{"id":5162,"date":"2017-04-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2017-04-19T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/kremlin-watch-monitor-april-19-2017\/"},"modified":"2021-12-16T12:21:57","modified_gmt":"2021-12-16T10:21:57","slug":"kremlin-watch-monitor-april-19-2017","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/kremlin-watch-monitor-april-19-2017\/","title":{"rendered":"Kremlin Watch Monitor April 19, 2017"},"content":{"rendered":"
Weekly monitor of pro-Kremlin disinformation effort in Europe. We follow best European analysts, best counter-measures and trends.<\/strong><\/p>\n Invitation: How Europe sees Putin’s Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n On April 24, we will present a new major study in the European Parliament, which evaluates policies of individual EU28 countries towards Russia. It is our pleasure to invite you to the public hearing (www.europeanvalues.net\/putin\/<\/a>).<\/p>\n \n \n We would like to introduce a new Kremlin Watch Report, authored by Ilyas Sharibzhanov, Analyst of the Kremlin Watch Programme. Mass media in Russia have changed significantly since the days of President Yeltsin and the contrast with the free and independent media in Russia of just 20 years ago has been ever so evident for the past three years, with Russia’s media turning from a market into a state-organized system of propaganda machine. The\u00a0document<\/a>\u00a0analyses these changes.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Our\u00a0Expert Jury<\/a>\u00a0consisting of\u00a0Jessikka Aro, Anton Shekhovtsov, John Schindler and Michael Weiss<\/strong>\u00a0regularly vote on the dangerousness of several candidates you can nominate via e-mail or Twitter.<\/p>\n The 8th Putin’s Champion Award Recipient is:<\/p>\n \n Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon<\/strong><\/p>\n For ignoring Russian aggression and willingness to renegotiate Ukrainian borders.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n Image Source:\u00a0Flickr,\u00a0<\/em>Place Au Peuple<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0CC BY-SA 2.0<\/em><\/p>\n \n The Expert Jury ranked his Putin-supportive job with<\/p>\n 3.3<\/strong><\/p>\n (out of 5) mark.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n The rating signals how much the recipient contributed to the interest of the Putin\u2019s aggressive regime. It is calculated as an average of ratings assessed by the Expert Jury of this Award.<\/p>\n You can find more details about the award and the former recipients\u00a0zde<\/a>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n It also reads in unofficial translation:<\/p>\n Full version, yet only in Czech language:\u00a0https:\/\/www.mocr.army.cz\/ministr-a-ministerstvo\/odkazy\/odkazy-46088<\/a><\/p>\n Similar wording can be found in other Czech strategic government documents: the 2015 Security Strategy, 2015 Foreign Policy Strategy, or the 2016 National Security Audit.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Estonian Internal Security Service<\/strong>\u00a0published its\u00a0Annual Review<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>for 2016<\/strong>. It describes several cases of caught Russian spies, including the\u00a0first case<\/a>\u00a0involving an alleged recruit of the GRU military intelligence service.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The National Security Council issued a\u00a0dossier<\/a>\u00a0accusing Russia of conducting a disinformation campaign aiming to cover up the role of the Syrian government in recent chemical attacks. The report includes declassified intelligence on the attack, showing that the Russian Federation and Syria both spread \u201cfalse narratives\u201d concerning the incident. Russian President Putin responded by comparing the accusation to the case of intelligence findings on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Joint Force Quarterly recapitulates the attacks on information systems in recent years, showing the increase in their numbers. From the\u00a0report<\/a>:<\/p>\n \n \n The Bundeswehr<\/strong>\u00a0is also a common target, noting more than 280,000 cyber-attacks only during January and February. The German government takes the issue seriously, establishing a\u00a0new Cyber and Information Space Command (CIR)<\/strong>\u00a0in the beginning of April. The CIR should involve around 14,000 military and civilian staff and include structures dealing with IT, cyber-security, military reconnaissance, geo-information and psychological warfare. You can read the\u00a0analysis<\/a>\u00a0of this move by Justyna Gotkowska from the Centre for Eastern Studies.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Helsinki will host a newly established\u00a0centre<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>for research on the tactics of hybrid threats<\/strong>. Experts from several\u00a0EU and NATO countries<\/strong>, including The United States, Britain, France, Germany, or Poland, will participate. According to the Foreign Minister of Finland Timo Soini, one of the aims should also be to boost society’s resilience against hybrid operations.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Field Guide to Fake News;<\/strong><\/p>\n compiled by Liliana Bounegru, Jonathan Gray, Tomasso Venturini & Michele Mauri; published by Public Data Lab.<\/strong><\/p>\n A collection of recipes for those who love to cook with digital methods \u2013 that is how this unique publication about fake news describes itself. Focusing on the character of online circulation and reception of fake news, the \u201cfield guide\u201d offers its readers new ways of mapping and responding to this phenomenon. It contains a number of recipes, which can be used by everyone with basic computer literacy who wants to grasp comprehensively the topic of fake news circulation on the internet or simply put a specific fake news into broader context. Every recipe is well-described and illustrated with examples, which are very interesting by themselves. To get a better understanding of how it all looks, here you can see a recipe how to create a network of cross-references between pages mentioning a certain fake story, and the result as well.<\/p>\n \n \n \n Result:<\/em><\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n The first set of recipes maps fake news hotspots on Facebook and offers answers to questions such as \u201cwhat publics does fake news animate\u201d, \u201chow may the trajectory of a fake news story be traced\u201d or \u201cdo fact-checking initiatives reach the publics of fake news\u201d (on Facebook). As with the other recipes, one can use the methods described and apply them to fake news of their choice. The second set focuses on tracing the circulation of fake news on the web and proposes various ways how to find out more about where do fake news originate and how they spread. Finally, the third set of recipes provides instructions how to use tracker signatures to map the techno-commercial underpinnings of fake news sites.<\/p>\n \n \n Read the full text\u00a0zde<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n As the\u00a0EU’s High Representative<\/strong>\u00a0Federica Mogherini approaches half of her term,\u00a0POLITICO<\/a>\u00a0asked foreign policy experts to evaluate her performance. Her\u00a0mark on Russia is not very high<\/strong>, unsurprisingly. \u201cMogherini completely fails to address a threat more than a dozen EU member states see as a major danger,\u201d says Jakub Janda in his contribution to the assessment.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Russian-born activist Masha Gessen and a former FBI special agent Clint Watts from the Centre for Cyber and Homeland Security discuss\u00a0the role of disinformation concerning the ties between the President Trump’s administration and Russia<\/strong>, and how bots, trolls, and fake news can influence politics on\u00a0Radio Times<\/a>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n John Cappello describes in his article for the\u00a0Foundation for Defence of Democracies<\/a>what narratives are spread and \u00a0politicians supported by the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign in the Western Balkans<\/strong>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Belarus<\/strong>\u00a0has been off the grid of the disinformation campaigns until recently. The\u00a0motives of the newly acquired attention<\/strong>\u00a0are discussed by Amy Mackinnon in the article for\u00a0.Coda<\/a>.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n Follow us on<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Facebook<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>or<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Twitter<\/a>!<\/strong><\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n The European Values think-tank participated in a\u00a0new study<\/a>\u00a0published by the GLOBSEC Policy Institute, together with counter-parts from Hungary and Poland. The aim was to describe how vulnerable are the societies of the Visegrad countries to subversive foreign influence and to point out the weak spots and best practices in addressing these threats, with the focus on five areas \u2013 public perception, political landscape, media, state countermeasures, and civil society.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n The Czech Republic ranked the third among the Visegrad group. Czech society, despite being quite euro-sceptic simultaneously rejects a pro-Russian orientation. One notable exception is Czech President Milo\u0161 Zeman, who is regarded by many as the most important and visible pro-Russian political actor in the region. At the same time, the current Czech government is leading the way in addressing subversive foreign efforts by setting up a dedicated anti-hybrid threats task force at the Ministry of Interior and is in close cooperation with a very active civil society.<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n National Bank of the Protectorate<\/strong>: According to the\u00a0New Republic<\/a>\u00a0website, the behaviour of the Council of the Czech National Bank (\u010cNB) suggests it is in the service of foreign capital or colonizers. The recent intervention of the Czech National Bank allegedly increased already huge exchange losses by 50 %.\u00a0\u00a0AC24<\/a>\u00a0informed that the price for previously weak Crown is 2 trillion CZK stolen from Czech citizens. Das neue Europa, we can read on\u00a0Aeronet<\/a>. Strengthening the Crown, according to its chief editor, really means setting up a reaction mechanism from Berlin in order to deal with an unsustainable situation in the area of low wages in the \u201cProtectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.\u201d<\/p>\n False flag in Syria<\/strong>: The reactions to the chemical attack in Syria varied on the disinformation websites. For example, according to\u00a0Protiproud<\/a>, the incident was a long-prepared excuse of the Pentagon generals for an indirect attack of Russia.\u00a0AC24<\/a>\u00a0references alleged sources amongst former CIA officials, according to which it was a fraud just as the sarin attack in Syria in 2013. Apart from other things, also former CIA official Philip Giraldi allegedly confirmed that neither the Syrian government nor the Russians are behind the attack. The government of Bashar al-Assad, according to fringe sources, would not have any benefit from using chemical weapons.\u00a0On the contrary<\/a>, the NATO inciters don’t want peace and desire prolongation of the war and destruction of Syria. Rescue operations after the chemical attack in Idlib in the White Helmets videos are\u00a0faked<\/a>\u00a0and conducted on a dead chid.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\nNew publication: How Kremlin controls major Russian media<\/h1>\n
Putin’s Champion Award<\/h1>\n
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<\/p>\nWeekly Update on the Kremlin Disinformation Efforts in Europe<\/h1>\n
The Czech Government adopted a new (State) Defence Strategy.<\/h2>\n
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Russian cover-up of Syrian chemical attacks<\/h2>\n
The rising number of cyber attacks<\/h2>\n
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Kremlin Watch Reading Suggestion<\/h1>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\nEuroatlantic experts on disinformation warfare<\/h1>\n
The Vulnerability Index<\/h1>\n
Subversive Russian Influence in Central Europe<\/h2>\n
<\/p>\nCzech Disinformation Corner<\/h1>\n