{"id":5110,"date":"2016-04-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2016-04-27T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/kremlin-watch-monitor-april-25-2016\/"},"modified":"2021-12-16T12:21:57","modified_gmt":"2021-12-16T10:21:57","slug":"kremlin-watch-monitor-april-25-2016","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/kremlin-watch-monitor-april-25-2016\/","title":{"rendered":"Kremlin Watch Monitor April 25, 2016"},"content":{"rendered":"
Weekly update on Kremlin disinformation efforts in Europe.<\/b><\/p>\n Kremlin Watch reading suggestions<\/b><\/p>\n Russia and the European Far Left by P\u00e9ter Krek\u00f3 and L\u00f3rant Gy\u00f6ri;\u00a0Political Capital Institute<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n P\u00e9ter Krek\u00f3 and L\u00f3rant Gy\u00f6ri point out in their\u00a0study<\/a>\u00a0that the radical right groupings are not the only ones that tend to support current Russian regime. Despite the Russian promotion of conservative and traditional values, the far left political parties in Europe often defend Russian foreign policy and the decisions of Russian president Vladimir Putin. The authors make several suggestions on how to tackle this phenomenon. According to them it is necessary for the investigative journalists, policy leaders, and intelligence services to acknowledge that the \u201ccomrade networks<\/i>\u201d have both a diplomatic and a secret service dimension. They also argue that \u201cit is important for politicians to point to the pro-Russian connections of radical left parties where they are, and challenge the credibility and self-definition of these parties via political debates and campaigns<\/i>\u201d.<\/p>\n Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign by Stefan Meister;\u00a0Transatlantic Academy<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n Although the possibilities are limited, the European Union and its Member States need to react to the challenges posed by the\u00a0Kremlin disinformation campaign<\/a>. It is important to maintain contact with Russian society and to promote platforms for exchange. One way to do that might be visa facilitation for Russian citizens in order to provide positive agenda. It is also important to prepare for the possibility that the president that comes after Vladimir Putin might be even more nationalist and aggressive and to focus on a more long-term agenda. Another crucial step is to keep up the policy of sanctions against Russia. EU member states must stand firm in order to preserve their credibility. An appropriate response also includes making Russian propaganda consistently visible by promoting responsible media and unmasking fakes. Last but not least, the EU needs to come up with a serious offer for its neighbours in the east including a membership perspective. If reform efforts succeed in Ukraine, the impact could spread to Russia and other post-Soviet states.<\/p>\n Euroatlantic Experts on Disinformation Warfare<\/b><\/p>\n Current state of pro-Kremlin scene in the Czech Republic<\/b><\/p>\n Infographic of the week<\/b><\/p>\n This week’s\u00a0infographic captures the evolution of the level of support of the European integration amongst Ukrainians, based on the data provided\u00a0by the\u00a0Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Sociological service of the Razumkov Center<\/b>\u00a0and a survey conducted by\u00a0GFK<\/b>, put together by the\u00a0Euromaidan Press<\/b>.<\/p>\n\n
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