košková
On July 1, China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法) entered into force. Adopted in March, the law has since drawn criticism from China analysts, Western governments, and human rights organizations.
The legislation expands the scope of Chinese jurisdiction beyond its territory, making it a potentially powerful instrument of transnational repression. It targets not only ethnic groups Beijing perceives as threats under its broad national security framework, but also foreign citizens. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has already warned its citizens against traveling to China, citing risks linked to the law’s vague provisions.
The stated aim of the law is to “forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识), a concept repeated throughout the document. Across its seven chapters, the law emphasizes patriotic education, the promotion of the Chinese language, and the construction of a unified national identity among all ethnic groups.
The law adopts a whole-of-society approach. Article 18 mandates the integration of “community consciousness” into national, cadre, and social education. It promotes both traditional culture and “red” content highlighting the achievements of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.“ Article 20 obliges parents and guardians to educate minors to “love the Chinese Communist Party, the motherland, and the Chinese people.”
The law also functions as a tool of broader sinicization in regions Beijing considers politically sensitive. Article 21 extends these requirements to Hong Kong and Macao, while also addressing Taiwan by promoting cross-strait exchanges and strengthening a shared sense of identity, belonging, and cultural inheritance. The same article emphasizes strengthening ties with overseas Chinese communities, encouraging them to promote Chinese culture and support China’s national objectives. This reflects a broader United Front approach, in which diaspora communities are not only cultural bridges but also political actors encouraged to align with Beijing’s narratives and interests.
More broadly, the legislation seeks to resolve what the Chinese government frames as “ethnic problems,”portraying the Chinese nation as a unified, pluralistic family. At the same time, it explicitly rejects external criticism framed around ethnicity, religion, or human rights.
“The cause of national unity and progress shall not be interfered with by external forces,” reads the text. “We resolutely oppose all acts of slander, smearing, containment, suppression, infiltration, and sabotage against the People’s Republic of China under the pretext of ethnicity, religion, or human rights.“
Digital control is addressed in Article 31, which imposes obligations on platforms to monitor, remove, and report content that “undermines ethnic unity.”
Particular attention has focused on Article 63, which states: “Organizations and individuals outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China who engage in acts that undermine national unity and progress or create national division against the People’s Republic of China shall be held legally accountable in accordance with the law.” 中华人民共和国境外的组织和个人，针对中华人民共和国实施破坏民族团结进步、制造民族分裂行为的，依法追究法律责任。
The law does not define these acts, leaving broad discretion to authorities. Analysts warn that this ambiguity could extend to foreign individuals, businesses, researchers, academic institutions, or human rights defenders critical of China. The ambiguity of the legislation has been partially clarified by Hu Weilie (胡卫列), Vice Minister of Justice, who stated at a press conference of the State Council Information Office that holding overseas individuals legally liable for undermining ethnic unity is “legitimate, lawful, and consistent with international norms.”
The extraterritorial reach of the law has raised concerns in the European Union and the United States, particularly regarding its potential application to foreign citizens.
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen (蔡明彥) warned citizens against traveling to China, noting that the law vaguely defines offenses such as “undermining ethnic unity” and that under its provisions, Chinese authorities may investigate individuals, including foreign nationals, seize property, and inspect electronic devices.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council stated that the law “aims to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty and extend ideological control over its population.”
Concerns extend beyond Taiwan. Tibetan communities have protested the law since its adoption. On July 2, Lobga Rangzen, a Tibetan in exile, self-immolated in front of the United Nations headquarters in New York. While self-immolation has long been used as a form of protest among Tibetans, such incidents abroad — particularly in the United States — are rare and signal heightened urgency.
This legislation represents a significant expansion of China’s transnational repression toolkit. By combining vague legal definitions with extraterritorial jurisdiction, it creates legal uncertainty not only for Chinese diaspora communities, but also for foreign nationals engaging with China-related issues.
Článek China’s Ethnic Unity Law as a Tool of Transnational Repression se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Deník N se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek Deník N se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek EVC TWO Contributes to SEASAT Youth Camp Discussion on Human Rights and Inclusive Governance se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>On July 13, Dr. Olimpia Kot, Senior Project Coordinator and Analyst at the European Values Center for Security Policy (EVC) Taiwan Office, participated as a speaker at the 2026 SEASAT Youth Camp, organized by the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF) in Taipei.
Speaking on the panel “Human Rights in Asia: A Multigenerational Dialogue on Building an Inclusive Future,” Dr. Kot explored the relationship between human rights, democratic resilience, and inclusive policymaking, drawing on EVC’s research and policy engagement in Taiwan.
During the discussion, she highlighted Taiwan’s democratic progress in advancing human rights while emphasizing that protecting rights also requires ensuring that communities whose voices are often overlooked remain visible in public policy. Drawing on examples from EVC’s work on migrant workers, Indigenous communities, media freedom, and democratic resilience, she discussed how inclusive governance strengthens democratic institutions and contributes to more resilient societies.
Dr. Kot also presented EVC’s work including initiatives promoting the rights of migrant workers, supporting human rights institutions, advancing media freedom, engaging pro-democracy activists, and facilitating dialogue on the abolition of the death penalty. Through research, public diplomacy, expert exchanges, and cooperation with civil society organizations and international partners, EVC continues to contribute to the promotion of human rights and democratic resilience in Taiwan and across the Indo-Pacific.
The SEASAT Youth Camp brings together young leaders from Southeast and South Asia to exchange perspectives on democracy, human rights, and regional cooperation. As these issues become increasingly interconnected with broader questions of resilience and security, such discussions are essential for fostering mutual understanding and preparing the next generation of leaders. EVC was pleased to contribute to this dialogue by sharing perspectives from its ongoing work in Taiwan.
Článek EVC TWO Contributes to SEASAT Youth Camp Discussion on Human Rights and Inclusive Governance se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek 37P se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
]]>Článek 37P se nejdříve objevil na European Values Center for Security Policy.
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