{"id":30046,"date":"2022-12-05T19:32:45","date_gmt":"2022-12-05T17:32:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/?page_id=30046"},"modified":"2022-12-13T17:07:35","modified_gmt":"2022-12-13T15:07:35","slug":"e-learning-disinformation-resilience-dialogue-lessons-learned-from-central-and-eastern-europe","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/our-programs\/security-academies\/e-learnings\/e-learning-disinformation-resilience-dialogue-lessons-learned-from-central-and-eastern-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"E-learning &#8211; &#8220;Disinformation Resilience Dialogue: Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-page\" data-elementor-id=\"30046\" class=\"elementor elementor-30046\" data-elementor-post-type=\"page\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-7f5347e elementor-reverse-mobile elementor-section-full_width elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"7f5347e\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-11040d5\" data-id=\"11040d5\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-68d8f10 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"68d8f10\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-c639205\" data-id=\"c639205\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-d8808d9 elementor-widget__width-auto elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"d8808d9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\"><a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/our-programs\/security-academies\">Security Academies Program<\/a><\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-40e9a3c\" data-id=\"40e9a3c\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1b559e0 elementor-widget__width-auto elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"1b559e0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\"><a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/our-programs\/security-academies\/e-learnings\/\">E-learnings<\/a><\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-316c34e\" data-id=\"316c34e\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\" data-settings=\"{&quot;background_background&quot;:&quot;classic&quot;}\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-8c23beb elementor-section-full_width elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"8c23beb\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\" data-settings=\"{&quot;background_background&quot;:&quot;classic&quot;}\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-dfe8f4d\" data-id=\"dfe8f4d\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b314e95 elementor-widget__width-initial elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"b314e95\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">DISINFORMATION RESILIENCE DIALOGUE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE E-LEARNING<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-42017e4 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"42017e4\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-691d183 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"691d183\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-33 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-f022c68\" data-id=\"f022c68\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-48cd960 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"48cd960\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"4247\" height=\"891\" src=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-21870\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS.png 4247w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-768x161.png 768w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-1536x322.png 1536w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-2048x430.png 2048w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-18x4.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 4247px) 100vw, 4247px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-33 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-85c3a45\" data-id=\"85c3a45\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-33 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-a137bb1\" data-id=\"a137bb1\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-49f57cd elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"49f57cd\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/EN_EVC_logo_RGB.svg\" title=\"\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-38b4e45 elementor-reverse-mobile elementor-section-full_width elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"38b4e45\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-d05338b\" data-id=\"d05338b\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-a6e0c7b elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"a6e0c7b\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-e976f96\" data-id=\"e976f96\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-595142a elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"595142a\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ab20916 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ab20916\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-no-translation=\"\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<style>.elementor-element-ab20916{display:none !important}<\/style>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-fcc9900 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"fcc9900\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-55925e3 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"55925e3\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Project partners<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-319d2e2 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"319d2e2\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-no-translation=\"\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<style>.elementor-element-319d2e2{display:none !important}<\/style>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5275033 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"5275033\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-no-translation=\"\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<style>.elementor-element-5275033{display:none !important}<\/style>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f1e8984 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"f1e8984\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-no-translation=\"\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<style>.elementor-element-f1e8984{display:none !important}<\/style>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f53b893 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"f53b893\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a1674d3 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"a1674d3\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">E-learning<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-4ec0a2f elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"4ec0a2f\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-no-translation=\"\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<style>.elementor-element-4ec0a2f{display:none !important}<\/style>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-cecd539 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"cecd539\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-fade31e elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"fade31e\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-f433d1c\" data-id=\"f433d1c\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-eb15865 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"eb15865\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Czechia<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1c7086c elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"1c7086c\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-60f4678 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"60f4678\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Websites and other media spreading untrue or skewed information in support of Russia are not a new phenomenon. Many have <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hom-bre.cz\/images\/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">been<\/a> around since before 2013, but the Ukraine crisis of 2014 brought a new, hardened and more intense wave of pro-Russian discourse. The ultimate goal of the pro-Russian disinformation campaign is the destabilisation and weakening of its host country and the shifting of public opinion against the democratic institutions and mainstream media in it. Russia then acts as the only viable saviour.<\/p><p>Since 2014, the disinformation scene has had many opportunities to create its own pro-Russian narrative out of twisting and retelling facts and real events. The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hom-bre.cz\/images\/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">annexation<\/a> of Crimea and the events of Maidan in Ukraine, the <a href=\"https:\/\/manipulatori.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/06\/document-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">migration<\/a> crisis which peaked in 2015, the <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/CS_Vyrocni_zprava_o_stavu_ceske_dezinformacni_sceny_pro_rok_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">covid-19<\/a> pandemic and the new findings around the 2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/CS_Vyrocni_zprava_o_stavu_ceske_dezinformacni_sceny_pro_rok_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vrb\u011btice<\/a> ammunition warehouses explosions became the origin and springboard of many misleading and false narratives. The consequences of the following information fog can be found in real-world events \u2013 the polarization of Czech society manifested itself in the increased support of pro-Russian and anti-Western among the population. Some political actors actively benefited from the panic which surrounded the migration crisis, such as the SPD political movement, the current Czech president Milo\u0161 Zeman and the ANO party, from which Andrej Babi\u0161, the previous prime minister, rose. Falsehoods spread about the use of masks and the covid-19 vaccine directly led to some people not taking enough precautions and furthering the spread of the virus, resulting in deaths. And finally, the case of Vrb\u011btice gave perfect footing for the defence of Russia against Western democracies who expelled Russian diplomats and for an overall escalation of the events and diplomatic consequences.<\/p><p>In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, disinformation websites <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/EN_Annual_report_on_the_state_of_the_Czech_disinformation_scene_in_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">share<\/a> some common characteristics. They show no interest in ethical or objective journalism. They are often non-transparent as they tend to hide their organizational and financing structures. However, they also tend to differ in the type and frequency of the content they publish, and the audience they are able to pull in.<\/p><p>There are about <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/EN_Annual_report_on_the_state_of_the_Czech_disinformation_scene_in_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">40<\/a> relevant disinformation websites in the Czech Republic. <a href=\"https:\/\/manipulatori.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/06\/document-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Chain emails<\/a> and social media also contribute to the spread of misinformation. Some <a href=\"https:\/\/manipulatori.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/06\/document-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">politicians<\/a> often participate on disinformation websites by giving them interviews or writing articles \u2013 this is a key characteristic of the Czech disinformation scene. It gives many sites more <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hom-bre.cz\/images\/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">credibility<\/a> than they would have without the support of publicly known figures. In 2021, Tomio Okamura, the leader of the SPD political movement, was the most active contributor, with Trikolora&#8217;s Zuzana Majerov\u00e1 Zahradn\u00edkov\u00e1 behind him. Higher standing political representatives have also played their part in the spread of misinformation \u2013 especially when it came to the events in Vrb\u011btice \u2013 namely the Czech president Milo\u0161 Zeman, the previous prime minister Andrej Babi\u0161, and others.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-db6c7fa elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"db6c7fa\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">SWOT<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1a61236 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"1a61236\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>On the following lines, a so-called SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) describing the approach of the Czech Republic towards disinformation is introduced.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-de02458 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"de02458\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">1. Strengths of the Czech Republic<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1f8f727 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"1f8f727\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Although the Czech capabilities to defend itself from the constant streams of disinformation are far from perfect, there are several stable pillars on which the Czech Republic can build its defences, which would protect its society against the mostly pro-Russia malign narratives. These pillars include a relatively strong civil society actively tackling the disinformation problem and producing a large amount of analysis about the local disinformation scene, several state institutions dealing with the problem, such as the Centre Against Hybrid Threats (CHH), and finally, experience with propaganda from the Soviet era and current awareness of the issue.<\/p><p><strong>Civil society organizations dealing with disinformation<\/strong><\/p><p>After the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the consequent start of a massive disinformation campaign, civil society slowly became the major player tackling the disinformation problem, despite the fact that there most probably wasn\u2019t any organisation dealing with this issue before 2014. Since the<a href=\"https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/disinformation\/news\/czech-republic-is-losing-the-information-war-experts-warn\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> state response<\/a> to disinformation had been very<a href=\"https:\/\/zpravy.aktualne.cz\/domaci\/babisova-vlada-dezinformace-neresila\/r~a08bf9e07ab811ecb13cac1f6b220ee8\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> weak<\/a> for a long time, NGOs had to fill the vacuum and supply the role of the state, in which they have been relatively successful.<\/p><p>As a result, there are several quite known organisations with decent expertise in the area of disinformation that try to cover all its aspects and problems that emerge along with that. Namely, the <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/publications-2\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">European Values Centre for Security Policy (EVC)<\/a> which is focused generally on Russian and Chinese influence and was among the first organisations that started to tackle disinformation. EVC produces weekly newsletters mapping the current disinformation narratives in the Czech Republic and other countries or annual reports on the state of the Czech disinformation scene.<\/p><p>There are the <a href=\"https:\/\/cesti-elfove.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Czech Elves<\/a>, focused solely on mapping and debunking popular disinformation narratives, including those appearing in the infamous chain emails or <a href=\"https:\/\/demagog.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Demagog<\/a>, which fact-checks political discussions and generally politicians\u2019 quotes but also Facebook content, i.e., disinformation that appears on Facebook. Then there are also organisations focused on teaching media literacy, such as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fakescape.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Fakescape<\/a> or <a href=\"https:\/\/zvolsi.info\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Zvol si info<\/a>, and many others dealing with different aspects of the disinformation issue, such as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nelez.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">NELE\u017d<\/a>, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amo.cz\/en\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Association for international affairs (AMO)<\/a> or the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pssi.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI).<\/a><\/p><p><strong>State centre and parliamentary commission against hybrid threats<\/strong><\/p><p>While the state response to disinformation has been quite slow and weak, non-negligible progress has been made. In 2017, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mvcr.cz\/cthh\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">the Centre against hybrid threats (CHH)<\/a>, dealing among other things with disinformation, has been created within the Ministry of the Interior. Since then, it has become a respectable institution with a lot of expertise in the subject, producing public analysis about current disinformation narratives and trends.<\/p><p>Since 2020, the topic of disinformation has been also tackled on the parliamentary level by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.psp.cz\/sqw\/hp.sqw?k=8300\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Permanent Commission on Hybrid Threats<\/a>, which can push for solutions on a political level and urge the government to adopt measures related to disinformation. Finally, the hybrid threats have been partly tackled by the Ministry of Defense, which has introduced<a href=\"https:\/\/mocr.army.cz\/informacni-servis\/zpravodajstvi\/vlada-schvalila-narodni-strategii-pro-celeni-hybridnimu-pusobeni-227120\/\"> the <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/mocr.army.cz\/informacni-servis\/zpravodajstvi\/vlada-schvalila-narodni-strategii-pro-celeni-hybridnimu-pusobeni-227120\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference<\/a> and, consequently an <a href=\"https:\/\/mocr.army.cz\/informacni-servis\/zpravodajstvi\/cr-ucinila-dalsi-dulezity-krok-v-posilovani-odolnosti-vuci-hybridnimu-pusobeni-231930\/#:~:text=%C4%8CR%20u%C4%8Dinila%20dal%C5%A1%C3%AD%20d%C5%AFle%C5%BEit%C3%BD%20krok%20v%20posilov%C3%A1n%C3%AD%20odolnosti%20v%C5%AF%C4%8Di%20hybridn%C3%ADmu%20p%C5%AFsoben%C3%AD,-Autor%3A%20redakce%20(ob&amp;text=Vl%C3%A1da%20%C4%8Cesk%C3%A9%20republiky%20dne%2022,posilov%C3%A1n%C3%AD%20odolnosti%20v%C5%AF%C4%8Di%20t%C4%9Bmto%20hrozb%C3%A1m.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Action plan<\/a> with specific goals for strengthening endurance against hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns.<\/p><p><strong>General experience and awareness of the disinformation issue<\/strong><\/p><p>Due to the 40-year-long experience of communist rule, as well as Soviet invasion and occupation, part of the Czech society has a relative resilience against certain foreign disinformation narratives and perhaps propaganda in general. Together with the work and findings of the NGO and state sector about disinformation, there is a general<a href=\"https:\/\/www.stem.cz\/dezinformace-ohrozuji-nasi-bezpecnost-mysli-si-cesi-vetsina-souhlasi-s-omezovanim-dezinformacnich-zdroju\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> awareness<\/a> about the problem, at least among the more educated population and country elites, also thanks to the media.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-35fa9c1 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"35fa9c1\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">2. Weaknesses of the Czech Republic <\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ba4241c elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ba4241c\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Czech Republic\u2019s strategy to tackle disinformation has several weaknesses and vulnerabilities emanating from the ambiguous approach of the Czech political elites, which generally did not give the topics the attention they required over the last couple of years. Therefore, certain unpreparedness is observable within the legal framework, governmental institutions and educational system, which makes defeating fake narratives a major challenge.<\/p><p><strong>a) Strategic communication<\/strong><\/p><p>The Czech Republic <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/Strategicka-komunikace-statu-tiskova-zprava.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">lacks<\/a> a comprehensive approach to strategic communication and therefore is unable to effectively control the information flow and rapid spread of certain harmful narratives.<\/p><p>There is a lack of coordination between different ministries and other governmental institutions that do not have a unified communication strategy towards the public, which often leads to intentional and unintentional misinformation both by the general public and foreign agents within the country.<\/p><p><strong>b) Public and state sphere coordination<\/strong><\/p><p>Czech governmental institutions are generally unable to coordinate their positions on certain critical issues among themselves, therefore it should not be a surprise that it is likewise unable to create close and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/disinformation\/news\/czech-republic-is-losing-the-information-war-experts-warn\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">effective<\/a> partnerships with civil society organizations dealing with disinformation and related topics.<\/p><p>Despite being able to provide some organizations with a certain level of funding, it is not a systemic cooperation that could truly stop the influx of harmful foreign narratives to the country or\u00a0 control their flow in Czech cyberspace.<\/p><p>Overall, the ability of the state to monitor and analyze the spread of disinformation in a reasonable timeframe is extremely limited. State institutions are able of observing different topics and officially fact-check the most dangerous narratives before they spread too far. However, expert governmental units (e.g. the CHH at the Ministry of the Interior) have a minimal following to be able to overcome major disinformation campaigns and are unable to launch effective and wide spreading counter campaigns.<\/p><p><strong>c) Educational system<\/strong><\/p><p>Despite major changes occurring in the educational sphere every few years and governmental declared focus on critical thinking and media literacy trainings, actual results are difficult to measure and, there is a massive divergence in different regions. Less prosperous ones, which already struggle in other indicators of societal progress, continue to struggle with new educational standards, which are difficult to implement and thus create further <a href=\"https:\/\/www.novinky.cz\/domaci\/clanek\/mapa-vzdelavani-ukazuje-propastne-rozdily-napric-republikou-40387794\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">disunity<\/a> within the educational system.<\/p><p><strong>d) Hijacked debate on the Freedom of speech<\/strong><\/p><p>Over the years, the actors of the disinformation scene have increasingly focused on the Freedom of speech resulting in a blurred perception of this core democratic principle by the general public. Systemic measures to tackle disinformation on a state level accompanied by a legislative change is currently an extremely toxic and <a href=\"https:\/\/hlidacipes.org\/vypinani-dezinformacnich-webu-versus-svoboda-slova-diktator-se-na-zakony-ptat-nebude\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">dividing<\/a> issue both within the political sphere and especially amongst the citizens.<\/p><p>The ability of the disinformation actors to hide their activities under the umbrella of the Freedom of expression limits higher public support for more punitive and harsh governmental measures against disinformation actors. Such measures are needed to limit their ability to influence public opinion especially on critical security and foreign policy-related topics.<\/p><p><strong>e) Weak editorial oversight in some media<\/strong><\/p><p>During the last couple of years, there were several instances in which the media <a href=\"https:\/\/preview.mailerlite.com\/r9o3r9i3b0\/1973066890007807612\/y5f8\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">spread<\/a> a false story that reached tens of thousands of people. It is a result of a systemic change in the media landscape &#8211; many media nowadays prefer speed and quantity over objectivity and quality, which means less editors and fact checkers and more reliance on information provided by external actors (various organizations, press agencies, PR press releases, \u2026). On the other hand, this preference of speed and even opinionated public journalism is at least partially fought by several relatively new media striving to provide its readers with well researched stories. Despite tabloids (such as Blesk) and media owned by oligarchs (Economia publishing house, MF Dnes, Lidov\u00e9 noviny, \u2026) still represent much larger percentage of the media market, subscriber models employed by new media (Den\u00edkN or Voxpot) have gained a substantial following.<\/p><p>To add to this, a high percentage of people get their daily dose of news stories on various social media networks, where respectable media houses advertise next to those that provide significantly worse services or are downright disinformation platforms.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-8220597 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"8220597\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">3. Opportunities<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-30d5f08 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"30d5f08\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Due to the rise of threats mentioned above like unprecedented geopolitical escalation in the proximity of the Czech Republic and information activities of malicious foreign actors in Czech public space, it is necessary to take advantage of various opportunities with the purpose to mitigate critical vulnerabilities and external threats. Most important is the membership in an integrated international organization and the current governmental willingness to improve the situation.<\/p><p><strong>Government&#8217;s commitment to tackle disinformation<\/strong><\/p><p>Despite issues regarding the state&#8217;s effectiveness in countering disinformation (like limits in strategic <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bis.cz\/public\/site\/bis.cz\/content\/vyrocni-zpravy\/2020-vz-cz-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">communication<\/a>), there is a clear desire to increase the effectiveness of governmental efforts in this area. This effort started with the previous government and the adoption of <a href=\"https:\/\/mocr.army.cz\/informacni-servis\/zpravodajstvi\/cr-ucinila-dalsi-dulezity-krok-v-posilovani-odolnosti-vuci-hybridnimu-pusobeni-231930\/#:~:text=%C4%8CR%20u%C4%8Dinila%20dal%C5%A1%C3%AD%20d%C5%AFle%C5%BEit%C3%BD%20krok%20v%20posilov%C3%A1n%C3%AD%20odolnosti%20v%C5%AF%C4%8Di%20hybridn%C3%ADmu%20p%C5%AFsoben%C3%AD,-Autor%3A%20redakce%20(ob&amp;text=Vl%C3%A1da%20%C4%8Cesk%C3%A9%20republiky%20dne%2022,posilov%C3%A1n%C3%AD%20odolnosti%20v%C5%AF%C4%8Di%20t%C4%9Bmto%20hrozb%C3%A1m.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Action plan <\/a>for the National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference at the end of 2021. The current cabinet of Petr Fiala then seems <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vlada.cz\/cz\/programove-prohlaseni-vlady-193547\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">more determined <\/a>in this field, considering the new strict attitude towards Eastern powers and the Policy Statement of the Government, where disinformation resilience holds an important position.<\/p><p>Moreover, the \u201cnew government\u201d is not dependent on the parties where at least some politicians have an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kscm.cz\/?s=dezinformace\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">unfavorable attitude <\/a>towards countering disinformation (like the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia which possessed some influence in<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/monkey-cage\/wp\/2018\/07\/26\/the-communist-party-is-supporting-the-czech-coalition-government-what-are-the-implications\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> the former Parliament<\/a>). Therefore, the commitment to increase digital resilience promises a supply of resources for the near future and represents a critical opportunity for the Czech Republic.<\/p><p><strong>Progress in the institutional framework<\/strong><\/p><p>Because of the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, certain positive dynamics exist in positions responsible for countering disinformation. In March 2022 the government created the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vlada.cz\/cz\/ppov\/zmocnenci_vlady\/vladni-zmocnenec-pro-oblast-medii-a-dezinformaci-194841\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">office<\/a> of special representative for media and disinformation with an agenda consisting of coordinating efforts of various administration branches in his competence as well as strategic communication. Although some view this move as insufficient (the newly established Department of strategic communication under The Office of the Government will have only <a href=\"https:\/\/zpravy.aktualne.cz\/domaci\/stat-spusti-oddeleni-pro-strategickou-komunikaci-je-to-malo\/r~541ba02af7f811eca3c0ac1f6b220ee8\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">four clerks<\/a> for now), it is without a doubt that the new office would help increase cooperation on the axis state \u2013 society.<\/p><p><strong>Western support<\/strong><\/p><p>Being part of the Western world is probably the most important opportunity the Czech republic has to counter disinformation and many other issues in these times of uncertainty. NATO is well aware of (for example)<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_156338.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> Russian Hybrid warfare<\/a> and experiences shared at the alliance level could provide invaluable help for the Czech Republic. The EU is also willing to tackle the spreading of disinformation, investing \u20ac50 million between 2015-2020 (which the European Court of Auditors sees as \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eca.europa.eu\/Lists\/ECADocuments\/SR21_09\/SR_Disinformation_EN.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">relatively low<\/a>\u201d). The focus is to increase media literacy, the ability of the private sector to tackle disinformation and raise awareness among the population. The Union resources could be critical in strengthening the domestic anti-disinformation budget and in negotiations with global social network <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-eu-tech-fakenews-idUSKBN29X1R2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">operators<\/a>.<\/p><p><strong>New legislation<\/strong><\/p><p>Another potential lies in adapting the country&#8217;s legislation to current reality, which will provide the necessary legal framework and authority to the various branches of apparatus of the state. And this process is already in motion, as was stated before. We can mention the changes in the Military Intelligence Act (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.lupa.cz\/clanky\/sondy-jen-v-krajnim-pripade-do-snemovny-miri-uprava-zakona-o-vojenskem-zpravodajstvi\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2021<\/a>). It empowers the Czech military intelligence service to monitor data in cyberspace and also holds it responsible for cyber defense. This year (2022) the Ministry of Interior also prepared<a href=\"https:\/\/www.novinky.cz\/domaci\/clanek\/vnitro-uz-pripravilo-zakon-k-blokovani-skodlivych-webu-40399442\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> a bill<\/a> against spreading disinformation. The New law will potentially allow the state to block or ban disinformation servers or fake news. In combination with other supportive measures, these changes could enhance the resilience of the Czech Republic as a whole in the future.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-cc9ab22 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"cc9ab22\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">4. Threats to the Czech Republic<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-05de0d3 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"05de0d3\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Based on its history and geographic proximity to currently hostile countries like the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic faces a relatively large number of threats, including disinformation. Furthermore, there are significant political powers that are not willing to see those threats or even try to weaken civil society to their <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/CS_Vyrocni_zprava_o_stavu_ceske_dezinformacni_sceny_pro_rok_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">advantage<\/a>. Hence, it is desirable to name some of the main threats in this issue.<\/p><p><strong>Potential growth of panslavic sentiment<\/strong><\/p><p>In light of the latest developments, it is clear that one of the leading threats to liberal democracy in the countries of the European Union comes from Russia. Similarly to other Central and Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic is vulnerable to narratives which are in its way modern varieties of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/event\/Pan-Slavism\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">panslavism<\/a> \u2013 the idea greatly popular among elites of Bohemia in the 19th century, that all Slavic people should live together in one big and powerful Slavic state. Unlike the original panslavism, narratives spreading its modern versions <a href=\"https:\/\/www.advojka.cz\/archiv\/2021\/14-15\/mobilizacni-potencial-panslavismu\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">promote<\/a> Russia as the savior from German (or generally Western) imperialism based on the role of the USSR in WW2 and also as the protector from Western decadence and multiculturalism. Such narratives still resonate enough to mobilize part of the Czech society, which consists mostly of older and less educated people.<\/p><p><strong>Possible change of political orientation<\/strong><\/p><p>The currently ruling government is fully composed of parties that declare their <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vlada.cz\/en\/jednani-vlady\/policy-statement\/policy-statement-of-the-government-193762\/#foreign_policy\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cpro-western\u201d<\/a> orientation in foreign policy. But it is not even one year by now since the populist PM Andrej Babi\u0161 (ANO 2011) was receiving tacit support from <a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/CS_Vyrocni_zprava_o_stavu_ceske_dezinformacni_sceny_pro_rok_2021.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">KS\u010cM <\/a>(Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) one of the main antisystem parties, very often criticizing Czech presence in structures of NATO and EU. It is impossible to rule out the return of now opposition leader Andrej Babi\u0161 (ANO 2011) to the PM chair in the future. The only other opposition party which made it over the parliamentary electoral threshold in 2021 was the <a href=\"https:\/\/manipulatori.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/06\/document-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SPD<\/a> (Freedom and direct democracy) \u2013 a far-right anti-European and arguably pro-Russian party. It is questionable what decisions regarding foreign affairs would the possible government of Andrej Babi\u0161 with the SPD \u2013 and potentially once again KS\u010cM \u2013 make.<\/p><p><strong>Rising importance of China<\/strong><\/p><p>The influence of Russia might be significantly weakened by its latest killing of civilians and breaking international norms on a huge scale. Nevertheless, there is one more actor in the disinformation scene worth your attention \u2013 China. The Chinese regime is building its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlasvlivu.cz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">influence <\/a>in Czechia in the long run. For example, the CEO of Chinese company <a href=\"https:\/\/sinopsis.cz\/en\/?s=CEFC+\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">CEFC <\/a>China Energy Ye Jianming even became a special adviser to Czech president Milo\u0161 Zeman in 2015 and stayed in this position until he disappeared in 2018. It became known later that he was detained by the ruling regime. Chinese state also gained leverage through its <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/full\/10.1177\/18681026211007147\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cmask diplomacy\u201d <\/a>applied all over the globe, without the exception of the Czech Republic throughout the Covid-19 pandemic.<\/p><p><strong>Appearance of social-economic topics easily exploitable by disinformation actors in public debate<\/strong><\/p><p>Last but not least, we should not forget to mention a window of opportunity for disinformation actors in increasingly crushing social-economic situations. As the prices of energy are rising and inflation is increasing the cost of living likewise, it will be tempting for disinformation actors to use those facts to argue that Czechia should not try to lower its dependence on Russia in a similar manner as Hungarian PM Viktor <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/hungary-cannot-support-new-eu-sanctions-against-russia-present-form-pm-orban-2022-05-06\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Orban <\/a>is already doing.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ad75d93 elementor-widget elementor-widget-video\" data-id=\"ad75d93\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-settings=\"{&quot;youtube_url&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.youtube.com\\\/watch?v=eFkcAhn7oqo&amp;list=PLVPVACPBEa38gIEcFROvuUNNcy2Nd0eJ7&amp;index=4&quot;,&quot;video_type&quot;:&quot;youtube&quot;,&quot;controls&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;}\" data-widget_type=\"video.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-wrapper elementor-open-inline\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-video\"><\/div>\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-fe4cf70 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"fe4cf70\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-88674ac elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"88674ac\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-9636d4f elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"9636d4f\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-ebab5d9\" data-id=\"ebab5d9\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-d39aaa5 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"d39aaa5\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Georgia<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-7740105 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"7740105\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-9fd0c93 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"9fd0c93\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Georgia has long been a testing ground for Russian hybrid warfare. During the 2008 August war, Russia piloted its hybrid warfare and disinformation tactics, which Russia later successfully adopted in Ukraine and beyond. Since then, apart from Russia occupying 20% of Georgian territory, pro-Russian and anti-Western groups have continuously disseminated malign disinformation and propaganda in Georgia, attacking its pro-Western foreign policy, NATO and EU integration aspirations, and liberal democracy. Apart from targeting Georgian citizens with anti-Western and pro-Kremlin narratives, Russian disinformation has consistently spread tailor-made campaigns for different societal groups in Georgia. Russian disinformation campaigns have intensified since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. In Georgia, there are Russian state-controlled outlets (Sputnik and NewsFront) and proxy websites, even TV channels, and some pro-Russian\/anti-Western political parties (of which Alliance of Patriots and alt-right Conservative Movement are the most prominent) who spread anti-Western disinformation.<\/p><p>As Russia has been waging a hybrid war against Georgia, there have been quite a few initiatives in Georgia to address this threat. Georgia&#8217;s Reforms Associates (GRASS) and Media Development Foundation (MDF) have launched fact-checking platforms &#8211; Factcheck Georgia (GRASS) and Mythdetector (MDF). They have been producing debunking articles and related content.<\/p><p>Factcheck Georgia and MDF are partnering with Facebook&#8217;s Third-Party Fact-Checking program, which means that they are fact-checking content spread on FB (the most widely used platform for spreading disinformation in Georgia) and labeling manipulative or false posts, which reduces their reach. Labeling the content also reduces the viewership of propagandistic outlets on the social media platforms, ultimately limiting their audience. The program has proved quite effective, especially during times of crisis, elections, and the pandemic.<\/p><p>GRASS, MDF, and other organizations are conducting media-literacy campaigns, providing training to youth, students, teachers, representatives of ethnic minorities, etc.<\/p><p>ISFED, GRASS, and MDF monitor and regularly produce reports describing Georgia&#8217;s disinformation scene, actors, and narratives. Such reports are useful for research purposes, as well as for decision-makers. The media has also more or less covered those reports, thus raising public awareness on the issue.<\/p><p>ISFED and DFR Lab of the Atlantic Council have been conducting extensive research on coordinated inauthentic behavior of disinfo sources on Facebook. They have then communicated their findings to Facebook, which has removed the pages, accounts, and groups engaged in inauthentic coordinated behavior. Such removals are immensely effective as they degrade disinformation infrastructure, although malign actors create new pages, groups, and accounts every time. Nevertheless, the removals limit their effectiveness and reach.<\/p><p>Sovlab and the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) conduct research that addresses the historical narratives of disinformation. Ifact conducts investigative journalistic activities about actors engaged in disseminating propaganda. IDFI, in partnership with the University of Georgia, has developed a course for students (and not only) in disinformation and propaganda issues. Tbilisi State University also has a class about the information wars and propaganda in the BA program of International Relations.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5fa5be7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"5fa5be7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Lessons learnt<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-de5448b elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"de5448b\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The Georgian government acknowledges the threat of propaganda and disinformation in its strategic documents but has not done much to counter it. There have only been sporadic cases when the government representatives countered Russian propaganda with strategic communication.<\/p><p>It&#8217;s noteworthy that the parliament has conducted a thematic inquiry into anti-Western propaganda and adopted the report containing numerous recommendations. However, since the report&#8217;s adoption, there has been almost no progress, and the parliament has not been active in pushing the government to implement the recommendations.<\/p><p>The government has established strategic communication departments in the foreign ministry, interior ministry, ministry of defense, and government strategic communication (in the chancellory of the Prime Minister). Strategic communication is an excellent tool to counter disinformation; however, the work of these departments has been controversial. They have not done much and certainly not enough against pro-Russian and anti-Western propaganda, while the Facebook pages of the stratcom departments have mainly focused on countering the opposition-affiliated media and those critical to the government.<\/p><p>To effectively counter disinformation campaigns in Georgia, the parliament must proceed with its report and implement recommendations; the government&#8217;s stratcoms must focus on the imminent threat stemming from Russia&#8217;s disinformation campaigns, and government, civil society, media, and all other relevant stakeholders must work together to address this issue.<\/p><p>The coronavirus pandemic has proved that disinformation can have devastating effects not only in Georgia but all over the world. Government\u2019s ignorance has paid off and Georgia has experienced the actual on the ground impact of disinformation and malign information operations. The ineffective campaign against disinformation led Georgia to concrete severe consequences which had significant impact on Georgia\u2019s political, social and economic agenda:<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-c9918c7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"c9918c7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Rise of alt-right proxy groups resulting in extremist violence<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-8faf39a elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"8faf39a\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Alt-info, a radical group, notorious for its violent actions and hateful, threatening and violence-inciting statements, conducts propaganda against Georgia\u2019s allies and against its constitutionally recognized Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course. It accuses the West of interference into Georgia\u2019s domestic issues, colonialism, and of undermining Georgia\u2019s traditions and its Christian faith. Alt-info considers that Georgia does not have an European future, seeks to end liberal democracy in Georgia and cut off relations with the West. As an alternative Alt-Info suggest to start negotations with Kremlin with the aim of aligning with Russia. Apart from acting as a long-standing source of anti-western propaganda, the radical Alt-info group was behind the violent events of July 5, 2021, which led to the physical assault of 53 media representatives. Particularly, Alt-Info employed its propaganda tactics and to organise a violent rally with the aim of not letting the Pride March to take place. As the Pride March did not take place, the extremists attacked reporters and cameramen, resulting in massive organised violence in the centre of the capital Tbilisi, with the police not able to stop the extremists.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-d43beab elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"d43beab\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Threat to economic and energy security \n<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5ea5ce9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"5ea5ce9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Alt-Info and other groups organised a massive campaign against building a massive hydro power plant. The protest started with some legitimate questions but then it was dominated by propaganda and disinformation. Eventually, the propagandists managed to halt the project and investor left the country resulting in economic damage and the missed opportunity to achieve energy-independence because as consumption increases in Georgia it is necessary to generate more energy locally in order not to get dependent on imports from Russia.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b436129 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"b436129\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Security threat<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b36f45a elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"b36f45a\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 constituted a threat to Georgia&#8217;s security, as there was a serious risk of the conflict spilling over into Georgia, given that Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic minorities live geographically close with each other on the territory of Georgia. Disinformation campaigns have tried to confuse the situation and provoke controversy. For example, disinformation messages said that Syrian fighters and weapons were transported to Azerbaijan through Georgia. These messages also called on ethnic Armenians to block the state border between Georgia and Turkey.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-05df3bf elementor-widget elementor-widget-video\" data-id=\"05df3bf\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-settings=\"{&quot;youtube_url&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.youtube.com\\\/watch?v=q2IUcosyDys&amp;list=PLVPVACPBEa38gIEcFROvuUNNcy2Nd0eJ7&amp;index=1&quot;,&quot;video_type&quot;:&quot;youtube&quot;,&quot;controls&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;}\" data-widget_type=\"video.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-wrapper elementor-open-inline\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-video\"><\/div>\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-76d54ef elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"76d54ef\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-d01ddee elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"d01ddee\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-7fdf5c8 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"7fdf5c8\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-ba845eb\" data-id=\"ba845eb\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-7fb039f elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"7fb039f\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Germany<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-65ee422 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"65ee422\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-36ae7ce elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"36ae7ce\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The spread of conspiracy theories plays a big role in coordinated disinformation campaigns. Conspiracy theories have always existed, but recently, since the Covid-19 Pandemic, they have become increasingly popular. Since the beginning of the Pandemic Germany was one of the countries where a significant part of the population spread conspiracy theories about the virus.<\/p><p>This part focuses on the actors of disinformation and creation of conspiracy theories with the main goal to divide societies and destabilize the liberal democratic order. The first part elaborates on originators of disinformation, as well as countermeasures, while the second part further looks into conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Lastly, it gives an insight into the right-wing terrorism in Germany, which was influenced in the last years by long-standing disinformation campaigns by various actors.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-e87af13 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"e87af13\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Disinformation in Germnay - Un \u00c9tat actuel<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-7526b52 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"7526b52\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Disinformation is used domestically by various actors to pursue their own political goals. At the same time, foreign actors such as states in particular are involved in disinformation campaigns to export their narratives or divide and destabilize societies. In this part, originators of disinformation, as well as countermeasures, are presented.<\/p><p>Non-governmental actors are normally individuals who act out of political or financial interests. Actors with political interests are anti-vaxxers and right-wing extremists which are both very effective in spreading disinformation as a study from the <em>Center For Countering Digital Hate (CCDH)<\/em> shows. <a href=\"https:\/\/counterhate.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/210324-The-Disinformation-Dozen.pdf\">According to the study<\/a>, in 2022 65 % of the disinformation content on Twitter and Facebook about the vaccine was spread by only 12 individuals. Climate crisis deniers are mainly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tagesschau.de\/faktenfinder\/weidel-klimawandel-101.html\">found<\/a> in the extreme right spectrum, such as the far-right politician Alice Weidel (AFD) who has regularly spread the disinformation that the sun is responsible for \u201cclimate change\u201d to negate the human-made climate crises. Other actors do not pursue political but purely economic interests by spreading disinformation. Organizations associated with important anti-vaxxers <a href=\"https:\/\/counterhate.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/210601-Pandemic-Profiteers-Report.pdf\">operate <\/a>with annual revenues of at least 36 $ million and the followers of anti-vaxxers on social media could be worth up to 1.1 billion in annual revenue for big tech giants like Facebook.<\/p><p>The most important governmental actor in spreading disinformation in Germany is currently the Russian Federation. However, China, Iran, and Turkey are mentioned as well in the constitutional protection report 2021 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2021). Nina Schick describes in her book \u201cDeep Fakes\u201d profoundly how Russia has built up structures and organizations in the state apparatus over decades to use disinformation as a weapon. For this purpose Russian disinformation purposefully <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bsi.bund.de\/SharedDocs\/Downloads\/DE\/BSI\/Publikationen\/Lageberichte\/Lagebericht2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=3\">uses<\/a> fears to weaken the population&#8217;s trust in democratic and state institutions.<\/p><p>The NATO <em>Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE)<\/em> pursues the goal of preventing and responding to disinformation. The European Union faces the threat of disinformation by providing a high level of transparency. Therefore,the center for <em>strategic communication and information analysis<\/em> provides a weekly report which detects and informs about the actors and mechanism of disinformation that is directed against EU member states or simply occurs inside their media environment. The aim is not to eliminate disinformation but rather to enlighten society about the networks and strategies of the originators. The report is published weekly at: <em>\u201ceuvsdisinfo.eu. \u201c <\/em>. On the national scale, the defense is organized in a cluster of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The potential threat of disinformation has led to a concentration of resources in the interagency <em>Cyber AZ<\/em> which is an interagency cooperation platform to detect, tackle and prevent cyber-threats like disinformation.<\/p><p>Actors of disinformation in Germany can be divided into state and non-state actors. Non-state actors act out of political (anti-vaxxers and right extremists) or economic interests (anti-vax industry and influencers). State actors are primarily Russia, but also China, Iran, and Turkey, with the aim to weaken trust in democratic institutions and divide democratic societies.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-88b6fff elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"88b6fff\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Conspiracy Theories and the COVID-19 Pandemic<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-10675ac elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"10675ac\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Conspiracy theories are usually based on a secret plan: Someone aims to attack society and has developed a strategy to execute the plan. Conspiracy theories are often <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tagesschau.de\/faktenfinder\/corona-desinformation-jahresrueckblick-101.html\">associated<\/a> with an anti-Semitic structure, not because they specifically target Jews but because they follow the same patterns as anti-Semitic myths like the &#8221; The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#8221;. This was especially observable during the migration crisis, when it was reported in many circles that chancellor Angela Merkel was pursuing the plan of &#8220;repopulation&#8221;. Oftentimes studies are reinterpreted, taken out of context and presented as &#8220;plans&#8221;, although their content has nothing to do with the conspiracy theory.<\/p><p>Some scholars argue that the phenomenon is not new and has existed since time immemorial. Conspiracy theories relating to vaccination are also not new. Because vaccination <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/in-germany-vaccinations-have-always-been-political\/a-56221965\">represents<\/a> the interface between society, the state and one&#8217;s own body, it has always been particularly controversial. Already in 1874, with the smallpox vaccination, opponents within society formed a fierce resistance to vaccination campaigns.<\/p><p>Being anti-vaccination and right-wing extremism often<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1515\/fjsb-2020-0058\"> go<\/a> hand in hand. The rhetoric is usually the same: The state, the media and scientists have united and are fighting against the \u201cpeople\u201d, who must now save democracy. Just as these three groups pose a danger to the &#8220;people&#8221; (which is seen as homogeneous), those who think differently or are part of minorities also pose a threat to the \u201cpeople\u201d because they have malicious ulterior motives. This quickly leads to racism and anti-Semitism.<\/p><p>In 2020, conspiracy theories <a href=\"https:\/\/netzpolitik.org\/2020\/wie-die-plattformen-durchgreifen-und-welche-fragen-das-aufwirft\/\">spread<\/a> rapidly, primarily via social networks. There are now task forces within the social media corporations whose job is to find methods of using AI to delete false information or provide warnings to content that is probably misleading. The problem, however, is that the corporations are taking on the role of independent regulators, which is not without controversy. The federal government and local administrations have also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bezreg-muenster.de\/de\/im_fokus\/uebergreifende_themen\/coronavirus\/corona_fakenews\/index.html\">taken<\/a> steps to combat conspiracy theories, which might (especially when it comes to misleading medical advice) lead to severe injuries, and have created portals to help users identify fakes. Below we have compiled a list of most conspiracy theories that popped up during the pandemic.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-c8eb560 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"c8eb560\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<table width=\"566\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p><strong>Name<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p><strong>Description<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p><strong>Time (estimates)<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Avoid infection<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Warm temperatures can kill the virus<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>Beginning of the pandemic<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>5G<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>5G is responsible for the COVID infection<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>undefined<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Virus manmade and bioweapon<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Virologist Tasuko Honjo said the virus is manmade. Virus is used as a bioweapon, mainly by the USA<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>April 2020<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Vaccination<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Vaccination is deadly, and mandatory<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>undefined<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Masks are counterproductive<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Masks are ineffective or come with negative side effects.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>undefined<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Comparison with flu<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Covid is just like the flu<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>November 2020<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Bill Gates<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Gates patented the virus and already has a vaccine which he wants to sell. In addition, he was aware of the pandemic before it hit<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>undefined<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Drink water<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Drink water with salt or vinegar kills the virus<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>March 2020<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Hydroxychloroquine and Chlorine dioxide<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Hydroxychloroquine and Chlorine dioxide are remedies against the virus (by Trump and Musk)<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>March 2020<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"141\">\n<p>Helicopters<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"309\">\n<p>Helicopters spray pesticides and disinfectants on infected areas<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"116\">\n<p>April 2020<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f534b69 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"f534b69\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>\u00a0Source: (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.br.de\/nachrichten\/wissen\/die-gesammelten-fakes-desinformation-zu-corona,RuuURMo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cInfodemic Covid-19 in Europe: A Visual Analysis of Disinformation\u201d 2020; \u201cArchiv: Die gesammelten Fakes zu Corona\u201d 2020<\/a>)<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-21d3b73 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"21d3b73\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Deadly Propaganda: Right-wing disinformation environments in Germany<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-15704f0 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"15704f0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>On June 2, 2019, Walter L\u00fcbcke, local politician of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/07\/07\/world\/europe\/germany-murder-far-right-neo-nazi-luebcke.html\">is shot in his yard<\/a>. The perpetrator, a neo-Nazi, will later admit to killing L\u00fcbcke for his welcoming stance toward migrants during the influx of asylum-seekers in 2015\/16. The assassination was preceded by an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.t-online.de\/nachrichten\/deutschland\/id_85876452\/erika-steinbach-fachte-hass-auf-walter-luebcke-neu-an.htm\">online hate campaign<\/a> based on a misleading video and fueled, among others, by a member of Parliament of the far-right <em>Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland<\/em> (AfD). The murder of L\u00fcbcke would be the first in a series of deadly attacks committed by right-wing extremists against a synagogue in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-49997779\">Halle<\/a> (killing two) and Germans with foreign background in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2020\/feb\/19\/shooting-germany-hanau-dead-several-people-shisha-near-frankfurt\">Hanau<\/a> (killing nine). The close succession of these events has spurred debate in Germany about the influence toxic online environments have on radicalizing individuals.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-2534e36 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"2534e36\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Socio-cultural background\n<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-c07c092 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"c07c092\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Against the historic backdrop, Nazism and the far-right are sensitive topics in Germany, making the public react strongly to extremist positions and accusations of racism, antisemitism, or xenophobia. This is institutionalized in Germany\u2019s \u201cdefensive democracy\u201d (<em>wehrhafte Demokratie<\/em>) allowing the state to intervene \u2013 and even restrict fundamental rights \u2013 when its liberal-democratic order (<em>freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung<\/em>) is threatened. This includes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/themen\/rechtsextremismus\/dossier-rechtsextremismus\/41891\/streitbare-demokratie\/\">policing of speech<\/a> (e.g. Holocaust denial) or the surveillance and prohibition of political parties. While these measures are meant to prevent the installation of a dictatorship by democratic means, they do fuel claims of censorship that can be exploited by disinformers.<\/p><p>While Germany has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/themen\/rechtsextremismus\/dossier-rechtsextremismus\/41891\/streitbare-demokratie\">largely come to terms<\/a> with its past and education on the Nazi regime and the Holocaust are an essential part of Germans\u2019 lives, antisemitic and racist convictions are still widespread. Studies show that about 21 % of Germans agree completely or in part with antisemitic and 29 % with anti-Islam statements. The most widely held prejudice, however, concerns asylum-seekers, with about 77 % agreeing completely or partially with denigrating statements. Those preconceptions are a nurturing ground for disinformation.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-0ee5944 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"0ee5944\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Far-right disinformation narratives in Germany<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f5def98 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"f5def98\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Conspiracy narratives<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-8b2b001 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"8b2b001\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Among the most popular conspiracy narratives among the German (and international) <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/mediathek\/reihen\/wem-nuetzt-das\/327979\/folge-4-5-utoya-christchurch-halle\">far-right<\/a> is the Great Replacement narrative, claiming that a (Jewish) world conspiracy is plotting to eradicate white populations in \u201cthe West\u201d by enabling the mass immigration of non-Whites. It <a href=\"https:\/\/www.zvw.de\/specials\/menschen-im-fadenkreuz\/verschw%C3%B6rungserz%C3%A4hlungen-querdenker-reichsb%C3%BCrger-qanon-und-der-superspreader-telegram_arid-370418\">mobilizes<\/a> both, xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes. Some of those believing in this narrative consider themselves to be on the brink of a civil war with a cosmopolitan leftist elite wanting to destroy the German <em>Volk<\/em>. This can <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/mediathek\/reihen\/wem-nuetzt-das\/327979\/folge-4-5-utoya-christchurch-halle\">justify<\/a> violence as self-defence or encourage some to try to spark a civil war, with the goal of installing a fascist regime even sooner (<em>accelerationism<\/em>). This logic has inspired the Halle attack as well as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-56716712\">numerous exposed terrorist plots<\/a>.<\/p><p>Another specifically German <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/shop\/zeitschriften\/apuz\/verschwoerungstheorien-2021\/339286\/reichsbuerger-und-souveraenismus\/\">conspiracy narrative<\/a> is that of the so-called <em>Reichsb\u00fcrger<\/em> (citizens of the Reich) claiming that the Federal Republic is illegitimate or non-existent, as the Third Reich continues to exist in its pre-war borders. While authorities and the public shrugged off the risk for years, violent acts (including the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/germany\/reichsbuerger-in-germany-anti-government-group-turns-violent-a-1118002.html\">murder of a police agent<\/a>) and its considerable mobilization potential during the pandemic have increasingly drawn attention to the topic.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-38c5865 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"38c5865\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Disinformation campaigns<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ce23718 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ce23718\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/mediathek\/reihen\/wem-nuetzt-das\/327979\/folge-4-5-utoya-christchurch-halle\">Conspiracy narratives<\/a> are often the foundation disinformation campaigns are built upon. In Germany, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ardmediathek.de\/video\/rabiat\/infokrieger\/das-erste\/Y3JpZDovL2Rhc2Vyc3RlLmRlL3JhYmlhdC8xOTExYzZhYS1iN2RmLTQ3NDUtODlmMi0zODM3Y2Q3NzlkNTU\">right-wing disinformation<\/a> often seeks to discredit the political opponent, including minorities, and to sow distrust toward democratic processes and institutions.<\/p><ul><li>In 2015 and 2016, when over a million asylum-seekers arrived in Germany, the internet was flooded with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.belltower.news\/fluechtlingsfeinde-und-neonazis-online-das-verbreiten-von-luegen-41318\/\">sensational reports<\/a> of crimes (often rape) allegedly committed by asylum-seekers. While some did commit crimes, hundreds of these stories were found to be invented. The campaign was only successful because it catered to existing prejudices about asylum-seekers while referring to narratives like the Great Replacement. Together with the often-invoked myth of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/lying-press-germanys-misleading-media\/a-18816438\">\u201clying press\u201d<\/a> (<em>L\u00fcgenpresse<\/em>), that allegedly covers up migrant crime, it confirmed and strengthened distrust in government and mainstream media.<\/li><li>During both the 2017 and 2021 federal elections, online rumours <a href=\"https:\/\/correctiv.org\/faktencheck\/2017\/09\/24\/das-sind-die-fakes-am-wahltag\/\">spread <\/a>claiming that votes for the far-right AfD were discarded or that election boards had received instructions to declare AfD votes invalid. In 2021, inspired by Donald Trump, AfD politicians inflated the dangers of mail-in ballots. All claims were unfounded, but eroded trust in elections and questioned the legitimacy of democratically elected governments.<\/li><li>During the 2021 election campaign, Annalena Baerbock, Green chancellor candidate, became the main target of several disinformation campaigns. While some aimed at discrediting her personally (e.g. through <a href=\"https:\/\/dpa-factchecking.com\/germany\/210423-99-322740\/\">fake nudes<\/a> or <a href=\"https:\/\/correctiv.org\/faktencheck\/2021\/04\/22\/hundeverbot-angebliches-zitat-von-annalena-baerbock-ist-ein-fake\/\">falsely attributed quotes<\/a>), others linked her to the so-called <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mimikama.at\/baerbock-soros-feindbild\/\">Great Reset<\/a>, claiming she is the puppet of a Jewish world conspiracy. Again, the motive of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.isdglobal.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Digitale-Gewalt-und-Desinformation_v5.pdf\">lying press<\/a> was used, implying that the mainstream media had an unfair Green bias. This shows how easily conspiracy narratives can be recycled and applied to new contexts.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-0ad2a51 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"0ad2a51\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Disinformation actors and environments<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-570f7cc elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"570f7cc\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The disinformation scene in Germany is diverse. It <a href=\"https:\/\/cemas.io\/blog\/naidoo-telegram\/\">comprises<\/a> classic neo-Nazis, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/who-is-germanys-new-right\/a-57949592\">\u201cNew Right\u201d<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/germany\/german-doomsday-preppers-neo-nazi-survivalists-a-1297138.html\">preppers<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/the-reichsb%C3%BCrger-movement-in-germany\/g-41074914\">Reichsb\u00fcrger<\/a>, esoteric people, vulnerable individuals radicalized online, but also political parties, youth movements (e.g. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-germany-farright-idUSKCN1U61G1\">Identitarian Movement<\/a>) and celebrities (who often function as knots in networks as they pick up disinformation and accelerate their spread to their trusting followership). According to studies, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ardmediathek.de\/video\/rabiat\/infokrieger\/das-erste\/Y3JpZDovL2Rhc2Vyc3RlLmRlL3JhYmlhdC8xOTExYzZhYS1iN2RmLTQ3NDUtODlmMi0zODM3Y2Q3NzlkNTU\">bots have so far not played<\/a> an important role in Germany\u2019s disinformation environment.<\/p><p>Right-wing disinformers thus have a large target group to cater and adapt their messages to. For example, the \u201cNew Right\u201d has professionalized their communication, working with subtle messages and modern marketing strategies on social media. In addition to that, leaked documents illustrate their strategy to hijack online debates and flood social media with right-wing opinion (e.g. by making hashtags trend or by placing their messages in unconnected, harmless online trends). The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ardmediathek.de\/video\/rabiat\/infokrieger\/das-erste\/Y3JpZDovL2Rhc2Vyc3RlLmRlL3JhYmlhdC8xOTExYzZhYS1iN2RmLTQ3NDUtODlmMi0zODM3Y2Q3NzlkNTU\">goal is to get these picked up by mainstream media<\/a> and presented as legitimate talking points.<\/p><p>While popular social media platforms, in particular <em>YouTube<\/em> and <em>Facebook<\/em>, are often starting points for radicalization due to their algorithms, deplatforming efforts and legislative obligations, such as the German <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bmj.de\/DE\/Themen\/FokusThemen\/NetzDG\/NetzDG_EN_node.html\">Network Enforcement Act<\/a> (NetzDG), obliging platforms to remove <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tagesspiegel.de\/politik\/nicht-nur-baerbock-betroffen-falschinformationen-koennten-eine-gefahr-fuer-die-bundestagswahl-werden\/27181752.html.\">illegal content<\/a> within a given period of time, have pushed disinformers to other sites. Especially <em>Telegram<\/em> has been at the centre of scrutiny in Germany, because it does not moderate content, cooperate with German authorities, and, as a messenger, does not fall under the NetzDG. Yet, it is\u00a0 an incubator where <a href=\"https:\/\/www.belltower.news\/eine-strafverfolgung-findet-de-facto-nicht-statt-telegram-ist-superspreader-von-hass-und-verschwoerungserzaehlungen-108499\/\">narratives<\/a> are developed and tested,\u00a0 a connector between right-wing actors, a ground for planning attacks, and\u00a0 a disseminator for propaganda to a wide audience.<\/p><p>However, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/germany\/far-right-terrorism-in-germany-shooting-exposes-lapses-in-security-apparatus-a-1291075.html\">police and prosecutors in Germany struggle<\/a> to ensure systematic monitoring of these sites. It is telling, for example, that the spectacular <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/news\/covid-anti-vaccine-suspects-telegram-germany-murder-plot-saxony\/\">plot to murder the Minister-President of Saxony<\/a>, planned in late 2021 on <em>Telegram<\/em>, was not uncovered by the police, but a group of journalists.<\/p><p>Other so-called <a href=\"https:\/\/www.isdglobal.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/ISD-The-Online-Ecosystem-of-the-German-Far-Right-English-Draft-11.pdf.\">counter-publics<\/a> like imageboards (e.g. <em>4chan<\/em> or <em>8chan<\/em>, where right-wing terrorist attacks were announced, livestreamed and celebrated) platforms like <em>Reddit<\/em> or <em>Gettr<\/em> or serious-looking news websites and magazines (e.g. <em>Compact<\/em> magazine) are just as much breeding grounds for radicalization. However, <a href=\"https:\/\/cemas.io\/blog\/naidoo-telegram\/\"><em>Telegram<\/em><\/a> is the most accessible one.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-9fea967 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"9fea967\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Best practises<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-228f8fc elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"228f8fc\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ul><li>Do not shrug off far-right conspiracy narratives, even if they might sound ridiculous. They radicalize individuals which can and will lead to violence.<\/li><\/ul><p>\u00a0<\/p><ul><li>Far-right disinformation flourishes because of widespread negative attitudes towards minorities. The fight on disinformation will only be successful if we fight antisemitism and racism as well.<\/li><\/ul><p>\u00a0<\/p><ul><li>Distrust in governments and democratic processes contribute to the success of disinformation campaigns. Governments that want to fight disinformation will have to first regain the trust of their citizens.<\/li><\/ul><p>\u00a0<\/p><ul><li>Create awareness for modern extreme-right communication strategies.<\/li><\/ul><p>\u00a0<\/p><ul><li>Legislation on online hate speech can help to make propagandists\u2019 lives harder, but they will find other platforms on which they can spread even more problematic messages.<\/li><\/ul><p>\u00a0<\/p><ul><li>Law enforcement must get better at monitoring the most problematic platforms and channels. This includes providing the necessary organizational and financial capacities and proper education on the matter.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-dcd5286 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"dcd5286\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-62f7fc2 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"62f7fc2\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-03dc861 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"03dc861\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-657e2ba\" data-id=\"657e2ba\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-91e0c39 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"91e0c39\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Poland<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-3bc8d4b elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"3bc8d4b\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a043b3d elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"a043b3d\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Russian disinformation effort in Poland Due to its location, Poland is a country that is on the direct frontline of destabilising activities in the European Union and NATO. For this reason, the government and the public sector must be aware of the threats mainly caused by the Russian Federation. Destabilising actions have intensified with the Belarusian artificially created hybrid migration crisis, which began in 2021. Poland and the Baltic States have recently experienced a border crisis caused by the Minsk and Moscow regimes working together. The crisis mainly manifested in the creation of an artificial migration route, which manifested in the bringing in of economic migrants from Middle Eastern countries.<\/p><p>The victims of the crisis were mainly European residents of the nearby border belt, who experienced a sharp drop in the security level. Tackling the accumulated crisis required decisive action on the part of Poland and the Baltic States. In addition, in their attempt to stabilise the situation on the eastern border, Poland and the Baltic States were victimised both by regime TV stations from Russia and Belarus and by some western medias trying to blame Poland and the Baltic States for the crisis on the border.<\/p><p>In addition, the victims of disinformation were the financial migrants from the Middle East, who believed that Belarus would help them get into the European Union for a fee. That was why Poland launched an extensive information campaign in the Middle East and Turkey. The launch of a full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 showed that the migration crisis was only a test for the Polish security system. From February 2022. Poland unconditionally admitted 7 million people who crossed the border, of which about 3 million Ukrainians remained in Poland. With the wave of war refugees, Poland allowed people without EU passports to cross the border even when they might have been suspected of forcing the border in the Belarusian.<\/p><p>Over time, accusations of alleged racism and double standards were levelled at the Polish border guards by the foreign media. These accusations were not substantiated and were denied by the Polish side. For many years, Poland, due to its difficult history, has remained an advocate of a rational policy toward the Russian Federation. This approach has been heavily criticised, particularly by countries such as Germany, which have become dependent on Russian energy resources. Despite the changing attitudes of our Western partners, Russia continues its disinformation activities, which are both domestically and internationally directed.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-4b114e0 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"4b114e0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Activities to combat disinformation in Poland <\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-38cfbaf elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"38cfbaf\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Actions to combat disinformation in Poland are taken at the governmental and non-governmental level. The former relate mainly to strategic communication activities. The latter mainly relate to the activities of non-governmental organisations in this regard.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5e861e2 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"5e861e2\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Strategic communication in Poland <\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-20c6d47 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"20c6d47\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>In practice, strategic communication tasks are carried out in Poland by individual units working within various ministries. However, there is no common plan of action at the general level. As a result, there are problems with efficient cooperation and achieving the full synergy effect. Currently, there are no structural solutions at the inter-ministerial level, which would allow for effective coordination of activities within the whole state, and not just individual sections of its activities.<\/p><p>The Ministry of National Defence (MoD) is responsible for creating and conducting information policy on defence, including the fight against disinformation. Within the Ministry of Defence, the Operations Centre of the Minister of Defence is specifically responsible for &#8216;defining challenges and coordinating strategic communication activities&#8217;.<\/p><p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is also involved in strategic communication initiatives. A Strategic Communication Desk has been established in the Office of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This unit operates within the framework of the Rapid Alert System European cooperation network and is reported to deal with &#8220;disinformation in relation to Poland&#8217;s foreign policy priorities&#8221;. However, there is a lack of official information on the establishment of the group and the objectives and modalities of its functioning. In addition, there is also a Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to information on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, &#8220;public diplomacy&#8221; uses mechanisms from the field of soft power and is defined as &#8220;activities of a strategic, coordinating and executive character, which through shaping public attitudes and public opinion abroad are aimed at gaining understanding and support for the Polish raison d&#8217;\u00e9tat and foreign policy of the Republic of Poland&#8221;.<\/p><p>Activities in the field of strategic communication and counteracting disinformation also involve, among others, representatives of the National Security Bureau and the Ministry of Interior and Administration.<\/p><p>It is also worth mentioning the Territorial Defence Forces (WOT). The Strategic Communication Division of the Territorial Defence Forces (WOT) operates as part of the WOT. Since the first decisions concerning their formation, the Territorial Defence Forces have started active anti-disinformation activities. However, the inclusion of the WOT in strategic communication activities seems to be a solution that may be controversial due to the volunteer and territorial character of this type of Armed Forces.<\/p><p>Poland is also involved in international undertakings in the field of strategic communication and counteracting disinformation. These include, above all, the East StratCom Task Force of the European External Action Service and the NATO Strategic Communication Expert Centre (NATO StratCom COE).<\/p><p>The Academic Centre for Strategic Communication (ACKS) also plays an important role. This is a think-tank that conducts activities to enhance soldiers&#8217; practical communication skills. ACKS will also lead the public debate on strategic communication issues (StratCom). The Centre will also participate in the preparation of strategic communication training programmes for the needs of the Armed Forces in cooperation with other units of the Ministry of National Defence. Moreover, ACKS will conduct close international cooperation with institutions dealing with StratCom issues, e.g. with the NATO Strategic Communication Expert Centre. There are plans to launch a NATO-certified course on strategic communication conducted in English.<\/p><p>On 28 January 2022, the Operations Centre of the Ministry of Defence and the Academic Centre for Strategic Communication of the Military Academy also launched a social campaign announced during the conference &#8220;Independence of Information&#8221; under the slogan #Fejkoodporni. It will help to raise awareness of what disinformation and fake news are, what threats they pose, how to defend against them and how to protect yourself and your loved ones.<\/p><p>The &#8220;Fejkoodporni&#8221; information campaign was aimed at the soldiers of the Polish Army, but also at the general public to remember the nature of these threats.The inauguration of #Fejkoodporni was accompanied by a spot showing the nature of the phenomenon of disinformation, exposing the intention of their sources and encouraging people to oppose fake news. A report on vulnerability to disinformation was also presented during the event. The presentation was accompanied by panel discussions with the participation of experts: representatives of public administration, the Polish Army, the world of science and research centres, as well as the media. In the first part, the speakers took up the topic of knowledge and assessment of credibility of information about the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border. The second panel discussed, among other things, sources of information about Poland and the world and a model of media consumption.<\/p><p>The aforementioned report, commissioned by ACKS and prepared by the Foundation Institute for Market and Social Research (IBRiS), was aimed at investigating the susceptibility to disinformation in various situations and places. The research was conducted between 6 and 10 December 2021, i.e. just after the end of the state of emergency introduced in parts of Podlaskie and parts of Lubelskie provinces. The same questions about the perception of both fake news and true information on the situation at the border were asked to people living in the area covered by the state of emergency and other regions of Poland. The degree of trust in media messages, knowledge of the situation on the border, perception of potential security threats were also examined and in-depth interviews were conducted among residents of the state of emergency on their perception of the conflict on the Polish-Belarusian border.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b125258 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"b125258\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Activities at the non-governmental level <\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ad7dd7e elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ad7dd7e\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Activities to combat disinformation at the non-governmental level are primarily undertaken by fact-checking organisations. They combat disinformation in various ways, in particular by checking the credibility of individual pieces of information and publishing analyses on the subject. They also focus on refuting false information. Some organisations also cooperate with social media, especially Facebook. As part of this cooperation, false information found on this platform is debunked. Efforts to combat disinformation can also take the form of educating the public and increasing resistance to disinformation, such as through media education workshops. Below, we will present different fact-checking initiatives in Poland that deal with disinformation.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-6fd06bc elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"6fd06bc\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Demagog.pl<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-d17b870 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"d17b870\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The oldest fact-checking organisation in Poland, operating since 2014. It belongs to the IFCN (International Fact-Checking Network). The association conducts wide-ranging activities: it checks the statements of politicians, enables Internet users to submit reports, and provides educational materials as part of the Fact-checking Academy.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-391b0e3 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"391b0e3\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Konkret24.pl <\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-6d4cbb9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"6d4cbb9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Project launched in October 2018 by the TVN Group. Journalists check not only politicians, they also verify information in seven categories &#8211; Poland, World, Politics, Science, Health, Entertainment and Myths. Internet users can also report fake news. The project received funding from the Google DNI Innovation programme, which supports the development of quality journalism on the Internet.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-4d34d01 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"4d34d01\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Demaskator24<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ea7f3c2 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ea7f3c2\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Project launched in November 2018 by Agencja Informacyjna AIP24 (Polska Press Grupa). Journalists and editors check controversial news stories and statements by politicians. Readers also have the opportunity to report fake news. The project also includes the Demaskatora Academy, which teaches how to verify various materials on the Internet.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-eb8d65b elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"eb8d65b\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Antyfake<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-af066a9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"af066a9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Fact-checking portal run by HGA Media. The website was created as an indirect effect of a journalist investigation which revealed that portals owned by HGA Media published and disseminated false information. At the time, the owner announced the launch of a fact-checking platform. Antifake has been operational since April 2019.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5324376 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"5324376\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">AFP Sprawdzam<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a85b7f7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"a85b7f7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>AFP started its fact-checking activities in France in 2017. Since then, it has become a leading global fact-checking organisation, with specialised journalists working in numerous countries, from the United States to Myanmar. It also operates in Poland and is dedicated to debunking false information.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-dc72ac5 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"dc72ac5\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">FakeHunter<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-157122c elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"157122c\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>FakeHunter is a social project for verification of content published on the Internet, launched by the Polish Press Agency together with GovTech Polska, which aims at unmasking false news concerning the SARS-CoV-2 virus.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-49ec0c9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-video\" data-id=\"49ec0c9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-settings=\"{&quot;youtube_url&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.youtube.com\\\/watch?v=UZ0SeQVuUC4&amp;list=PLVPVACPBEa38gIEcFROvuUNNcy2Nd0eJ7&amp;index=3&quot;,&quot;video_type&quot;:&quot;youtube&quot;,&quot;controls&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;}\" data-widget_type=\"video.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-wrapper elementor-open-inline\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-video\"><\/div>\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-64634c0 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"64634c0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-c419eb9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"c419eb9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-b04cd6f elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"b04cd6f\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-6943f23\" data-id=\"6943f23\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-3b67b2b elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"3b67b2b\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Slovakia<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f6bbf66 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"f6bbf66\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Introduction<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ffff282 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"ffff282\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The need for information has always been a vital point of the existence of society throughout history. People act according to the messages they receive from the environment. This kind of situation creates a desire to manipulate the news the subjects receive. If the emitter of the message wants the society or the individual to prosper, he tends to pass positive news which stimulates the subject to great deeds which lead to prosperity. On the other hand, if there is a wish to exacerbate the power of the nation, negative news is going to be spread &#8211; the actor is thus creating disinformation to destabilize and weaken the whole society.<\/p><p>According to our experiences the master of this craft of producing catchy narratives with poisonous effects on the recipients is Russia and to a limited part the People&#8217;s republic of China. But the principal champion is without a doubt\u00a0 Russia. It is given by the fact that Russia is much closer to our \u201csphere of existence\u201d and China has not been mastering this craft as long as Russia has.<\/p><p>Russia has strong historical connections with Slovak citizens. According to the legends our nations once were one group which separated then into smaller units which started to wander through the European continent. This theory is strongly supported by the fact that our languages are quite similar and one can understand the spoken language of another to a limited extent.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p><p>Although historical ties between Russia and the Slovak nation are not only formed merely by this. In the historical mind of our nation, Russia has served as the saviour and preserver of world orders. Russian forces have marched through our land during the process of liberating Europe from Emperor Napoleon I.<\/p><p>Russia maintained its role as a great companion and friend also during World war I due to the fact that it fought a war against the Habsburg dominion, thus contributing to the cause of bringing down the hated monarchy and playing a part in granting freedom for the nations within e.g. Czechs and Slovaks.<\/p><p>Russia gained ultimate prestige during World war II when it managed to be perceived as the nation that has a pivotal role in tearing apart Nazi oppression in Europe. Nowadays Russia uses all its historical achievements to yield as much support from the population of Middle Europe as it can.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p><p>Unfortunately due to the geographical and geopolitical realities, western Europe has not found such strong relations with our nation throughout history as Russia did. This shifted to the advantage of the Western block just recently, after the fall of the iron curtain and predominantly after Slovakia joined the EU and NATO.<\/p><p>Russia puts its narratives and disinformation predominantly on its rich historical bond that it once had with our nation. Due to strong tradition and \u201chistorical longevity\u201d it is quite successful in gaining support from the elderly and middle-aged population who carry in themselves the notion and memory of those times when Russia acted as a role model. That time also carries their recollection of their youth and childhood. This fact somehow psychologically strengthens the positive picture of Russia in their imagination.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a6d28a7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"a6d28a7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Narratives<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-914d2f5 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"914d2f5\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>One of the ways to effectively spread false and misleading information in public is the use of narratives that are easy to understand for everyone, but at the same time embellish the reality in favour of one side. Russia used these techniques long before the invasion of Ukraine.<\/p><p>However, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, we have had the opportunity to observe the strengthening of pro-Kremlin rhetoric directed against Ukraine and NATO. While Russia increased pressure on the West with its declarations of retaliation, Slovak disinformation websites supported pro-Kremlin narratives.<\/p><p>One of them is the alleged genocide of the Russian-speaking minority by the Ukrainian side, with which Russia justifies its so-called &#8220;special military operation&#8221;. This narrative of &#8220;genocide&#8221; appeared in the Russian media as early as 2014, after the Maidan protests, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. Russia propagandistically calls Ukrainians a brotherly nation and that they have the duty to liberate them and &#8220;denazify&#8221; their country.<\/p><p>Another frequently used narrative is closely related to the previous one. Russia claims that it was forced to invade Ukraine because it is threatened by NATO and the West. In the disinformation sense, the universal initiators of the conflict have always been Ukraine, NATO or the EU (sometimes all actors at the same time). They were repeatedly accused of escalating tensions and provocations by Russia, which, on the contrary, was placed in the position of a victim.<\/p><p>They also claim that the annexation of the Crimean peninsula was necessary because it was one way to prevent the expansion of NATO and did not allow the US to build its bases in Ukraine.<\/p><p>However, because these reasons are not enough to justify an unjust invasion of the territory of a sovereign state, Russia has resorted to defaming Ukrainians in its state media, calling them Nazis and Fascists, in an attempt to overthrow the government and install its pro-Russian government. People in Russia, therefore, believe that the war in Ukraine is actually a liberation mission and they mostly support this war.<\/p><p>A relatively new narrative is the idea that the West is waging a hybrid war against the Russian Federation. This is undoubtedly an attempt to reverse the perception of reality, when the Kremlin practically applies the elements of hybrid action against the West but tries not only to cover up this fact but also to transform it into a form in which it appears as a victim of this strategy.<\/p><p>While one of these narratives seeks to portray the Russian Federation as a victim oppressed by the West, the other creates an image of the Russian Federation as a fearless superpower that dominates its rivals. These specific narratives represent a clear example of long-term propaganda by the Russian Federation. That narrative is primarily based on the presentation of modern Russian military technology and technology that may or may not be compared to Western, mostly American technology. In any case, it is an attempt to show that Russia is one step ahead and has an answer for all types of potential threats. Within this narrative, it is worth noting the fact that Russian propaganda likes to use statements in Western, especially American media, where commentators or military officials recognise the qualities of Russian weapons, while again spreading these statements in a greatly exaggerated way as part of the described narrative.<\/p><p>At the same time, it is possible to say that the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in its implementation did not correspond to this narrative, and perhaps that is why the Russian side began to threaten nuclear weapons in the information space.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-862e089 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"862e089\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Disinformation actors in the Slovak information space\n<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-3e41cac elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"3e41cac\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>There are numerous types of active disinformation actors in the Slovak information space. They mostly share similar narratives, but all of them have different motivations.<\/p><p>The most influential are politicians who seek to gain political points and increase their popularity. It is not a coincidence that Slovak politicians who spread disinformation are the ones who use social media in their campaigns the most. Politicians use the algorithms of social media, which are known to favour negative and false information, to get as much attention as possible. Having hundreds of thousands of followers and sharing &#8220;their own truth&#8221; on their social media profiles persistently has had the potential to get themselves a large number of supporters. Gaining peoples&#8217; trust is then just one step from gaining their votes in the next election. Apart from using social media, mostly Facebook, they also spread disinformation at their own press conferences and some are handing out posters and their own newspapers. The most influential political subjects in Slovakia are far-right and far-left extremists and pro-Russian leftists.<\/p><p>Apart from politicians, fake news in Slovakia is spread also by a large number of disinformation outlets, whose main motivation is money from advertisements displayed on their websites. Some of the most influential are Hlavn\u00e9 spr\u00e1vy, Hlavn\u00fd denn\u00edk, Slobodn\u00fd vysiela\u010d, B\u00e1date\u013e, Infovojna and others.<\/p><p>However, there is a number of non-governmental outlets which are supported, controlled, managed or in other ways connected to political subjects. An example is Magaz\u00edn 1 which is managed by a far-right party called Kotlebovci &#8211; \u013dudov\u00e1 Strana Na\u0161e Slovensko.<\/p><p>Others are also connected to foreign governments, mostly the Russian. For example, an author contributing to disinformation outlet Hlavn\u00e9 spr\u00e1vy has been known to be paid by Russian spies. Their main goal is to increase Russian influence in Slovak society and therefore politics.<\/p><p>The strategy of disinformation outlets in Slovakia consists of publishing articles on their websites and sharing them on their social media profiles afterwards. That is why Facebook pages are the next most influential disinformation actors in Slovakia. A number of them have tens of thousands of followers and their posts get hundreds and thousands of interactions (likes, comments and shares). Some of the most influential are Inform\u00e1cie bez cenz\u00fary, Arm\u00e1da Ruskej Feder\u00e1cie, nocomment.sk, DAV DVA and many others.<\/p><p>Apart from Facebook, some are also using other social media platforms like Youtube where they mostly share interviews with pseudo-experts full of disinformation and propaganda.<\/p><p>After Facebook started deleting some posts and even profiles, many are migrating to other social media which do not have any rules against fake news. These are for example Telegram or a Russian social media platform called VKontakte.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b1130a0 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"b1130a0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Manipulation techniques <\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-8afb0b6 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"8afb0b6\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Disinformation actors use several manipulation techniques that help to convince their audience about their \u201calternative truth\u201d and perpetuate disinformation on the Internet. In recent years, their tactics have become more sophisticated which makes it harder to spot fake information. Those who spread disinformation became much more professional and their disinformation is not so shallow anymore. The same trend can be, however, seen not only in Slovakia but all around the world.<\/p><p>Malign actors heavily rely on emotional manipulation since strong feelings, such as anger, outrage, or fear, increase the likelihood that people will believe in disinformation. Apart from expressive words, in many cases, they accompany their messages with photos that create strong emotional responses. These images or videos are often either taken out of context, they are not related to the discussed matter, or they are edited to serve their purpose.<\/p><p>Another important manipulation tool of disinformation actors is the oversimplification of difficult topics and cherry-picking of the evidence. Complicated problems are presented as black-and-white matters without the full context which can easily lead to misunderstanding and wrong conclusions.<\/p><p>To give credibility to disinformation claims, disinformation actors in some cases back up their statements with the words of experts and authorities. However, their arguments are in many cases either taken out of the context, these opinions are regarded as incorrect by other academics, or they are completely made up. Closely connected to this tactic is the usage of studies and reports which were rejected by the academic community or experts, or official studies whose results are being misinterpreted. Moreover, disinformation actors often create fake debates in which they position science and pseudoscience on the same level which is from a factual point of view incorrect.<\/p><p>Similarly, disinformation actors often present opinions (either opinions of their own or opinions of those who agree with them) as facts that significantly distort reality. In some cases, they try to convince their audience that many people actually believe in given disinformation. In this regard, they count on the bandwagon effect which is a tendency of people to accept ideas and opinions are being held by the majority.<\/p><p>Besides, disinformation actors use in their speeches, articles, and posts contain several manipulative argumentation tools. Among the most popular in Slovakia is the so-called \u201cwhataboutism\u201d. The main aim is to deflect criticism by creating a false parallel with a similar but unrelated phenomenon. It is an attempt to discredit the other site by accusing them of hypocrisy without actually reacting to criticism.<\/p><p>Furthermore, Slovak disinformation actors use, for example, a slippery slope argument that forces people to believe that small steps will inevitably lead to a chain of very negative consequences or they use a misleading vividness when explaining their arguments which evokes strong emotions from the recipient, etc.<\/p><p>In some cases, disinformation actors do not spread disinformation themselves but they use ambiguous language which leads the recipient of the information to the wrong conclusions. Similarly often, they present so-called loaded questions that hide a certain narrative to which are the recipients manipulated to believe.<\/p><p>Above this, disinformation actors repeat their lies so often and people get so familiar with it that after some time for many of them it becomes the truth. They rely on a simple well-known fact that the repetition of information significantly increases the likelihood that people will start to believe it.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-2c6abd7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"2c6abd7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Best practice examples<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-4bc7399 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"4bc7399\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>As the above-mentioned text presented, Slovakia has plenty of experience with coordinated disinformation campaigns, mostly originating from Russia. Therefore, state and non-governmental actors came up with countermeasures on protecting citizens and constitutional order from foreign influence activities. The following part will present a few examples of good practices in how the Slovak republic fights disinformation.<\/p><p>Firstly, there are some successful activities of state institutions. The president of the Slovak republic has launched a series of educational videos where experts present facts on how social media work, how are they designed to evoke emotions and are an easy tool for manipulation. The aim was to raise awareness and media literacy. In the area of debunking disinformation and warning the citizens about online fraud, The Police of the Slovak Republic have a Facebook page, where they are very active. The Slovak government has special institutions that are responsible for the monitoring of hybrid threats (including disinformation), they were established under the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and the Government Office. Recently revised media law enhanced the competencies of the Council for broadcasting and retransmission, where online media are to follow the same rules as the traditional ones.<\/p><p>Secondly, the non-governmental sector is very active in this area. NGOs participating in the research are GLOBSEC and ADAPT Institute. Debunked disinformations are provided by Antipropaganda.sk, Kon\u0161piratori.sk or Infosecurity.sk, where they are focusing also on revealing coordinated disinformation campaigns. Strengthening media literacy is the primary target of the NGO Zm\u00fadri and they are publishing educational materials for pupils and teachers.<\/p><p>To add, the company Gerulata has developed an online tool for enhanced monitoring of the spread of disinformation, which is a helpful tool for researchers and government institutions.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-3fddf8d elementor-widget elementor-widget-video\" data-id=\"3fddf8d\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-settings=\"{&quot;youtube_url&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.youtube.com\\\/watch?v=PS4P28XdNRU&amp;list=PLVPVACPBEa38gIEcFROvuUNNcy2Nd0eJ7&amp;index=2&quot;,&quot;video_type&quot;:&quot;youtube&quot;,&quot;controls&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;}\" data-widget_type=\"video.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-wrapper elementor-open-inline\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-video\"><\/div>\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1b1b6b7 elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"1b1b6b7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-7753096 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"7753096\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-3947d09 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"3947d09\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-125f23e\" data-id=\"125f23e\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a50a444 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"a50a444\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h1 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Ukraine<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-8b60f49 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"8b60f49\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Media literacy and information security in Ukraine<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-a9cf2be elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"a9cf2be\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">General comments<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-bed7598 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"bed7598\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The manipulation of public opinion in Ukraine is a complex problem. It consists of the existence of a significant number of internal and external stakeholders, whose aim is to create disinformation messages to achieve certain goals. The main one (in terms of the threat to the existence of Ukrainian sovereignty)\u00a0 is the influence of russia and its agents in our country (parties, public organizations, &#8220;useful idiots&#8221;, etc.). However, no less harmful are other political forces inside Ukraine. Their struggle for the electorate before and between elections is also accompanied by the spread of fakes and biased messages.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-62848fe elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"62848fe\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Best practices <\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-c861235 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"c861235\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>In Ukraine, we have a lot of projects, voluntary initiatives, non-governmental organizations and state authorities who care about increasing the level of media literacy awareness in different ways:<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-eb1001f elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"eb1001f\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ul><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.stopfake.org\/ru\/glavnaya-2\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cStopFake\u201d<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/voxukraine.org\/voxcheck\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cVoxcheck\u201d<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/behindtheukrainenews\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u041f\u043e \u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0456\u043a \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u201d<\/a> (\u201cOn the other side of the news\u201d) &#8211; projects whose goal is to produce best practises in fact-checking. They promote information hygiene on their pages in social networks, as well as by cooperating with the media. Another area of their work is to hold events aimed at raising awareness of media literacy.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/imi.org.ua\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u0406\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0457 \u0456\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457\u201d<\/a> (\u201cInstitute of Mass Information\u201d)<a href=\"https:\/\/detector.media\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">, \u201c\u0414\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0430\u201d<\/a> (\u201cDetector of Media\u201d),<a href=\"https:\/\/texty.org.ua\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> \u201cTexty.org\u201d<\/a> &#8211; organizations working in the field of media monitoring and improving journalist skills. They create professional analytics and research on a number of topics related to the observance of journalistic standards.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/inforules\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u042f\u043a \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0432\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043c\u201d <\/a>(\u201cHow not to become a \u201cvegetable\u201d\u201d), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/notaenota1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u041d\u043e\u0442\u0430 \u0454\u043d\u043e\u0442\u0430\u201d <\/a>(\u201cRaccoon\u2019s note\u201d), <a href=\"https:\/\/minzmin.org.ua\/?fbclid=IwAR0SBnH41JsdUyit6lc_N2M02oMYABL0yZ9YS12-kcyTOKVGKIe-VHpRrEc\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u041c\u0456\u043d\u0437\u043c\u0456\u043d\u201d<\/a> (\u201cThe Ministry of Change\u201d) &#8211; relatively young organizations and initiatives that develop original approaches to information hygiene training. &#8220;How not to become a \u201cvegetable\u201d&#8221; attracts a wide range of Ukrainians, trying to avoid focusing on age or professional groups, as well as specializing in corporate training. \u201cRaccoon\u2019s note\u201d combines fact-checking and game development with media literacy. \u201cThe Ministry of Change\u201d engaged in teaching children cyber security.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ed-era.com\/?fbclid=IwAR0yT177iCWUwXWbFcKS7hKvy9NUEx1IP89Kwn3C-dnhCIAYH-4YQGJottY\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201dEdEra\u201d<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/prometheus.org.ua\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cPrometheus\u201d<\/a> &#8211; online learning platforms that host free courses on information hygiene. In particular, those that are needed to improve the skills of teachers, educators.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.edcamp.ua\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cEdCamp\u201d<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/osvitoria.media\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201c\u041e\u0441\u0432\u0456\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u044f\u201d<\/a> (\u201cOsvitoria\u201d) &#8211; main target audience of these NGOs is teachers. They don&#8217;t work directly on media literacy issues. However, they include this topic in regular trainings, conferences, etc.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li>We also have a number of grant organizations that conduct trainings and seminars with young people, teachers, journalists, etc.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1ef2232 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"1ef2232\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>The state authorities of Ukraine also work in the field of information security. Mainly in the field of strategic communications. For example:<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-b766337 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"b766337\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ul><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/SecurSerUkraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>The Security Service of Ukraine<\/strong><\/a> &#8211; find and neutralize bot farms, detect \u201cgrids\u201d of Russian news channels.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.npu.gov.ua\/en\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>The National Police of Ukraine<\/strong><\/a> &#8211; work with the punishment of pro-russian agents who spread disinformation at the request of the aggressor country.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rnbo.gov.ua\/en\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine<\/strong><\/a> &#8211; \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/cpd.gov.ua\/?fbclid=IwAR3RhCGU5hKdlBcWzR1J2C5ENiXUM3ygxJwf-YLuQ0SsJ1x0gHgk8v66PBU\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Center for Countering Disinformation<\/a>\u201d as a part of its structure conducts strategic communications about the rules, which are recommended and needed to be followed while information war against Ukraine spreads.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/thedigital.gov.ua\/?fbclid=IwAR01FPSD6fITWDv4wCRgXYpJcvR8wv8Vpk8-cu6jgSiMqUSOpdetYBGB8_4\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>The Ministry of Digital Transformation<\/strong><\/a> &#8211; with the beginning of the war, they launch the <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/itarmyofukraine2022\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">IT Army of Ukraine<\/a>. Its main task is to fight against the aggressor country in the digital field: block malicious pro-russian pages, bots, etc. Everybody can join them as a volunteer.<br \/><br \/><\/li><li><a href=\"https:\/\/mon.gov.ua\/eng?fbclid=IwAR35QXQq82GkfMjDy45xbEwsdpzCJ14td-1sI7hxd9V-8cvf5LyVjP_XY4w\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine<\/strong><\/a> &#8211; introduce information hygiene to the educational system of Ukraine.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-6a405a9 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"6a405a9\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\">Shortcomings<\/h3>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-deccc64 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"deccc64\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ul><li>Lack of trust in government.<\/li><li>Self-confidence of the population in media literacy skills (50% vs 3%).<\/li><li>The gap between propaganda funding and counter-propaganda funding.<\/li><li>Focus on individual target audiences. Issue with a lack of national programs.<\/li><li>Issues of real impact and audience reach.<\/li><li>Fact-checking VS media literacy.<\/li><li>Media literacy seminars &#8211; to add as an additional course in schools, or other higher education institutions.<\/li><li>Lack of understanding of the difference between traditional media and the digital age.<\/li><li>Political manipulations and financial fraud.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-38d4143 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"38d4143\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>Interested to learn more? Check out game <a href=\"https:\/\/drive.google.com\/drive\/folders\/10EU582GlbL7edbg9WP-Y0V49LsHCS9FV\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">&#8220;How to filter propaganda. Russian edition&#8221;.<\/a><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-94b5291 elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"94b5291\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-9f6b3b0 elementor-hidden-desktop elementor-hidden-tablet elementor-widget-divider--view-line elementor-widget elementor-widget-divider\" data-id=\"9f6b3b0\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"divider.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-divider\">\n\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-divider-separator\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-e812e06 elementor-hidden-desktop elementor-hidden-tablet elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"e812e06\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-433d926 elementor-section-content-middle elementor-hidden-desktop elementor-hidden-tablet elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"433d926\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-25 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-0e0cf63\" data-id=\"0e0cf63\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-25 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-9e82da3\" data-id=\"9e82da3\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-853892e elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"853892e\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"4247\" height=\"891\" src=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-21870\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS.png 4247w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-768x161.png 768w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-1536x322.png 1536w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-2048x430.png 2048w, https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS-18x4.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 4247px) 100vw, 4247px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-25 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-f26910a\" data-id=\"f26910a\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-25 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-e094c01\" data-id=\"e094c01\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-27e4fca elementor-hidden-desktop elementor-hidden-tablet elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"27e4fca\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element 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elementor-widget-table-of-contents\" data-id=\"a7a666e\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-settings=\"{&quot;headings_by_tags&quot;:[&quot;h1&quot;],&quot;marker_view&quot;:&quot;bullets&quot;,&quot;collapse_subitems&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;,&quot;min_height&quot;:{&quot;unit&quot;:&quot;vh&quot;,&quot;size&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;sizes&quot;:[]},&quot;icon&quot;:{&quot;value&quot;:&quot;fas fa-circle&quot;,&quot;library&quot;:&quot;fa-solid&quot;},&quot;no_headings_message&quot;:&quot;No headings were found on this page.&quot;,&quot;minimize_box&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;,&quot;minimized_on&quot;:&quot;tablet&quot;,&quot;hierarchical_view&quot;:&quot;yes&quot;,&quot;min_height_tablet&quot;:{&quot;unit&quot;:&quot;px&quot;,&quot;size&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;sizes&quot;:[]},&quot;min_height_mobile&quot;:{&quot;unit&quot;:&quot;px&quot;,&quot;size&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;sizes&quot;:[]}}\" data-widget_type=\"table-of-contents.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div 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data-e-type=\"section\" data-settings=\"{&quot;background_background&quot;:&quot;classic&quot;}\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-ac5da08\" data-id=\"ac5da08\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ea75aae elementor-widget elementor-widget-spacer\" data-id=\"ea75aae\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"spacer.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-spacer-inner\"><\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-4d96530 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"4d96530\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-33 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-3813f2a\" data-id=\"3813f2a\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-854b461 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"854b461\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"4247\" height=\"891\" src=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/EN_Co-Funded_by_the_EU_POS.png\" 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\/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-3a41023 elementor-reverse-mobile elementor-section-full_width elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"3a41023\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-4331f4a\" data-id=\"4331f4a\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-inner-section elementor-element elementor-element-73fd0bd elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"73fd0bd\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-826bce0\" data-id=\"826bce0\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-25ec3ae elementor-widget__width-auto elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"25ec3ae\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\"><a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/our-programs\/security-academies\">Security Academies Program<\/a><\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-inner-column elementor-element elementor-element-afcc3fc\" data-id=\"afcc3fc\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-f07532d elementor-widget__width-auto elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading\" data-id=\"f07532d\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"heading.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default\"><a href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/en\/our-programs\/security-academies\/e-learnings\/\">E-learnings<\/a><\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-50 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-585281f\" data-id=\"585281f\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\" data-settings=\"{&quot;background_background&quot;:&quot;classic&quot;}\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Security Academies Program E-learnings DISINFORMATION RESILIENCE DIALOGUE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE E-LEARNING Introduction European Values Centre for Security Policy organized Disinformation Resilience Dialogue: Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe project supported by Erasmus+ EU&#8217;s programme to create e-learning for youth under 30 years focused on media literacy and disinformation resilience. The [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":15647,"parent":27686,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-30046","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.9 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>E-learning - &quot;Disinformation Resilience Dialogue: Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe&quot; - European Values Center for Security Policy<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/europeanvalues.cz\/cs\/our-programs\/security-academies\/e-learnings\/e-learning-disinformation-resilience-dialogue-lessons-learned-from-central-and-eastern-europe\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"cs_CZ\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"E-learning - &quot;Disinformation Resilience Dialogue: Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe&quot; - European Values Center for Security Policy\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Security Academies Program E-learnings DISINFORMATION RESILIENCE DIALOGUE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE E-LEARNING Introduction European Values Centre for Security Policy organized Disinformation Resilience Dialogue: Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe project supported by Erasmus+ EU&#8217;s programme to create e-learning for youth under 30 years focused on media literacy and disinformation resilience. 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