{"id":5164,"date":"2017-05-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2017-05-01T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/kremlin-watch-monitor-may-2-2017\/"},"modified":"2021-12-16T12:22:23","modified_gmt":"2021-12-16T10:22:23","slug":"kremlin-watch-monitor-may-2-2017","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/kremlin-watch-monitor-may-2-2017\/","title":{"rendered":"Kremlin Watch Monitor May 2, 2017"},"content":{"rendered":"
Weekly monitor of pro-Kremlin disinformation effort in Europe. We follow best European analysts, best counter-measures and trends.<\/strong><\/p>\n \n \n \n The 124-page overview reviews shifts in strategic and policy documents of EU28 Member States following Russian aggression against Ukraine.<\/p>\n You can find the Full Study\u00a0zde<\/a>.<\/p>\n Below, find the OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n 20 SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS are available in a well-printable\u00a0SUMMARY<\/a>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The European Values think-tank was one of the co-authors of the\u00a0research<\/a>\u00a0of the Political Capital (Hungary) covering Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, focusing on\u00a0the violent ramifications of Russia’s regional influence<\/strong>. The case studies conducted in each of the countries describe how\u00a0the Kremlin’s strategy supports fringe, extremist or paramilitary organizations<\/strong>\u00a0in order to undermine bilateral ties with Ukraine and the United States, and destabilise the region after 2014.<\/p>\n The research highlights that\u00a0these organizations are posing a national security threat<\/strong>\u00a0throughout the region by keeping their secessionist, revisionist, and ultranationalist cross-country historical grievances dating back to World War II alive.<\/p>\n The summary report is available\u00a0ZDE<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Czech country report is available\u00a0ZDE<\/a>:<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Several fake Facebook profiles of Russian embassies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged recently, often ridiculing Kremlin’s actions and statements. Moscow\u00a0complained<\/a>\u00a0about the profiles to the operators of the social network, accused the accounts of being part of the information attack on the Russian Federation and requested them to be blocked. Facebook didn’t fulfil the Kremlin’s wishes and blocked the real account of the Russian embassy in Bratislava instead.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia \u201cIN SHORT: The 64th<\/sup><\/em>\u00a0<\/em>humanitarian aid column left for Donbas.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \n Instead of fighting against openly impersonating websites and comical projects, Facebooks wants to step up in dealing with\u00a0false accounts<\/a>\u00a0participating on \u201cwell-funded and subtle efforts by nations and other organizations to spread misleading information and falsehoods for geopolitical goals\u201d.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Parliament of Montenegro approved its decision to become a member of NATO, despite the disinformation campaigns and other hybrid means used by the Kremlin in order to prevent it. What it might mean for the future of the Balkans is discussed by John R. Schindler in\u00a0Observer<\/a>.<\/p>\n The role of the Kremlin in the attempted coup which has taken place not so long ago in Montenegro is the focal point of a new\u00a0Bellingcat analysis<\/a>. Here are the main findings:<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Analysing indicators of Russian aggression in the Baltic states;<\/strong><\/p>\n created and published by IHS Jane\u2019s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre<\/strong><\/p>\n Full study available\u00a0zde<\/a>.<\/p>\n Ahead of Russian military exercises in September, with the Russia-Belarus relationship deteriorating and with ambiguities in the US commitment to NATO, the Baltic states are anxious about Moscow’s intentions. In order to assess the probability of a future Russian invasion of the Baltics, we can lay out a series of both non-military and military indicators which would presumably be triggered on the pathway towards a worst-case scenario of invasion. Some of these indicators have already been at least partially triggers, the most significant being \u201cmedia attacks on \u2018anti-Russian policies\u2018 and disinformation campaigns\u201d (non-military); and \u201ccreation of new large military formations and reserves\u201d and \u201csnap and scheduled exercise including enhanced electronic warfare\u201d (military). There is already a strong presence of Russian military forces in or near the Baltic, and in case of invasion, these forces would probably prevail – at least initially \u2013 over NATO.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n In the spring volume of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence official\u00a0journal<\/a>, James Rogers and Andriy Tyushka describe the\u00a0Russian anti-hegemonic offensive seeking to desynchronise political developments<\/strong>\u00a0in the regions close to Europe, to distort European perceptions of reality, split the Atlantic democracies from the European continent and saturate the vacuum with false and fictitious narrative. You can also find chapters analysing the influence of Russian academic, political and public spheres on the\u00a0politicisation of information warfare,<\/strong>\u00a0or examining\u00a0the role of botnets in propaganda dissemination<\/strong>\u00a0during the Crimean war and the Dragoon ride.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Media Development Foundation published a media monitoring\u00a0report<\/a>\u00a0summarizing the\u00a0anti-Western messages<\/strong>\u00a0spread by the media, political parties and civic society in\u00a0Gruzie<\/strong>\u00a0during 2016. Apart from other findings, it seems that\u00a0the number of messages targeted against NATO increased<\/strong>, corresponding with a decrease in public support of the organization.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Marta Kowalska and Adam Lelonek from Centrum Analiz Propagandy I Dezinformacji\u00a0predict<\/a>\u00a0the\u00a0goals of Russian propaganda in Poland<\/strong>\u00a0for this year. They warn against the lack of political actions of the Polish government and consequently against further deepening of the political crisis and weakening the political position of Poland in Central Europe and on the international scene.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Follow us on<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Facebook<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>or<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Twitter<\/a>!<\/strong><\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n You can read the full Information war monitor, summarizing latest disinformation trends in Central Europe, co-authored by the European Values think-tank, Globsec Policy Institute and Political Capital\u00a0zde<\/a>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n The French presidential election is the main topic of discussion and one of the most important political events of the year 2017. Various public opinion polls and personal background information of the candidates have been brought to light before the first round and presented daily. Automated bots, social media trolls and disinformation outlets focused their activities on France as well.<\/p>\nNew publications<\/h1>\n
How do European democracies react to Russian aggression?<\/h2>\n
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The activity of pro-Russian extremist groups in Central-Eastern Europe<\/h2>\n
Weekly Update on the Kremlin Disinformation Efforts in Europe<\/h1>\n
Information operations on Facebook<\/h2>\n
<\/p>\nState of play in Montenegro<\/h2>\n
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Kremlin Watch Reading Suggestion<\/h1>\n
Euroatlantic experts on disinformation warfare<\/h1>\n
<\/p>\nINFORMATION WAR MONITOR<\/h1>\n
Disinformation outlets have a favourite French presidential candidate<\/h2>\n
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